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Abstract 
This dissertation explores the ways in which sovereignty and nationalism are 
expressed within four small island nations of Oceania. These four nations represent 
significant variation in the level of sovereignty and types of nationalism. Hawaiʻi, though the 
largest of the four, remains a part of the United States following the overthrow of the 
Kingdom of Hawaiʻi. An active nationalist movement continues to fight for the end of U.S. 
occupation. Fiji, whilst legally fully independent, has seen considerable nationalist activity 
including four coups. Niue and the Cook Islands are in free association with New Zealand. 
Though independent nations, they have elected to outsource several government functions 
including foreign affairs and defence to New Zealand. They also maintain a close 
relationship wherein Niueans and Cook Islanders hold New Zealand citizenship. This 
unusual relationship tests the bounds of typical models of sovereignty and nationalism. 
Despite their small size, nationalism is present in all four nations.  
Contrary to expectations given the contested status of the three nations and the 
ethnonationalist struggles Fiji has faced, the fiery and intense version of nationalism known 
as hot nationalism is mostly historical for these nations. Rather, we see nationalism expressed 
through taken for granted components of daily life. This phenomenon known as everyday or 
banal nationalism can be seen across areas that would not typically be considered as 
nationalist such as food, music, language and sport. Even extremely banal areas such as road 
naming, airport organisation, and mailing procedures, can serve to remind people of their 
place in the nation and create or reinforce a national identity.  
Sovereignty has been the focus for activists across many modern movements. Though 
traditionally nationalists have often utilised folk definitions of sovereignty, international law 
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and the legal definitions of sovereignty have become paramount to many modern 
movements. Nationalists are increasingly using legal theory and academia as tools to gain 
legitimacy and support for their causes. How nationalism and sovereignty are expressed and 
contested have changed considerably over the past few decades necessitating the fresh look 
at nationalism in small island states provided by this study.  
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
This dissertation looks at the variety of ways in which nationalism is expressed in 
four small island nations of Oceania1. It explores this issue across a range of 
independence and sovereignty statuses, from legally fully independent Fiji to Hawaii’s2 
ongoing occupation and status as a US state. Niue and the Cook Islands’ statuses are 
                                                 
1 Oceania has been defined in a variety of ways. This dissertation uses a definition that is common 
in the region where it includes all of the islands of Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia except New 
Guinea. Australia is not typically included in this definition, though it is within the geopolitical definition 
of Oceania. New Zealand can, depending upon the model employed, be considered to be part of Polynesia 
or Australasia. For comparative utility, New Zealand is often excluded from regional definitions and in this 
dissertation is not presented as part of Oceania.  
 
2 This dissertation uses the spelling Hawaiʻi (with the ʻokina) rather than Hawaii. This form best 
represents modern Hawaiian orthography and is the form favoured by the National and State Parks services 
and the University of Hawaiʻi. Hawaii is used when referring specifically to the State of Hawaii 
government, as the official state name does not include the ʻokina. The ʻokina is not included in the word 
Hawaiian, nor in the possessive form (Hawaii's), as they are using English word endings, causing them to 
be considered non-Hawaiian words. 
 The term Hawaiian, when referring to people, is used here as a synonym for Native Hawaiian to 
describe peoples who consider their ancestry to trace back to the original Polynesian settlers of Hawaiʻi. A 
partial exception to this is when referring to the Hawaiian sovereignty movement. Most groups within the 
movement do not consider it to be a racial issue, but rather one affecting all people of Hawai'i. Though 
there is frequently an implied racial element in the Hawaiian sovereignty movement, the usage of 
“Hawaiian” here should not be considered an indicator that a group or the movement as a whole considered 
themselves to solely represent native peoples. 
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ambiguously positioned somewhere in between. These nations provide for an ideal 
exploration of the ways in which nationalism can be manifested in ways that are different 
from that which is typically studied. Though all four nations have experienced colonial 
domination in some form, their colonial experience is dramatically different from that of 
most other former colonies, resulting in very different approaches to sovereignty and 
nationalism. These nations are also much smaller than typically studied in nationalism 
research and in contrast to many other postcolonial states’ versions of nationalism, none 
of these nations has had significant violent or armed nationalistic movements.3  
 The way in which a nation gained its independence (or failed to gain 
independence) and its current expression of sovereignty appear to be the most significant 
factor in the ways in which nationalism can be observed. The Cook Islands and Niue 
have full legal independence and sovereignty, though they have entered into a compact of 
free association under which many of the rights of a sovereign state have been 
surrendered to New Zealand, their former colonial power. Fiji remains a largely 
independent state since its release from colonialism in 1970, but still frequently feels 
pressures from the more powerful countries of the region, namely Australia and New 
Zealand. Fiji also faces a complex postcolonial legacy of ethnic division and political 
instability. Following the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 by the U.S., 
Hawaiʻi has remained under the control of the United States. Though generally accepted 
as a state of the United States of America, many advocates of the sovereignty movement 
                                                 
3 Whilst Fiji has experienced four coups since independence, and Hawaiʻi has had some historical 
armed skirmishes (discussed in greater detail in the chapter on hot nationalism), actual violence was fairly 
minimal, especially when compared with movements in other nations.  
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argue that Hawaiʻi is an independent nation under U.S. occupation. These varying levels 
of independence and sovereignty have dramatic effects upon the character of these 
nations. 
 Nationalism, in its most visible fiery form, appears to be displayed most strongly 
in Fiji and Hawaiʻi, whilst outward displays of this type of nationalism are relatively rare 
in the Cook Islands and Niue. Banal or everyday nationalism, however, seems ever-
present in all four nations. In contrast to the extreme form of nationalism known as hot 
nationalism, everyday nationalism represents the taken-for-granted ways in which 
nationalism is integrated into our daily lives. In both Hawaiʻi and Fiji, the nations can be 
considered under threat, with a resulting need for building a national identity in response. 
In the case of Hawaii, the threat to the nation is in the form of continued U.S. occupation. 
For Fiji, it is a combination of a threat from internal division and outside interference 
from neighbouring countries. Fiji has had a particularly turbulent history with four coups 
since independence in 1970. Since the 2006 coup, the government has oriented itself 
towards building a unified Fiji free of outside influence. In both cases, traditional 
nationalism is often internally divisive, and its reception mixed and thus whilst present, it 
has proved problematic for these nations. 
 Along with the backdrop of very active traditionally nationalistic displays are the 
under-considered presentations of everyday nationalism that appear in many ways to be 
more effective at defining that nation. Niue and the Cook Islands seem largely content 
with their political and legal statuses. Although there are occasional stirrings for change, 
there has been a considerable evolution in their statuses since the free association 
agreement with New Zealand was signed allowing their sovereignty to grow within the 
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framework of the agreement. Ending the compact with New Zealand in favour of full 
independence has often been a reoccurring issue for a handful of Cook Island politicians 
but has never gained much traction amongst the general voting public. In Niue 
reabsorption into New Zealand has been proposed a few times, such as following a 
devastating hurricane, but likewise fails to gain real support. Given the lack of any 
significant movement toward full independence, there appear to be only minimal attempts 
to make use of traditional nationalistic displays in the islands. Banal nationalism, on the 
other hand, is in heavy use in these nations. In Fiji and Hawaiʻi, similar displays of 
everyday nationalism are paired with often poorly received traditional hot nationalistic 
symbols and displays. 
Though reasonably stable democracies at present, three of the four nations have 
had meaningful political turmoil in their recent pasts. Fiji has had four coups in a handful 
of decades. The Cook Islands saw a sitting prime minister removed by the courts for 
election irregularities and also experienced a recent coup attempt. Hawaiʻi has a very 
active sovereignty movement, whose supporters consider Hawaiʻi to be under foreign 
occupation since the forceful overtaking of the country 124 years ago. Niue, though on 
the whole politically stable, is currently facing rapid depopulation and an increasingly 
overextended government, which now employs nearly the entire labour force. Many of 
these concerns, however, are kept out of the world's attention because of these nations' 
dependence on foreign tourism.  Foreign tourism is often harmed by impressions of 
political upheaval or other imagery that hurts the impression of the islands as a 
“paradise”.  
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The four nations of this paper were selected because they represent atypical 
versions of the nation. Niue is one of the smallest countries in the world and has an 
unusual legal status. The Cook Islands is also extremely small and shares the legal status 
of Niue. Fiji whilst larger than its neighbours is still a small nation by global standards. It 
has also been one of the most politically turbulent countries in the region, as well as the 
most developed independent state. Hawaiʻi is interesting, as it is one of the most racially 
diverse places in the world and features an exceptionally low-key, but highly active, 
sovereignty movement.  
1.1 Purpose 
This dissertation aims to expand our understanding of the relationship between 
banal nationalism and sovereignty within small states. Nationalism, contrary to 
assumptions, is very present even amongst the smallest of nations. Though it may be less 
visible than in nations undergoing major political upheaval (a favourite for traditional 
nationalism studies), or the long-established large western nation (the recent area of 
interest in the field), it seems to be a critically important feature of the nation. Everyday 
nationalism can be argued to be a powerful, but under-explored tool in the battle towards 
independence and sovereignty.  
The typical context for everyday nationalism research has been urban 
environments within large well-established nations. There has been a severe lack of 
research within small nations and particularly, small island nations. Similarly, most of the 
studies have focused on nations with traditional governance models and well-recognised 
sovereignty. By exploring nationalism in understudied environments with less typical 
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legal statuses, we can see how well the theories of nationalism hold up under more 
diverse examples. 
In Hawaiʻi, armed movements against U.S. occupation are both politically 
unworkable and practically impossible, given the clear superiority of military resources 
of the U.S. government. Likewise, the promotion of traditional pro-sovereignty 
nationalism through the use of the sovereignty flag and protests are met with general 
disdain or disinterest from the public. In contrast, tools of everyday nationalism such as 
food, language, sports and music have done more to bring the idea of a sovereign 
Hawaiian nation into the public’s mind, and with it, acceptance of a theoretically 
sovereign Hawaiʻi, than traditional nationalism could ever do.  
In Niue and the Cook Islands, everyday nationalism is effectively establishing 
stronger sentiments of independence and full sovereignty than political movements have 
been able to. In many ways, their arrangements of free association are so beneficial to the 
islands that eliminating them is unlikely ever to gain meaningful public support. 
Nevertheless, like most peoples globally, they feel the universal calls for sovereignty and 
independence. Again, banal nationalism seems to fill a gap that would otherwise be 
highly problematic.  
Fiji has seen conscious efforts by the government to shape everyday nationalism 
in ways that fit its model of a unified, independent country. Fiji’s political climate, in the 
face of ethnic and religious division, is such that most outwardly nationalistic attempts 
are poorly received by large sectors of the nation, given their traditional relationship to 
ethnic division. Everyday nationalism allows the government of Fiji to establish a unified 
national identity in a way that is not harmful to the nation.  
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Everyday nationalism has played a clear, but somewhat unique, role in each 
nation’s pathway to independence and its postcolonial aftermath. Strangely, though, 
given this role, there has not yet been much academic attention paid to its effects. This 
dissertation seeks to provide a starting point to this apparent gap in the nationalism and 
sovereignty literature.   
 I will also explore how nationalism can function within very small nations. 
Benedict Anderson famously defined a nation as an imagined community. The nation is 
imagined “because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion”.4 Owing to Niue’s small geographic size and tiny population, 
it is not only possible, but reasonable for members of the Niuean nation to know, or at 
least know of, effectively all of their fellow members. The Cook Islands, though larger, is 
still small enough that many of its members will have some connection beyond that of the 
imagined community. In the larger nations of Fiji and Hawaii, knowing large percentages 
of their fellow members is not practical. However, attempts at finding non-nation 
connections between people are deeply ingrained in the local culture. Family ties (which 
are themselves often imagined) are a key element of South Pacific cultures, but their 
effects on nationalism have been underexplored.  Despite their comparatively larger 
sizes, Fiji and Hawaii too remain dwarfed by most other nations, particularly those 
Anderson was writing about. This dissertation will argue that nationalism is still possible 
                                                 
4 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(New York City: Verso, 2006), 6. 
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and present in nations significantly below the size generally considered, but that this 
nationalism may take a somewhat different form, particularly manifesting as banal 
nationalism. 
1.2 Conceptual Framework 
1.2.1 The Nation 
 The concept of “nation” has proved to be quite tricky to define precisely. 
Definitions often suggest that a nation is a group of people with common characteristics, 
such as language, ethnicity, history and/or religion. Will Kymlicka, for example, 
proposes that “'nation' means a historical community, more or less institutionally 
complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and 
culture”.5 Otto Bauer and others have chosen to focus more upon the commonality of 
national character, noting that the people of a nation are “united by a common fate … 
[which] is primarily a common history; the common national character involves almost 
necessarily a uniformity of language”.6 These definitions seem, though, to overemphasise 
actual commonalities, ignoring the flexibility that is exercised by nations in defining 
themselves. 
 Whilst there is a great diversity in ways of defining the nation, Benedict 
Anderson’s definition of the nation as an imagined political community seems most 
                                                 
5 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Wotton-under-
Edge, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995), 11. 
6 John Hoffman and Paul Graham, Introduction to Political Theory (Harlow, UK: Pearson 
Longman, 2006), 260. 
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useful for this dissertation. His 1983 work Imagined Communities has become one of the 
most frequently cited works on nationalism. However, within the study of nationalism, it 
is generally only a small portion of his first chapter that is utilised, with frequent 
disagreement over the applicability of the remaining chapters. In this first chapter, he 
proposes that a nation is “an imagined political community” which is “imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign”.7 He argues that nations are imagined in the sense that, 
in even the smallest nation, the members will “never know most of their fellow members, 
meet them, or even hear of them”; however, they hold an “image of their communion”.8 
Despite an absence of actual bonds, members consider themselves connected through the 
bonds of their shared nation.9 There is a general shared affinity for each other, even when 
commonalities beyond nationality do not exist.  
 Nations are generally defined as limited, in that they have physical, finite 
boundaries.10 A nation cannot usefully include all peoples of the world, nor do nations 
imagine themselves as doing so. The boundaries of the nation are supposedly finite, and 
other similarly bounded nations are seen as existing beyond the boundaries of each 
nation. 
Sovereignty is also presented as a requirement for defining a nation. The nation 
must imagine itself as sovereign in order to exist. Nations do not need to actually be able 
                                                 
7 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6. 
8 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1-9. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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to express sovereignty, but rather "nations dream of being free”.11 Thus, a nation can 
exist as an imagined community, even when its members lack sovereignty, so long as 
they share in the belief that their community “should” be sovereign. Finally, the nation is 
a community in that “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail 
in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”.12 A member 
of the nation is presented as having a meaningful connection to fellow members, even 
when this connection might not exist in any practical form. 
 Anderson’s definition of a nation, whilst generally very useful, is somewhat 
problematic when looking at the nations in this paper. He suggests that it is not possible 
for all members of a nation to interact with or even know of each other. This 
impossibility of non-imagined bonds creates the need for the nation to establish a shared 
affinity. Without the nation, the peoples of that space would otherwise not generally be 
able to hold an “image of their communion” with their fellow members. 
 When looking at a nation such as Niue with a population around 2,000, the notion 
that it is not possible to interact with all fellow members of a nation no longer holds true. 
With only one primary and secondary school, one supermarket, a single hospital and only 
a handful of restaurants in the 260-square-kilometre island, the idea that any person living 
in the nation would be a complete stranger is highly unlikely. Any two members of the 
Niuean nation are likely to have been born at the same hospital, gone to the same school, 
attended the same church, and shared a host of social events. Should the person somehow 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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have avoided having a personal connection with another member of the nation, it is a 
virtual certainty that a close relation of the person would. Even in the somewhat larger 
Cook Islands, the population of around 10,000 suggests that whilst close bonds with all 
fellow members are probably not possible, most people will have more connections than 
just the imagined bonds of nationhood. Although it is statistically impossible to calculate 
with any real accuracy how many people someone will meet in a lifetime, many rough 
estimates describe numbers as high as 100,000 people.13 This suggests, then, a possibility 
of actually meeting around ten per cent of the population of even the larger nations of Fiji 
and Hawaiʻi. When we start to consider connections beyond just direct contact, such as 
the connections of family and friends, it remains plausible that some sort of connection 
other than nationality can be found amongst most members of a nation. This dissertation 
will show that Anderson's apparent requirement of a large population is not necessary for 
the development of nationalism and that the bonds of the nation can continue to exist 
despite lacking the need for the imagined bonds of nationhood which a larger nation 
would require. 
 Anderson’s definition of the nation still remains useful in this dissertation. 
However, as noted above, it is necessary to redefine somewhat the “imagined” 
component of the nation. Whilst Anderson sees the imaginedness to be required as a 
                                                 
13 These estimates are typically based upon a thought experiment by travel writer William Least Heat 
Moon and are generated by multiplying the number of people a person will meet daily by average life 
expectancy (currently 71.0). The estimate of 100,000 people is reached by assuming a person will meet an 
average of four new people a day. Though this number will clearly vary based upon a variety of social and 
geographic factors and how “meet” is defined, it seems accurate to believe that most people will meet 
extremely large numbers of people in their lifetime.   
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replacement for other bonds, it appears that the “image of their communion” as a nation 
is still present even when other bonds exist amongst the members of the nation. These 
feelings of being connected by nationhood do not seem to be any stronger or weaker as a 
result of other bonds, but rather exist as an altogether different type of connection. 
Further, small nations still exist within a world of other nations. Even if the imagined 
community is unnecessary to connect a small nation together, its people are still going to 
be continuously exposed to others within the imagined communities of foreign nations. 
Given how deeply embedded the nation is within our daily lives, exposure to the idea of 
nationhood is unavoidable, and it is unsurprising that people within nations wherein the 
imagined component of nationhood may be unnecessary would  still find themselves 
utilising it. 
 In recognition of the role of self-determination, the term nation in this dissertation 
is used to refer to any set of peoples that defines themselves as a nation, whilst still 
observing the other components of Anderson’s definition (“limited and sovereign” with 
at least a “dream” of sovereignty). 
1.2.2 The Nation-State 
 Though nation is often used as a synonym for state or country, they are not the 
same. Nations in Anderson’s argument are closely related, but not necessarily the same as 
the states within which they exist. Nation-states exist when there is a convergence 
between the sovereign geopolitical entity which is the state and the cultural entity which 
is the nation.14 Nation-states “come in all shapes and sizes”. There is a common 
                                                 
14 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1-9. 
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assumption that nations are built upon objective variables such as language, religion or 
geography, on which the boundaries of the state can be established. Despite this 
assumption, no nations fully meet this standard. 
 Of the four nations this dissertation explores, none can be considered to be 
entirely nation-states. The Cook Islands and Niue, though having no trouble meeting 
general definitions of a nation, have unclear political sovereignty. Fiji, in contrast, whilst 
clearly politically sovereign, does not have the unity or homogeneity to be 
unambiguously a nation. Hawaiʻi fails both parts. Its political sovereignty is 
unrecognised, and it lacks the cultural or social cohesiveness to form a nation (at least 
one that corresponds to its geopolitical bounds). 
1.2.3 Nationalism 
 Nationalism, in the popular imagination, is most commonly associated with a 
fight for independence or extreme right-wing politics. It is also generally envisioned as 
something that occurs elsewhere, with established nations seen as not having nationalism. 
Though this is clearly not the case, instances of nationalism in established nations are 
often presented as being an exception or a fringe movement, so as to allow the 
mainstream society to maintain the illusion that they are not a part of the nationalism that 
they fear. Nationalism is perceived as a dangerous or exotic force, being the result of 
“overheated reaction”. For established nations, nationalism is presented as a function of 
the periphery; it is a tool of separatists and other extremists, not a part of normal activity. 
Michael Billig challenges this notion. He argues that, rather than an exotic part of the 
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periphery, nationalism is deeply embedded in the normal activity of the nation.15 The 
nation is continuously reproduced throughout its daily life.16 The term “banal 
nationalism” is proposed to cover the ways in which these established nations' habits 
serve to reproduce the nation.17 Within established nations, there is a continual “flagging” 
or reminding of nationhood.18 This nationhood provides “a continual background for … 
political discourses, for cultural products, and even for the structuring of newspapers”.19 
In small, often subtle, ways the people of the nation are reminded of their place in a 
“world of nations”.20 This reminding, however, is so commonplace and constant that it is 
not generally consciously recognised. 
  It is commonly assumed that, within the daily life of most established nations, the 
nation’s identity emerged essentially spontaneously and organically based on a shared 
sense of the nation’s values. Billig strongly rejects this idea of a natural national identity. 
Instead, he suggests that the establishment of the nation, particularly the violence of the 
nation's establishment, is forgotten and the continuing of the national identity comes 
through largely unconscious reminders. Billig uses the concept of the waved and 
unwaved flag to illustrate this. The flag is said within nationalist thought to represent “the 
sacred character of the nation”. The flag is “revered by loyal citizens and ritually defiled 
                                                 
15 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Ltd, 1995), 1-13. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid, 37-59. 
18 Ibid, 8. 
19 Ibid, 1-13. 
20 Ibid. 
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by those who wish to make a protest”.21 Despite this symbolism, however, the vast 
majority of the times in which citizens see their national flag, it is not conveying a 
particular message.22 Though there are instances in which it will be “consciously waved 
and saluted”, most times in which the flag is viewed it will be “unwaved and 
unsaluted”.23 It will be passed by without conscious analysis of the symbolism. It is a part 
of the landscape of government buildings, patches on uniforms, and other unnoticed uses. 
Though serving as seemingly mindless symbols, flags do perform a function. They 
provide a daily reminder of nationhood. Other symbols such as money and postage 
provide a similar function. 
 Billig also challenges the notion that nationalism is an inherently harmful force, 
as well as the notion that it must ultimately be associated with violence.24 He does note, 
however, that banal nationalism should not be assumed to be harmless, as it provides a 
way of priming populations for nationalistic clashes.25 
 Billig uses the term “hot nationalism”26 to distinguish banal nationalism from the 
form of nationalism that is routinely discussed. Hot nationalism is the “force which 
creates nation-states or threatens the stability of existing states”.27 He suggests it is found 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid, 39. 
23 Ibid, 40. 
24 Ibid, 13-36. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Prior to Billig, “hot nationalism” seems to be used primarily as a literary device to emphasise an 
intensity of nationalism (i.e. “red-hot nationalism”), rather than to denote a type of activity.  
27 Billig, Banal Nationalism, 43. 
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in a time of exception when there is “social disruption” and struggle. Hot nationalism is 
generally assumed to eventually fade away after the new nation is established. Though 
many other authors present this fade-away as having nothing replacing it, Billig sees 
banal nationalism as often the ultimate result. 
 Although his work is extremely useful, Billig assumes that there is a necessary 
difference between nationalism in established nations and nationalism in nations fighting 
for recognition. This assumption seems problematic, as it presupposes that all facets of a 
nation's struggle will be hot nationalism. Though in young or especially violent struggles 
this might be the case, many instances reveal banal reproductions of the struggling nation 
rather than violent expressions of nationalism. Across the world, as many independence 
movements are now decades old, earlier symbols of hot nationalism have become 
uncontroversial and unnoticed. In Hawaiʻi, the struggle for sovereignty has been going on 
since shortly after the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi in 1893. Though there have 
been isolated flare-ups, there does not appear to be a meaningful continuation of hot 
nationalism in the form that Billig describes. Whilst the notion is not incompatible with 
his work, he seems to largely ignore the possibility that banal nationalism is a 
replacement for hot nationalism in long-running sovereignty struggles, not just in cases 
where the sovereignty struggle has succeeded in producing a new state. 
 Jones and Merriman argue that Billig's separation of banal and hot nationalism 
may not adequately describe the way in which nationalism is commonly expressed. They 
note that banal nationalism can often be examples of hot nationalism expressed through 
17 
 
the everyday.28 Hot nationalist movements will often focus their energies around banal 
topics because engaging in aggressively nationalistic campaigns would likely cause the 
marginalisation of their movement.29 Using the example of bilingual road signs in Wales, 
they show how this banal symbol became a rallying point for Welsh hot nationalism.30 
English-only road signs were described by the movement as “symbols of oppression” and 
were defaced and destroyed by nationalist activists.31  Even within the debate over 
bilingual road signs, though their symbolic value was of great importance to the parties, 
much of the debate was framed around banal issues such as typefaces, colour and their 
effects on road safety.32  
 Rhys Jones and Peter Merriman advocate “a focus on the everyday contexts 
within which nationalism is reproduced” rather than treating banal nationalism as a 
“categorically different form of nationalism from ‘hotter’ varieties”.33 Billig does note 
that banal nationalism can be used to prepare a country for hot nationalism and should 
not be seen as discrete categories of nationalism. This common oversimplification of 
Billig’s argument has led, unfortunately, to the majority of work on banal nationalism 
focusing solely on everyday and mundane expressions. It often ignores the hot 
                                                 
28 Rhys Jones and Peter Merriman, “Hot, Banal and Everyday Nationalism: Bilingual Road Signs in 
Wales,” Political Geography 28, no. 3 (March 2009): 164–173, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2009.03.002. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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nationalism underlying the expression.34 Though Billig suggests a fluidity to the 
everyday, this fluidity seems largely ignored.35 
 Jones and Merriman advocate the use of the term “everyday” in the place of 
“banal”, as everyday “in addition to being a place of banal and mundane processes, may 
also incorporate a variety of hotter differences and conflicts that affect people's lives on a 
habitual basis”.36 This sort of everyday nationalism seems to be common in Hawai‘i. 
Given the predictable lack of success hot nationalism has in Hawai‘i, many of the targets 
of Hawaiian nationalism have been banal areas of life, particularly in issues relating to 
the Hawaiian language. For example, activists were successful in gaining the passage of a 
Honolulu City law requiring that many streets be given Hawaiian names. 
 In a proposal similar to Billig's, Brian McVeigh suggests a dichotomy of “hard” 
and “soft” nationalism in looking at Japan.37 In this model, strongly nationalist instances 
such as “politicians in denial about Japan's wartime atrocities, right-wing organizations, 
and official visitors to Yasukuni Shrine” are contrasted with the “taken-for-granted 
notions about the national state and its political and economic machinery”.38 Soft 
nationalism forms the “hegemonic practices embedded in the education system, in state 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Brian J. McVeigh, “Postwar Japan’s ‘Hard’ and ‘Soft Nationalism,’” JPRI Working Paper 73 
(January 2001), http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp73.html. 
38 Ibid. 
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ideology, and in culture and social life”.39 Like Billig, McVeigh rejects the notion that 
nationalism is found only in “other” countries as part of violent conflict.40 McVeigh, 
however, also shows that hard nationalism can be found in a nonviolent form in a more 
developed country. This soft form of nationalism can be argued to be more dangerous 
and pervasive than hard nationalism.41 
 McVeigh's case study of Japan describes four general types of soft nationalism: 
economic, educational, cultural, and peace nationalism. Economic, educational and 
cultural nationalism seem applicable to most nations. However, his form of peace 
nationalism is so closely tied to Japan's post-war history that it has almost no 
generalisability. 
 Economic nationalism exists where there is a strong preference for domestically 
produced goods and is generally supported by quotas and tariffs. In Japan, it is 
manifested as a widespread concern about the safety and suitability of imported foods.42 
“Buy local” campaigns or import substitution industrialisation programmes appear to be 
the most common way in which this form of economic nationalism is supported.43 The 
replacement of foreign imports with domestic products is encouraged.44 This type of 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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nationalism is one of the most significant current focuses of the governments in this 
paper. 
 Educational nationalism is displayed in the ways by which their school systems 
reproduce and support national values.45 It provides a way for nationalism to spread 
beyond state structures and into everyday life with long-lasting effects.46 Especially in 
Hawai‘i and Fiji, educational nationalism is prevalent. The educational system has been a 
prime battleground in these nations for nationalist and counter-nationalist movements. 
 Cultural nationalism can be seen in the notion that a nation possesses cultural 
uniqueness and that this “unique” culture is a defining feature of the nation.47 Cultural 
features, including material culture and vague cultural ideology, are presented as being 
responsible for establishing the nation in a special cultural space.48 In doing so, the 
boundaries between the nation-state and other nation-states are reinforced.49 This form of 
nationalism can be harmful to the stability of the state because it can “bolster ethnic 
exclusivism, heightened ethnocultural self-consciousness, [and] racialised notions of 
identity” through explanations of supposed uniqueness and presentation as a cultural 
function.50 This style of nationalism can be seen frequently in Hawai‘i and Fiji. Each 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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nation's uniqueness is useful both for typical nationalist functions and for tourism 
purposes. 
1.2.4 Patriotism and Nationalism 
  It is often argued that patriotism and nationalism should be considered as distinct 
concepts. Alter suggests that patriotism should be seen as a "love of one's homeland", 
whereas nationalism is a new, more nefarious, force. Patriotism and nationalism have 
also been presented as both being along the same continuum with intensity serving as a 
key distinguishing factor. Patriotism is an affection for one's country, whereas 
nationalism introduces a xenophobic and aggressive hatred of others. The primordial 
versus modern debate on nationalism is often indirectly invoked by authors like Peter 
Alter. They suggest that patriotism is the older concept, representing the attachment to 
the homeland, whereas nationalism is newer and built around the rise of nation-states.51 
Others such as Charles Taylor have argued that the difference between the two is that 
nationalism focuses upon “ethnic, linguistic, cultural or religious identity”, whereas 
patriotism is about identification with a territory.52 
 Some have cynically decried the difference between the two as patriotism is what 
we have; nationalism is what they have. Steven Grosby’s work can be seen as an example 
of this application.53 This form presents a value-laden version of nationalism as violent 
                                                 
51 Peter Alter, Nationalism (St. Louis: San Val Inc, 1994), 6. 
52 Charles Taylor, Dilemmas and Connections: Selected Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2011), 91. 
53 Steven Grosby, Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction (OUP Oxford, 2005), 16. 
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and built around difference, whereas patriotism is the positive loyalty to a territorial 
community. This definition is problematic both in its blatant bias and in its analytical 
uselessness. Even history's most horrific nationalistic expressions have been exercised by 
people who claim they are acting out of a love for their country rather than a hatred of 
others. 
 Though attempts at defining the difference between nationalism and patriotism 
are often unsatisfactory, there does appear to be a useful, though perhaps blurry, 
distinction. Many of the definitions frame patriotism in terms of attitude, whereas 
nationalism is framed in terms of action and consequences. This distinction may prove 
useful in exploring the apparently contradictory situation in Hawaiʻi, where patriotism 
(toward the U.S.) and support for Hawaiian nationalism do not appear to be mutually 
exclusive. A distinction between the two concepts also seems appropriate for explaining 
the divide between the love for one's country and the minimal representations of 
nationalism in Niue and, to a lesser extent, in the Cook Islands. 
1.3 Methodology 
 Everyday nationalism produces a number of unique methodological challenges. 
By its very nature, most of its expressions are relatively unconscious and rarely self-
examined. It can be challenging to study because most inhabitants are unaware of how 
nationalism operates or affects their lives. I have adopted a multimethod approach in 
order to capture the effects of nationalism from several perspectives.  
I spent nine weeks conducting fieldwork over the summer of 2013. My time was 
split, with approximately two weeks in Niue; two weeks in Suva, Fiji; one week in Coral 
Coast, Fiji; one week in Aitutaki, Cook Islands; and two weeks in Rarotonga, Cook 
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Islands. I grew up on the island of Hawaiʻi (the Big Island) and have also lived on the 
islands of Molokai and Oahu for several years. As a young teenager, I lived in Fiji as 
well. Data for Hawaiʻi are built upon both my experiences living in Hawaiʻi and more 
systematic study across the past few years.  
For this dissertation, I interviewed a number of government officials in each 
nation. Their official roles involve them in developing areas of everyday nationalism, 
including health/nutrition, cultural promotion, tourism marketing, and foreign trade. 
These semi-structured interviews provide insight into how everyday nationalism can 
develop within official contexts, even when the official may not be fully aware of this 
effect. These interviews were supplemented by mostly unstructured interviews with 
chefs, hotel owners and others working in hospitality, as well as those working in 
education, to see how they saw national identity presented in practice.    
Interviews were primarily exploratory.   As nationalism can be a fairly sensitive 
topic for many, questions were relatively broad and focused primarily on expressions of 
everyday nationalism. Given that sampling for this project was not representative, the 
interviews were mainly used to identify areas on which I should focus, to find general 
trends, and for information about specific topics, rather than to measure levels or types of 
nationalism. The interviews were conducted at the place of the interviewee’s choosing. 
Most were done at their place of work or a nearby café. Approximately 50 people were 
interviewed. 
I also observed shoppers in grocery stores and markets, as well as attendees at 
sporting events and festivals across the research sites, to see how items of interest 
(signage, product marketing, etc.) were presented and how they were received.  Though 
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opportunities were limited, I sought out and observed displays of hot nationalism in Fiji 
and Hawaiʻi, including protests and presentations by sovereignty activists in Hawaiʻi.    
I observed how local culture and history were presented to tourists (and, 
secondarily, to locals) at museums, visitor centres, and exhibits at historical or culturally 
significant sites. When possible, I also interviewed those responsible for creating these 
presentations to learn more about their motivations in each particular presentation.   
This dissertation is also built upon research conducted for my MA thesis. I spent 
seven weeks in Fiji over the summer of 2009 at three sites split between the cities of 
Lautoka and Suva and villages on Koro Island. I observed customers in grocery stores, 
eateries and hotel restaurants. I also conducted semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews with approximately thirty people. These interviews focused on a range of 
topics relating to nationalism and national identity. Because of the political situation at 
the time (the constitution had recently been dissolved, and several academics had been 
recently deported), questions that were directly nationalistic were avoided to focus 
primarily upon everyday nationalism.    
Primary sources were used heavily to inform this dissertation. I collected a 
significant number of publications by government agencies (particularly by the Ministry 
of Health/Health Department in each nation); tourist promotional materials; cookbooks; 
and general audience publications that expressed everyday nationalism, both during my 
fieldwork and archivally at libraries in Rarotonga, Suva, Honolulu and Auckland. These 
sources were supplemented by an analysis of approximately twenty issues of each 
nation’s newspapers for references to both hot and everyday nationalism.  
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In selecting nations for this project, I sought places that had unusual legal statuses 
or other aspects that were atypical within nationalism studies. Niue and the Cook Islands 
were selected because of  their small size and highly unusual legal statuses. As two of 
only five states in the World with a free association agreement, they provide a previously 
unexplored position within nationalism research. The Marshall Islands, Federated States 
of Micronesia and Palau (associated with the United States under a Compact of Free 
Association) were also considered. However, these states, whilst undoubtedly likely to 
produce valuable data, have concerns so profoundly interwoven with climate change, the 
fulfilment of the Compact, and broader American nationalism that executing this project 
would be challenging and would reduce generalisability. Tokelau (a dependent territory 
of New Zealand), Rapa Nui (a special territory of Chile) and New Caledonia (a special 
collectivity of France) were also considered, but were eliminated for logistical reasons. 
Fiji was selected as it has had very active ethnonationalist and civic-nationalist 
movements in recent years, resulting in four coups. The low level of violence within the 
coups and the ways in which the nationalist message is accepted is unusual. Despite 
relatively fiery nationalist messaging (now mostly historical), popular support for 
nationalist movements have been muted. I choose to look at Hawaiʻi, as it provides one 
of the few examples in the region of nations that have sought sovereignty  but have been 
unable to achieve it. Across nations with contested sovereignty, it is also interesting to 
study because widespread support for independence and a lack of counter-sovereignty 
activism exist without a viable path to sovereignty. Like Fiji, Hawaiʻi has also seen a 
reasonable amount written about nationalism in the islands, but virtually nothing looking 
at the role of everyday nationalism.   
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1.4 Significance of the Study  
 This dissertation is one of the only works on everyday nationalism in these 
nations. It provides a look at a previously unstudied area, testing several assumptions of 
nationalism research. It also aims to expand our understanding of the various ways in 
which nationalism can function in small nations in general. This dissertation pushes the 
limits of where nationalism has been previously thought to function by looking at 
extremely small nations.  
1.5 Limitations of the Study  
 The most significant limitation is the result of it being a comparative overview of 
nationalism in these nations. Time and space limitations necessitated only relatively brief 
coverage of many topics. Unfortunately, many of these have not been meaningfully 
studied previously. Consequently, there is a multitude of further research that could and 
should be conducted to explore these topics in further detail.      
 It also becomes apparent in several sections of this dissertation that there is an 
imbalance in nationalistic activity amongst the nations. Whilst in some cases this could 
be interpreted as a lack of nationalistic feeling, it remains impossible to separate from 
functional resources limitation issues relating to their small sizes. In a small nation, there 
are very real practical limitations to any person’s ability to implement nationalistic 
agendas; lower priority causes will lack the dedicated supporters required to make them 
happen. In a larger nation, any idea is bound to have at least a few supporters who can to 
raise some resources to support it, by merely having a large enough population.  
 At the government level, a nationalistic agenda can be challenging to implement 
in small nations, again not necessarily because of lack of desire, but rather owing to a 
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lack of people to carry it out. Many government ministries in Niue and the Cook Islands 
are so small that they consist of only a handful of people. Even in Fiji and Hawaiʻi, 
although much larger, they will still often be short in specialised resources. Though they 
may wish to implement particular policies or practices, they often do not actually have 
the personnel to do so. In a larger nation, it might not be a problem to allocate resources 
to lower priority goals, but for a small nation, few have the personnel to spare for 
anything other than top priority items.  
Conversely, with small populations, it does not take many people to skew data 
radically.  For example, Niue alternates between having the world's highest and lowest 
traffic fatality rates:  a single fatality is measured as equivalent to the death of a tenth of a 
per cent of the nation. Similarly, the difference between the nation having an initiative or 
policy can often be a matter of only one person working it. The level of direct influence 
any member can have on his or her nation is radically magnified in these low-population 
nations.  
1.6 Organization of the Study  
 Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature on Oceania and nationalism in 
small states. Oceania remains an exceptionally poorly studied region with several of the 
countries highlighted in this dissertation being amongst the least studied. Whilst banal 
nationalism, in general, has been reasonably well explored, there remains a significant 
lack of studies in small nations.       
 The history of the four nations is explored in Chapter 3. Each of them has had a 
unique colonial and postcolonial experience that has meaningfully shaped the nations of 
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today. Information about key areas such as demographics, geography, race and land laws 
are also provided. 
The question of sovereignty and independence is presented in the fourth chapter. 
As a concept closely related to nationalism, sovereignty has been the focus for activists 
across many modern movements. Whilst historically, folk definitions of sovereignty or 
conceptions primarily defined by de facto status were typical, increasingly however many 
modern nationalist movements are extremely focused on international law and the legal 
definitions of sovereignty.   
 Chapter 5 looks at hot nationalism. Hot nationalism is the form of nationalism that 
provides the most iconic representation for the public imagination. It is the fiery and 
intense struggle. This chapter looks at the organised and semi-organised nationalist 
movements occurring within the four nations. Though none of the nations has meaningful 
traditional style hot nationalism today, each still has a noticeable version of hot 
nationalism. 
 Banal or everyday nationalism is overwhelmingly the form of nationalism that we 
see today in most nations and is explored in Chapter 6. It represents the ways in which 
the nation is presented and reproduced through everyday life. It is present in each of the 
four nations, but is relatively different across, representing the unique character of each 
nation.  
Across these chapters, it becomes clear that the four nations represent an 
expression of the nation and nationalism that differs considerably from what is often seen 
as the typical post-colonial nationalistic experience. The transition into colonialism was 
relatively smooth for each and with the exception of Hawaiʻi, they all shifted into 
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independent nations without struggle. For the three currently independent states, they 
gained their autonomy through reasoned negotiation, rather than a protracted 
independence struggle. Even for Hawaiʻi, its post-colonial experience is unusual in its 
absorption into the larger state, rather than maintaining a separate status. The four nations 
are also much smaller than typically studied, as well as being a part of a region that has 
received little scholarly attention. As such, they present an ideal set through which to 
explore nationalism in a new way. 
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Chapter 2 
2 Literature Review 
 Oceania has often been called one of the least studied regions of the world. Topics 
that are fairly common starting points for the social sciences, such as race54, language55, 
and even the basic physical environment remain vastly understudied. The smaller nations 
in the region receive virtually no academic attention, and thus, many topics in these 
nations remain completely undocumented. As such, literature is extremely scarce on most 
topics in Niue and the Cook Islands, and rather limited for Hawaiʻi and Fiji.  
In the last ten years, there have been three books (academic or popular) published 
about Niue; two histories, and a children's book.56 Over the same time period, nine books 
were published about the Cook Islands.57 These included two travel guides, a children's 
book, a history, and five special subject non-fiction works. In contrast, Fiji had over a 
hundred books published about it in 2016 across several genres; and Hawaiʻi often can 
have more than 50 books published regarding it within a month.  
Publications in academic journals have also been scarce for Niue and the Cook 
Islands. There were under a hundred journal articles published about Niue in the last ten 
                                                 
54 Sills, David L, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan 
Reference USA, 2008), 255. 
55 Karsten Schmidtke-Bode, A Typology of Purpose Clauses (Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
Publishing, 2009), 222. 
56 Based on a search of Amazon, Google Books and Wheelers Books (a New Zealand library 
supplier) 
57 Ibid.  
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years.58 The majority of these are looking at public health, economic development, 
natural sciences and migration patterns. The Cook Islands sees slightly more results, but 
still less than 250 articles published in the last ten years.59 Again, public health and the 
natural sciences dominate the topics of research. Fiji had about ten times as many articles 
published in the same period, and Hawaiʻi had over five thousand across the last ten 
years. 
2.1 Banal Nationalism 
 Though banal nationalism is a relatively young approach, it has been well 
embraced. Its flexibility allows, with minor adjustments, for it to be used to explain a 
wide range of nationalistic behaviours, including many that are subconscious. This work 
has included a variety of subjects, such as print media, sport, music, food, and several 
other less commonly explored topics of nationalist interest. 
 Often building upon Anderson’s work on print capitalism, as well as Billig’s 
examples, many writers have applied the concept of banal nationalism to the press. For 
example, Arus Yumul and Umut Özkirimli mirrored Billig in finding a number of 
nationalist positions that the Turkish media (and the consumers of these media) accept as 
natural.60 Similarly, Alex Law adapted Billig’s version of banal nationalism to look at the 
                                                 
58 Based on a search of Google Scholar, Proquest, JSTOR and MUSE for articles with Niue or Niuan 
in the title.  
59  Using the same technique as for Niuan articles.  
60 Arus Yumul and Umut Özkirimli, “Reproducing the Nation:Banal Nationalism’in the Turkish 
Press,” Media, Culture & Society 22, no. 6 (2000): 787–804. 
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media in the context of Scottish nationhood.61 Sport has also been common areas for the 
application of banal nationalism. In this context, research has been done on many nations, 
including articles looking at soccer in Cameroon62, soccer and skiing in Austria63, the 
Olympics in South Korea64 and the popular approach to sport in Nordic countries65. Food 
has likewise been increasingly gaining attention in the banal nationalism literature. As 
one of the most relatable and approachable topics, it has provided a rich area of study 
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across Japan66, Australia67, Equatorial Guinea68, the United States69, as well as several 
other large nations.  
Banal nationalism has provided a framework for many topics that would 
otherwise be disregarded despite having significant effects on nationalism. Scholars have 
looked at commonly encountered symbols of the nation in architecture70, banknotes71, 
licence plates72, and road signs73. Though there are still many areas in which the effect of 
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banal nationalism is underexplored, which invites future research, the largest gap in the 
literature, seems to be in applying banal nationalism to small nations.  
2.2 Nationalism in Small Nations 
There has been extremely little published about banal or everyday nationalism in 
small nations. Though the limited studies available do suggest that everyday nationalism 
is fully possible within small nations, there is little information available about the ways 
in which it differs from larger nations. Across the 83 nations that have populations of less 
than a million, there have only been a few dozen publications on how everyday 
nationalism operates there. Considering the wide variety of small nations, this represents 
a fairly significant and concerning gap in the literature. Furthermore, in many small 
nations, banal nationalism actually more accurately represents the displays of nationalism 
that are seen. Exhibitions of hot nationalism are much rarer yet have long been the focus 
of nationalism studies.  
2.2.1 Theories of the Nation 
 Hot nationalism, for a variety of reasons, does not seem to gain much of lasting 
foothold in small nations. Nevertheless, there is clearly the sense of nation and national 
identity in these nations which mirrors what scholars have written extensively about in 
larger nations. Everyday nationalism is often useful to explain the nationalistic situation 
in small nations where traditional approaches to nationalism are inapplicable. 
Malta represents one of the small nations where theories of hot nationalism seem 
largely inapplicable. Godfrey Baldacchino argues that, though having a common 
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language and lacking significant division, it is without a unified national identity.74 Malta 
had a long colonial period, but there was minimal desire for independence, particularly in 
light of the financial benefits of remaining a colony.75 In contrast to the typically 
expected decolonisation model, Malta strongly fought the end of British colonial 
presence. The island saw pro-colonial riots and political turmoil during the time when the 
British were intending to pull out.76 Baldacchino describes this as “upside-down 
decolonisation” in which the colonial power wishes to remove themselves, contrary to the 
desire of the colonised people.77 It appears, however, that, despite a long period of 
minimal public nationalism, the increasing number of undocumented migrants to Malta 
has caused great concern. Baldacchino argues that this has been responded to through a 
rise in symbols of national identity as expressed in banal methods such as currency.78 The 
Baldacchino model of banal nationalism representations emerging when the national 
identity is challenged in otherwise minimally nationalistic nations seems reasonable. It 
fails, however, to explain the situation in the Cook Islands or Puerto Rico where, like 
Malta, there was a strong financial benefit to continuing colonialism and an “upside-
down decolonisation” model. They also in many ways have fewer negatives to 
colonisation than for Malta. Nevertheless, they have developed very visible examples not 
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only of banal nationalism but also of hot nationalism (particularly for Puerto Rico) 
without significant external threat.  
Denmark is often ignored as a colonial power, but it did once have numerous 
colonies scattered across the world. Of these, Greenland and the Faroe Islands are the 
only remaining. Both have had home-rule for several decades and, as of 2009, Greenland 
has had self-rule. In looking at this transition, Naja Graugaard provides a detailed 
depiction of Greenlandic identity in the context of colonialism and modernity, 
particularly the dichotomies between Greenlandic and Danish identities.79 She argues that 
that Greenlandic identity has become synonymous with indigenousness and the “old” 
traditions.80 As such she suggests that it seems difficult to be both Greenlandic and 
modern, as well as it being seen as impossible for newcomers to become a Greenlander.81 
These dichotomies and conflicts of identity seem extremely common across small post-
colonial nations, particularly ones that did not have an especially contentious 
independence process. Niue and to a lesser extent the Cook Islands face these challenges. 
Many feel considerable pressure to embrace the New Zealand identity and the benefits 
that go with it, but they still wish to maintain their island culture.    
Among the nations outside of Oceania, the Isle of Man provides one of the most 
analogous nations to those of this dissertation. Though a crown dependency, it is self-
governing. Whilst Niue and the Cook Islands are independent in free association, rather 
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than being dependencies, many of the challenges of defining the nation are shared, as are 
their unusually close ties to another nation. Paul Cottier takes a social psychological 
approach to the question of national identity.82 He elects to look at what people mean by 
the concept of the “nation” and the consequences of such meaning within the Isle of 
Man.83 It provides an interesting secondary approach to the study of nationalism, though 
given the dearth of research on banal nationalism in small states, a more traditional 
approach seems justified to build a framework first.  
2.2.2 Newspapers 
 Researching newspapers has been one of the classic ways in which to study banal 
nationalism, as it provides writers with a highly influential but often little-noticed method 
to shape the feelings of the nation. In this vein, Linda Kenix looked at the way in which 
national identity was constructed within Samoa’s main newspaper the Samoa Observer 
and in New Zealand and Australian papers where they wrote about Samoa and 
Samoans.84 In using a quantitative approach (which is uncommon for studying banal 
nationalism in newspapers), he looked at the frequency of personal pronouns and 
symbols that evoke an emotive response.85 Contrary to many media studies in other 
nations, Kenix concludes that the creation of national identity does not require the 
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exclusion of others within a nation’s news media.86 What remains untested is whether 
these results are a function of Samoan uniqueness in how they express everyday 
nationalism or the result of the application of a quantitative model to a subject that has 
largely been only explored qualitatively. Future studies are needed, as it seems very 
possible that other nations of Oceania could provide similar results.  
In one of the only other studies looking at newspapers in small nations, John 
Richardson, Stephen Huckerby and Mike Williams explored the conflict between 
Corsican identity and French identity in Corsica (a Mediterranean territorial collectivity 
of France).87 In an environment of hot nationalism, they argue that the main newspaper of 
Corsica has adopted a form of Corsican identity that is depoliticised, regional, and 
folkloric.88 This style apparently fits well within the popular notions of Corsican identity, 
allowing it to be enforced in a way like that which Billig describes.  
 
2.2.3 Food 
 Though several large nations have seen theories of everyday nationalism 
expanded to include food, notably Japan and France, it remains poorly studied in smaller 
nations. An MA thesis by Gina Butrico provides one of a small number of cases in which 
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banal nationalism has been applied to food in small nations.89 In looking at Iceland, she 
notes an active effort to support Icelandic nationalism through the purchase and 
consumption of emblematic foods.90 Products visibly and proudly bear Icelandic 
branding, and their consumption provides a sense of  
camaraderie and shared national pride.91 This model seems to differ considerably from 
that which is seen in my four nations, where imported foods are preferred. Many nations 
have ongoing efforts to promote locally produced foods. As such, it is likely that in the 
future more nations will mirror what Gina Butrico saw in Iceland. A similar study 
focusing on Gibraltar was done as an MSc dissertation by Amy Nuñez.92 She finds that 
food acts as a national repository showing the ways in which a number of cultures have 
influenced nationhood with food as the medium.93 In contrast to the incorporation seen 
within Gibraltar (and the nations of my dissertation), Igor Cusack’s work in Equatorial 
Guinea found little blending of cuisines.94 Further, he suggests that national cuisine there 
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has existed as part of the colonisers’ attempts to assimilate the population with other 
locally driven initiatives only just starting to emerge.95  
2.2.3 Sports 
 Sport has often been a popular area for studies of banal nationalism. It is a unique 
area in which the energies of classic hot nationalism can be seen, but without the political 
significance we associate with this type of nationalism.96 Like other areas of banal 
nationalism, sport remains poorly studied in the small nation context. Simon Vaukins’ 
work on the Isle of Man and Clément’s look at Samoan rugby are the most significant.  
The Isle of Man Tourist Trophy motorcycle races have been suggested by 
Vaukins to be a significant identity marker to the people of the Isle of Man (the Manx).97 
As one of the best known Manx features, he suggests that they are highly significant to 
the Manx identity.98 The prominence of daily reminders of the race allows it to be 
embedded within the Manx sense of self.99 Unfortunately, the mechanism by which these 
reminders are to become part of the identity is to occur is absent from his article, limiting 
its utility. 
                                                 
95  Ibid. 
96 Sport generally is described as a display of banal nationalism rather than hot nationalism, because 
despite fan rhetoric, the game is both a part of the everyday routine set of activities and is not of the 
seriousness displays of hot nationalism typically represent.    
97 Simon Vaukins, “The Isle of Man TT Races: Politics, Economics and National Identity,” 
International Journal of Motorcycle Studies, 2007, 
http://ijms.nova.edu/November2007TT/IJMS_Artcl.Vaukins.html. 
98  Ibid. 
99  Ibid. 
41 
 
Julien Clément, in his article on rugby in Samoa, presents three ways in which 
rugby is a part of the Samoan national identity.100 In looking at the Samoan national 
team, he emphasises the three parties that support the formation of their national identity 
through rugby. The first party is the Samoan community (both in Samoa and overseas); 
the second is the Samoan Government; the third is the International Rugby Board (known 
as World Rugby). Clément, unlike many others writing on nationalism (and particularly 
banal nationalism), explores the role groups outside of the nation can play in shaping 
national identity and nationalism. This is an extremely useful extra dimension that has not 
previously received significant attention. We shall see that each of the nations in this 
dissertation has clearly had its national identities influenced by outside actors.  
2.3 Nationalism and Sovereignty in Fiji 
 The literature on nationalism in Fiji has largely been centred around the coups. As 
one of the most visible depictions of hot nationalism in Fiji, the four coups provide 
numerous examples of Fijian ethnonationalism. Stephanie Lawson has written 
extensively on what she describes as “indigenous nationalism”.101 This form of 
nationalism emerges from the ethnonationalist notion that a nation is built upon the 
common descent of peoples in a homeland, with a natural right to control this 
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homeland.102 Key to this narrative is a foundational myth that their people have been in 
that place since “time immemorial”.103 Building from colonial-era policy, which 
paternalistically protected iTaukei land rights and allowed the continuance of many 
traditional power structures, this narrative of indigenous nationalism has been pervasive 
in Fijian politics.104 Three of the four coups since independence have been orchestrated 
with a stated purpose of protecting indigenous rights and an apparent goal of establishing 
an “ethnic democracy” to protect the “paramountcy” iTaukei established in the colonial 
system.105 The post-2006 coup reforms saw much of the expressions of hot nationalism, 
including indigenous nationalism, fade. The government actively discouraged (both 
through policy reforms and oppressive restrictions on free speech and assembly) any 
form of nationalism that harmed the message of a unified nation. Indigenous nationalism, 
however, can still be seen in much subtler ways. Within the wider global conversation 
about Native rights, many iTaukei nationalists have found a framework that allows their 
message to be presented within a context of cultural protection and promotion.  
John Kelly and Martha Kaplan provide one of the more comprehensive looks at 
the formation of the Fijian nation.106 During the colonial period, British authorities 
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established a system in which the racial groups were kept separate, and iTaukei were 
favoured.107 It also redefined all Indo-Fijians under a single label, where previously they 
had defined themselves by region of origin, religion, caste and other group identifiers.108 
Along with several other arguments on the ways in which feelings of rivalry were 
established (most of which seem to have faded from popular discourse and are no longer 
relevant to nationalism in Fiji today), they argue that Indo-Fijians historic decision not to 
join the armed forces during World War II (largely due to their insistence upon equal 
treatment) resulted in a long-lasting feeling that Indo-Fijians were not a part of the Fijian 
nation.109 They did not “shed blood” for their nation.110 Though the actual decision not to 
participate seems to now be accepted, effects of it remain. Indo-Fijian politicians are 
often stereotyped by nationalists as cowards who are not willing to sacrifice for Fiji.  
 Though I argue that banal nationalism is actually more present in and significant 
for Fiji, hot nationalism (particularly surrounding the coups) has received most of the 
attention, leaving only a few works looking at banal nationalism. Daniel Guinness and 
Niko Besnier, look at the contradiction created by the fact that the best Fijian rugby 
players play for and thus represent other nations, but are nevertheless heroes in Fiji.111 
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Fijian nationalism remains produced and reproduced through rugby, despite the players 
officially representing another nation.112 They suggest that this duality challenges 
Anderson’s conception of territorial boundedness.113 Rather than being bounded by the 
nation, the sense of connection shifts to being linked through identity politics.114 Though 
problematic for a strict reading of Anderson, it could be argued that this phenomenon 
actually reinforces his core message. The imagined component of the nation here 
seemingly survives a difference in physical territory.  
In a rather unusual application of banal nationalism, John Connell looks at the 
ways in which the “good citizen” is constructed within the Fiji Times.115 He focuses upon 
a feature in the paper called “People” wherein the paper highlights everyday Fijians who 
have “made it”.116 It provides for the continual reproduction of ideas of the nation and 
modernity by focusing on values that are consistent with their ideology.117  
As a more general application of banal nationalism, my MA thesis applied 
Billig’s notion of banal nationalism to Fiji’s national cuisine.118 I argued that food 
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provided a point of similarity within a national narrative full of differences.119 Rather 
than simply serving as a banal daily part of life, food allowed for the development of a 
unified national identity in a way that was unexpected.120 This provides a focused piece 
of a larger question of nationalism in small nations that this dissertation aims to explore 
further.  
 Given that Fiji is generally recognised as a sovereign nation, unsurprisingly, little 
has been written about sovereignty there. The threat of external forces (namely Australia) 
to Fijian sovereignty received considerable attention in the news media but largely failed 
to make the jump to academic literature. Vijay Naidu provides an extremely brief 
regional analysis of external threats to sovereignty (colonialism, nuclear weapons testing, 
“adventurers”, calls for democracy).121 Most of these threats, though still a serious 
concern for the region, are largely historic for the well-established Fiji. Donald Horowitz 
similarly in his comparison of the constitutional change process in Fiji and Indonesia 
makes a compelling argument for a loss of sovereignty caused by external pressures in 
the process.122 These threats, however, represent relatively minimal impact upon Fijian 
sovereignty. Other threats, such as that to economic sovereignty caused by economic 
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dependence, though slowly starting to gain regional attention, remain understudied in 
Fiji.  
2.4 Nationalism and Sovereignty in Niue 
There has been virtually no work on nationalism of any variety in Niue. The only 
significant academic reference to nationalism in Niue is a single paragraph by Jon Barnett 
in a larger work on the effects of climate change. In his chapter on the effects of 
depopulation on Niue, he argues that national pride is rare in Niue, and Niue lacks any of 
the “powerful icons of nationalism associated with most modern nation-states”.123 He 
then briefly describes the challenges of identity within the context of New Zealand 
citizenship.124 This provides a very basic starting point for exploring nationalism in Niue. 
Though Niuean nationalism does not have the intensity of many other nations, to describe 
it as lacking the icons of nationalism seems to be inaccurate. As he notes, New Zealand 
citizenship and the relationship with New Zealand, in general, do represent one of the 
biggest challenges for conceptualising Niuean nationalism.    
Sovereignty has been only marginally better covered. There are a handful of 
articles that briefly mention Niue’s special status in regard to sovereignty, such as Firth’s 
work on independence in the Pacific125, but these largely fail to go beyond a basic legal 
                                                 
123 Jon Barnett, “On the Risks of Engineering Mobilty to Reduce Vulerablity to Climate Change: 
Insights from a Small Island State,” in Climate Change and Human Mobility: Challenges to the Social 
Sciences, ed. Kirsten Hastrup and Karen Fog Olwig (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
124 Ibid. 
125 Stewart Firth, “Sovereignty and Independence in the Contemporary Pacific,” 1989, 
http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/handle/10125/8357. 
47 
 
analysis. Barry Bartmann in exploring para-diplomacy in sub-national island jurisdictions 
briefly discuss Niue and the Cook Islands concluding that they are “far beyond what is 
understood to be the various practices of para-diplomacy”.126 However, given his broad 
focus, he elects to not devote much discussion to it, asking that within the scope of these 
arrangements, “ what is possibly left to meet the full international legal personality of 
sovereignty?”.127  There has also been some limited work on the commercialisation of 
sovereignty in Niue as it relates to the Niue domain extension (.nu)128, postage stamps, 
and tax haven status.129 These, however, are of limited usefulness as they completely 
ignore the socio-cultural effects of this commercialisation of sovereignty.  
2.5 Nationalism and Sovereignty in the Cook Islands 
 The literature on nationalism in the Cook Islands has been very limited. The most 
substantial of this work is Jeffery Sissons book on national identity. It provides a detailed 
look at the ways in which the Cook Islands’ national identity was shaped in support of the 
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tourist industry.130 Unfortunately, it has been almost two decades since the book’s 
publication. Beyond some passing mentions in larger works, modern nationalism there 
remains largely unstudied. Through this dissertation, I aim to expand the scholarly 
knowledge of modern nationalism in the Cook Islands and particularly how everyday 
nationalism can function within a small island nation.  
Many of the general articles on sovereignty cover both the Cook Islands and Niue, 
such as Stewart Firth’s independence in the Pacific131 or Stephen Levine’s brief coverage 
of the two nations in his work on sovereignty in the Pacific.132 As a relatively unique 
example of a type of sovereignty (free association), the Cook Islands receives a cursory 
mention in dozens of larger works on sovereignty. These, however, typically fail to go 
beyond more than a few sentences on the Cook Islands’ or Niue’s status. There are also 
some purely legal analyses of issues related to Cook Islands sovereignty, such as Alex 
Frame’s look at defence obligations133 or Stephen Smith’s analysis of the possibility of UN 
Membership134. Like with Niue, there remains a significant gap in the literature. 
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Kevin Sobel-Read’s dissertation explored sovereignty and globalisation in the 
Cook Islands and its diasporic communities.135 He provides a detailed ethnography that 
does an excellent job of describing the lived reality of life in the Cook Islands. He rejects 
the notion that sovereignty is the same as nationalism (or sub-component of it) and 
proposes a new framework of emotional sovereignty to cover the portions that he feels 
are not well captured by existing theories.136 Many of the concerns he has with existing 
theories of nationalism are addressed at least in part by the work on everyday nationalism 
or the common expansion of Anderson’s work on imagined community. His definition of 
sovereignty is greatly expanded beyond that which academia and the legal community 
have generally considered being within its scope. This expansion whilst intentionally 
aiming to broaden the utility of the concept is of limited analytical use for us given a lack 
of scholarly consensus on the topic. It proposes a mechanism by which the vagueness of 
other models can be overcome but remains far from a proven model. It is also highly 
problematic to use the unusual case of the Cook Islands to try and build a new 
comprehensive theory of sovereignty. The Cook Islands is undeniably in a unique 
sovereignty space, however, existing theories do largely apply to it. Nations with similar 
diasporic communities such as Fiji would have provided a much better test case, in that it 
                                                 
135 Kevin B. Sobel-Read, “Sovereignty, Law, and Capital in the Age of Globalization” (Duke 
University, 2012), 
https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/5403/SobelRead_duke_0066D_11241.pdf?s
equence=1&isAllowed=y. 
136 Ibid. 
50 
 
would allow a separation of the expanded sovereignty phenomenon that he describes 
from the unique legal position the Cook Islands holds.   
2.6 Nationalism and Sovereignty in Hawaiʻi  
 Whilst nationalism in Hawaiʻi has been written about fairly extensively, banal 
nationalism has not been meaningfully explored. Even when framed within the context of 
hot nationalism, the classic areas of banal nationalism (music, sport, media, etc.) have 
largely been ignored. As the site of an active sovereignty movement, efforts towards 
sovereignty have attracted reasonable scholarly attention. This focus has largely centred 
on specific historical, legal or political questions, such as those taken up by Norman 
Meller and Anne Lee, who looks to trace the history of the movement and its desired 
outcomes,137 or by NoelleKahanu and Jon Van Dyke, who explore the legal foundations 
for various nation-within-a-nation models.138 Unfortunately, there has been only limited 
attention to the social effects of nationalism and sovereignty.  
 Music is one of the classic areas for research into banal nationalism. It has long 
played an important role in the formation of protest and resistance movements.  George 
Lewis explores this use of music in the Hawaiian sovereignty movement.139 He elects to 
focus upon the context of the songs rather than the lyrics, for a genre he labels “Da Kine” 
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music.140 Since many of the most influential songs have been in Hawaiian, much of the 
audience will typically lack an ability to understand the lyrics.141 As such, the way in 
which the song is used becomes more important for analysis.142 The first way he sees the 
music as functioning is in serving to connect people to their roots in response to a trend 
of bastardising and co-opting versions of Hawaiian music and dance to serve tourist 
desires.143 He notes a second theme of protest and opposition to the misuse of Hawaiian 
land.144 In a style that reflects protests elsewhere, several songs have been written as part 
of larger social movements in response to incidents such as the US Navy's use of one of 
the islands as a bombing range and evictions due to development needs.145 Music is used 
in this way to attempt to build a social consciousness of resistance.146 The third theme is 
one of preservation of the Hawaiian culture and people.147 Lewis identifies many trends 
that had not been previously studied. However, in the decades since his 1984 article, it 
appears that the areas covered by his first and third themes have changed significantly. 
Both seem to have faded as distinct styles. The touristy pseudo-Hawaiian style that had 
previously dominated has declined as more traditional music and dance styles regain 
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favour. The theme of resistance has since grown much stronger with expansions in 
popularity and genre. It can also be seen as increasingly expanded in scope to respond to 
more general wrongs, as well as nation-building. Beyond music, areas of banal 
nationalism have received little attention.  
Questions of identity in relationship to the sovereignty movement have been 
explored across a handful of articles. The US Supreme Court case Rice v. Cayetano 
brought considerable attention, both socially and legally, to the question of who is 
actually Hawaiian and consequently, who can “legitimately” participate in the Hawaiian 
nation.148 The case challenged the policy of allowing only Native Hawaiians (using a 
blood quantum criteria) to vote for Office of Hawaiian Affairs trustees.149 The court 
found this policy to be in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, 
which forbids race-based voting limitations.150 As Kehaulani Kauanui notes, US policy 
has both encouraged and created the blood quantum criterion, as well as imposed patterns 
of assimilation. As a result, it works to reduce access to entitlements and recognition of 
Hawaiian sovereignty.151 Robert Statham suggests that this ruling could have significant 
effects for ethnic national self-determination.152 Given that Hawaiians are not recognised 
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as a tribe153 and that the US Supreme Court rejected the argument that ancestry was not a 
proxy for race, it is unlikely that the US will accept any policy that treats Hawaiians as 
separate from others in affording them any meaningful special rights or privileges.154 As 
such, he rejects any possibility for self-determination within the US other than through a 
universal appeal or an establishment of tribal status.155  
 Hawaiian sovereignty is often connected to the colonial experience that faced 
many other native groups. Haunani-Kay Trask’s essay collection From a Native 
Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawaiʻi remains one of the most influential 
and controversial works on Hawaiian sovereignty in this space. Written from a highly 
radical Native rights perspective, it details the oppression and mistreatment Hawaiians 
have suffered since Cook’s first visit to Hawaiʻi.156 It captures the anger and frustration 
that had largely been ignored within work on the sovereignty movement and still remains 
neglected. She does not shy away from making her feelings known in critiquing popular 
thought on Hawaiian sovereignty. In doing so, she provided a centring point for a part of 
the movement that had not been well heard and reminded people that the injustice of the 
overthrow is not over. The book (and her other work) has also been extremely 
controversial. It has been critiqued as hate-mongering, racist and advocating violence. 
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(University of Hawaii Press, 1999). 
54 
 
The book is highly problematic from a scholarly perspective as well. It largely ignores 
the work of other sovereignty activists and non-supporting research. Though presented as 
an academic work, it fails to meet many of the standards for such work.  
There have been a number of master’s theses and doctoral dissertations that have 
attempted to analyse the sovereignty movement in Hawaiʻi and address the validity of its 
claims. This seems to represent the bulk of modern scholarship on Hawaiian sovereignty. 
Unfortunately, many of these are almost entirely focused on historical or legal analysis 
with the ways in which the sovereignty movement has affected social life in Hawaiʻi 
largely ignored. There is also a noticeable lack of critical analysis or objectivity in many 
of these works. Whilst the core fact that the Kingdom was unjustly and illegally 
overthrown is typically acknowledged (even amongst those opposed to modern 
sovereignty), little since can really be said to have universal acceptance. Many of the 
arguments in these dissertations are spurious or logically contradictory, adopting poorly 
supported minority views of legal or political theory. Furthermore, many of the 
dissertations are written by people who are otherwise active in the sovereignty movement 
with clear biases despite claiming to present objective facts. Many directly reject any 
nuance in the arguments on sovereignty, preferring to claim that what they present on 
issues of history and law are clear and unambiguous.  
 One of the clearest examples of this is David Keanu Sai’s doctoral dissertation in 
which he presents his argument for why Hawaiʻi should be considered “an internationally 
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recognised sovereign, but occupied State”.157 Sai has been one of the most politically and 
legally active sovereignty activists in Hawaiʻi. His arguments have gained a reasonable 
following, but no legal success and one of his approaches earning him a Class B 
felony.158 Though extremely fascinating, his dissertation obfuscates his arguments and 
presents an analysis of international law that lacks any wider consensus.  
 Willy Daniel Kaipo Kauai provides a clearer and more reasoned version of the 
illegal occupation narrative and explores its theoretical effects on citizenship.159 Though 
mostly well-reasoned and thorough, much of its analysis of international law is poorly 
grounded, relying upon fringe interpretations.  
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Another well-known sovereignty activist, Lynette Hiʻilani Cruz, in her 
dissertation, shares a narrative that has become quite common within the movement.160 It 
tells of sovereignty activists leading normal lives until for whatever reason they became 
interested in history and started researching the topic, leading them to conclude that 
Hawaiʻi is illegally occupied and having learned the truth, they started to take action.161  
In one of the more objective, though still supportive, analysis of the movement, 
Anthony Castanha attempted to catalogue the players and models within the sovereignty 
movement.162 As a result of this effort, it becomes evident that whilst there are a number 
of areas of agreement among activists, there are also widely varying views on what is the 
desired outcome for the movement.163 Unfortunately, this thesis was written almost 20 
years ago. The players and the tactics have changed significantly since then, though the 
desired outcomes and the lack of agreement remain consistent. Similarly, Norman Meller 
and Anne Feder Lee article attempted to divide the movement into “Hawaiian Nation 
Separatists”, “Nation-within-a-Nation supporters” and those seeking status-quo with 
redress. Published around the same time as Castanha work, the article, though well done, 
is very dated. The players and tactics of the movement have changed considerably over 
time limiting the utility of the article.    
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In contrast to the legal/historic focuses of much of the other work on Hawaiian 
sovereignty and identity, an article by David Baker does explore the ways in which 
Hawaiian culture and national identity are constructed. He is highly critical of the version 
of Hawaiʻi presented to tourists. He suggests that “the knowledge of Hawai'i circulating 
off-islands is mass produced by a coalition of information organizations” where 
“profitable images are promoted, others obscured”, constructing “a virtual Hawai'i”. His 
article however largely ignores the ways in which the sovereignty movement itself 
constructs images of Hawaiʻi, Hawaiian history and the sovereignty movement. Using 
near straw man examples, it argues that any positions contrary to his are examples of 
ignorance. The article also shares a fixation upon blood-based definitions of Hawaiian 
status that remains problematic amongst a segment of activists (discussed in chapter 5).  
Judith Schachter and Albrecht Funk look at how “Hawaiians identify themselves 
and understand themselves as being Hawaiian”.164 Rather than focus on the political 
activists, they spoke with “ordinary people” to capture the lived experiences of Native 
Hawaiians.165 They found Native Hawaiians to have distinct experience than Native 
American, and they recognised themselves as such.166 They also saw a rejection of a 
blood quantum for Native Hawaiian identity and a separation of ideas of sovereignty 
from ethnic identity.167 Their work provides a much needed ethnographic look at 
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everyday conceptions of sovereignty and identity in Hawaiʻi. Though brief, it reflects the 
ways in which most people outside of sovereignty activists seem actually to feel.   
While there has been a reasonable amount written on nationalism and sovereignty 
in Hawaiʻi, little work has been beyond the legal or historical spheres. Furthermore, much 
of the work that does look beyond these spaces are written by people so immersed in the 
movement that their objectivism is often compromised by their frustration at the injustice 
of the overthrow. There has been little work looking at the movement itself. In many 
ways, the ways in which the Hawaiian sovereignty movement has adapted their tactics 
over time and embraced new techniques are unique. This dissertation aims to go beyond 
just an exploration of the challenges of Hawaiian sovereignty and take a look the 
movement itself and its effects on forming the Hawaiian nation.      
2.7 Nationalism in the Region 
 Oceania is composed of small island nations with a variety of governance 
approaches. Self-governance and full independence for many nations have been much 
more recent and limited than in most other regions. With the exception of Western 
Sahara, all of the remaining non-self-governing territories are small island nations and 
over a third of them are in the Pacific168. Even within the independent nations, many face 
                                                 
168 This list is frequently controversial, as it excludes a number of nations who have contested 
statuses (such as Hawaiʻi) and includes ones which would not be viable as independent states (like the tiny 
Pitcairn Islands). It also ignores the desires of the population such as in Tokelau where Tokelauans have 
twice voted against further self-determination. 
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a variety of challenges in defining their national identity, often as a result of their colonial 
legacy.  
French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna remain French overseas collectivities, 
whilst New Caledonia has special status as part of a  20-year transition process under the 
Nouméa Accord. The Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Palau are 
independent in free association with the United States. Guam and the now uninhabited 
Wake Island are US territories and the Northern Mariana Islands, whilst technically a 
commonwealth is administered as a US territory. Tokelau remains a territory of New 
Zealand. As noted earlier, the Cook Islands and Niue are in free association with New 
Zealand. Rapa Nui (Easter Island) is considered part of insular Chile. The Pitcairn Islands 
are a British Overseas Territory. Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Kiribati, Nauru, 
Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu are fully independent states.  
Between Samoa achieving independence in 1962 and Palau finally ending US 
administration in 1994, most of the region gained self-governance or full independence. 
Stephen Levine suggest that there exists a common perception that it is now “‘settled’ 
matter, with no ongoing legacy of bitterness or discontent remaining to be resolved, and 
with no further island communities denied opportunities for self-determination”.169 
Though most of the region has now received at least some form of self-governance, he 
argues that for many of these nations, “the experience of sovereignty and independence 
has been something of a disappointment, with ongoing dependence and limited room for 
                                                 
169 Stephen Levine, “The Experience of Sovereignty in the Pacific: Island States and Political 
Autonomy in the Twenty-First Century,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 50, no. 4 (2012): 439–55, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2012.729729. 
60 
 
manoeuvre a more accurate rendering”.170 Further, the world's response to further 
independence efforts have varied between “immobilised indifference” to outright 
hostility.171  
The path to independence for most Pacific Island countries was fairly smooth with 
little conflict. Levine suggests that this came “not through struggle so much as imperial 
exhaustion”.172 The utility of empire faded, and the colonies became an embarrassing 
burden on the colonial administrators. In many of the nations, independence was hastily 
imposed with little care towards the tensions between “democratic values and traditional 
patterns of rule and outlook” or demographic changes.173 The models adopted have been 
problematic for many of the nations. Further, many of the nations have only what Levine 
characterises as ‘semi-sovereignty’.174 The continued presence of the external powers 
limits sovereignty in many of the island nations.175 He likewise suggests that 
practicalities of dependency “mock the trappings of sovereignty, self-rule and 
independence”. As Levine describes, sovereignty in the region is much more complex 
than popular opinion assumes. Though many of the nations have self-governance that 
they achieved with minimal struggle, a number of them do not, in practice, have the 
ability to express their sovereignty as other nations can, despite their desire to do so. 
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There are also clashes with the anti-colonial movement in nations like Tokelau and the 
Pitcairn Islands, who have made it very clear that they would like to remain colonies.  
Not all of the nations have however had a completely smooth transition from 
colonialism. David Robie has described the violent events in New Caledonia, Palau, 
Vanuatu and Fiji as the result of “liberation movements” as part of “a quest for national 
sovereignty that takes into account the legacy of more than two centuries of 
colonialism”.176 He conjures up images of global struggles for liberation from oppressors. 
Similarly, Graham Hassall in a 1991 article suggests that independence for several of the 
Pacific Island states has been marked by ethnic identity & conflict with much of its 
origins in the decolonisation process.177 He notes that “whereas most Pacific peoples 
have obtained political independence, or achieved political decolonisation, the processes 
of adaptation are not necessarily complete, and have themselves become hidden catalysts 
to conflicts manifesting themselves in the political sphere”.178 He, however, does notes 
that not all of the modern conflicts are the result of colonialism with some of the conflicts 
caused by “rivalries of ancient origin” and that “not all ethnic conflict derives from 
nationalist aspiration”179  
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 Though this model of decolonisation is commonly applied, Terence Wesley-
Smith has questioned the continual utility of this conceptual framework.180 He notes that 
there is an “absence of an ‘obvious colonial villain’”.181 Whilst it can be applied to the 
French territories, it fails when used for nations like Fiji whose struggles are postcolonial 
where neither side is representable as a villain.182 A similar problem exists in much of the 
rest of the region. The colonial experience, whilst far from ideal, was reasonably pleasant 
for many of the nations. Sovereignty was often granted without struggle and in some 
cases accepted with great reluctance. It is common to find people in the region who with 
great pride in their independent nation look towards the colonial power with nostalgia. 
For some states like the Solomon Islands, Wesley-Smith argues that beyond the “intrinsic 
value of sovereign independence”, day-to-day conditions have even decreased since 
independence.  
The push towards decolonisation in the region came as part of a UN effort in 1961 
calling for self-determination in the form of decolonisation. This effort was problematic 
in many ways. Wesley-Smith notes that it “discriminated among the colonised peoples of 
the Pacific” as it allowed France and the US to argue that the problematic votes by New 
Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna and Hawaiʻi for their statuses should 
allow them to be removed from the list of non-self-governing territories.183 The process 
was also very driven by the wills of the colonial power rather than the people of the 
                                                 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid. 
63 
 
islands.184 Also problematic, was the focus on imposing a Western view of the nation and 
the political structure.185 As was the case in much of the colonial experience, nations 
were divided or combined with little regard to common cultures or previous governance 
structure.186 Whilst some of this was logistically necessary given the low population 
sizes, it has meant that many cultures have been ignored in building the larger national 
identity. 
Nevertheless, most of the nations of Oceania have been politically stable since 
independence. As Wesley-Smith notes, even the more serious conflicts in the region 
“pale in comparison to the conflicts that characterise many other parts of the previously 
colonised world”.187 He suggests that the issues they have had have been in part caused 
by a conflict between traditional and new models of governance, arguing that states with 
“hierarchical traditional political systems, a history of centralised forms of organisation 
and culturally homogenous populations” have been most successful. States such as Tonga 
and Samoa were able to adapt traditional practice to a Western political system, whilst 
the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in their lack of traditional state model have struggled. 
Hassall likewise suggests that there is a conflict between traditional authority and legal 
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systems and “modern” systems.188 Group-based consensual approaches to governance 
and traditional customary law were replaced with Western models of limited utility.189  
Several other authors have attempted to catalogue and further explain the political 
situation in the region. Amongst the more comprehensive efforts is Dave Peebles book 
Pacific Regional Order. He divides the problems the region is facing into five broad 
categories; “challenges to sustainable economic development; to security; to the rule of 
law; to democracy; and the challenge represented by the rise in regionalism elsewhere in 
the world, a development that has so far excluded Pacific states”.190 Challenges posed by 
economic development are largely related to the limited resources and remoteness of the 
islands.191 Security challenges are limited with a few major conflicts representing the 
largest concerns.192 Peebles expresses concern over the region’s general lack of 
ratification of key humanitarian law instruments and a “general ambivalence” towards the 
domestic rule of law.193 He notes and dismisses the common explanation for this attitude 
towards the domestic rule of law of the “Pacific Way” favouring consensus and 
traditional dispute resolution.194 Though he fails to recognise it, the lack of adoption of 
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international law is often explained by resource limitations and governmental priority 
rather than a statement on the nation’s support for humanitarian principles. His charts are 
also somewhat misleading in failing to recognise the treaties that apply in less 
conventional ways.  
Peebles argues that in the region “colonial powers often implemented an 
imperfect model of Westminster democracy, which in some cases has been further 
corrupted rather than improved by Forum island countries”.195 He seems to suggest that 
the only acceptable system is a Westminster democracy. The coups in Fiji are presented 
as an example of democratic failure, completely ignoring the undemocratic portions of 
the system that were unconnected. He also suggests that “imbuing traditional authority 
with political power” is undemocratic.196 This conclusion is questionable. Jon Fraenkel, 
amongst others, has challenged the applicability of European governance models to the 
region.197 Across the Pacific, a number of unique or unusual models exist with reasonable 
success. He notes that whilst the European models were highly influential in the colonial 
period, wholesale lifting of governance models is often unsuccessful.198 Though not 
rejecting the utility of foreign models, he calls on reformers to “avoid grandstanding on 
international principle, and instead to base arguments on a deep and rich appreciation of 
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the local contexts.”199 Though this is likely critical for successful governance in the 
region, there is a real danger of it providing a justification for practices that are harmful 
to the nation.  
Many of the independent states in the region maintain significant ties to their 
previous colonial power.  The Solomon Islands and Tuvalu both consider Queen 
Elizabeth II their head of state. Though this position is typically presented as largely 
ceremonial, Jon Fraenkel argues that this power is both significant and provides several 
examples in which through the Governors-General, the Queen has utilised these 
powers.200 He suggests that the influence goes well beyond the role of the crown to 
symbolise the “unity of a national community” in having a “critical part in Pacific 
constitutional crises”.201 
Though other nations in the region have seen scattered studies, French Polynesia 
and New Caledonia have received the most scholarly attention. New Caledonia had one 
of the region’s few traditional-style struggles for sovereignty. Between 1976 and 1988 
the indigenous population, the Kanak, led an active independence movement against the 
French who had annexed the islands in 1853. This movement saw serious violence and 
disorder including seized farms and a pro-independence hostage-taking in Ouvéa 
resulting in the death four gendarmes, nineteen hostage-takers, two members of the 
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military and three additional deaths of hostage takers whilst in custody. The Matignon 
Agreements were signed in 1988 establishing the groundwork for the Nouméa Accord in 
1998. This accord set up a 20 year special transition period ending with an independence 
referendum to be held in November 2018. 
In many ways, the struggle for independence in New Caledonia represents the 
typical fight against colonialism. For French Polynesia, however, Nathalie Mrgudovic 
argues that “there was never such a strong feeling of deprivation of indigenous cultural 
and social identities as there was in New Caledonia”. She suggests that the movement is 
primarily a political one and that “the claim for sovereignty in French Polynesia had little 
to do with the struggle of an indigenous people”. The native people of French Polynesia 
remain the dominant ethnic group in the islands, and French Polynesia already operates 
largely as an independent country.  
The Nouméa Accord encourages the government of New Caledonia to develop 
national symbols (including a motto, anthem, banknotes, and a flag). Its loyalist President 
has led the adoption of a number of symbols that though representing a separate New 
Caledonia identity contain very pro-French symbolism.  
Mrgudovic notes that free-association with France is now a “perfectly conceivable 
option” for the French Pacific.202 However, she argues that free association, often 
presented as a good model for late decolonisation, may not actually result in less political 
instability.203 
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Much of the work on French Polynesia and New Caledonia has been focused 
upon the debate over the level of sovereignty the islands have. For example, Lorenz 
Gonschor has challenged the idea that French Polynesia has actually been decolonized, 
suggesting that France responded to calls for decolonisation by redefining the concept 
and creating a “de-facto continuity of colonial rule but also to create a corrupt 
authoritarian local government favourable to French interests”.204 Similarly, an article by 
Gerard Prinsen, Yves Lafoy and Julien Migozzi argues that New Caledonia is not 
sovereign in a Westphalian sense and that “a unique ‘Islandian’ concept of sovereignty is 
emerging”.205  
Beyond brief mentions, everyday nationalism and the subjects that it typically 
explores have been largely absent from the literature. This interesting given the frequency 
the ways in which food and language are used to build the French identity in 
Metropolitan France have been studied. 
Though the nations of this dissertation are feeling only the secondary effects of 
climate change206, it remains one of the most significant concerns for the region. Within 
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the next few decades, it's estimated that thousands of low-lying islands will be 
submerged. Already, storm surges and groundwater contamination are rendering areas 
unliveable.  Susannah Willcox notes that “a loss of habitable territory has not been 
recognised as a possible cause of state extinction in international law”.207 Nevertheless, 
there become significant practical problems if a state ceases to exist due to climate 
change. International law has always assumed that a successor state would absorb the 
rights and obligations of the extinguished state.208 Assuming a willing host state, a 
government-in-exile situation could be used.209 These, however, have always operated 
under the premise that the exile is temporary with a clear population and defined territory 
to which they seek to return.210 Willcox proposes a mechanism by which nations could 
continue to be seen as legally sovereign following a climate change related territorial 
loss. As she recognises, the usefulness of this model is still yet to be seen. Regardless of 
the legal situation, it is likely that nations will lose sovereignty and have significant 
cultural impact as its citizen lose their connection to the traditional territory.  
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The region has hosted a number of nationalist movements over the past few 
decades. Unfortunately, little has been written about them outside a purely historical or 
occasionally legal context. With a few exceptions discussed above, banal nationalism has 
been unstudied in the region.  
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Chapter 3 
3 Background Information 
 This chapter supplies a brief background on the four nations explored in this 
dissertation. Niue and the Cooks Islands are very rarely studied, with much of the world 
having nearly no knowledge of their history, circumstances, or often even their existence. 
Hawaiʻi and Fiji receive more attention globally, but most of this attention is focused 
upon their suitability as vacation destinations with the socio-political situations 
whitewashed. Even within the region, little is often taught about the islands of Oceania 
other than their own.  
3.1 Geography 
 Hawaiʻi is a large volcanic archipelago consisting of hundreds of islands 
dispersed across 2,400 km2. There are eight main islands, of which seven are permanently 
inhabited. Located in the North Pacific Ocean, Hawaiʻi is approximately 4,000km from 
California 6,000km from Japan and almost 7,000km from New Zealand. Consequently, it 
is one of the most remote population centres in the world.  
Fiji is an archipelago formed of over 330 islands, of which 110 are permanently 
inhabited. It is about 2,000km northeast of New Zealand and is surrounded by several 
other small island nations. Though Fiji’s population is dispersed across many islands, 
87% of the population live on the islands of Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. Most live in the 
capital city of Suva or the towns of Nadi and Lautoka (and the surrounding areas of 
each).  
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 The Cook Islands are formed of coral atolls and consist of 15 major islands 
dispersed across 2.2 million km2 (849,425 sq. mi) of ocean. Rarotonga is by far the most 
populous of the islands. If its ocean territory were to be considered a part of the total area 
of the country, the Cook Islands would be the 12th largest country in the world. It is 
about 3,000km from New Zealand and around 1,000km from its nearest neighbour, 
French Polynesia.  
 Niue, whose name is typically translated as “behold the coconut”211 is unique in 
this dissertation in consisting of only a single island. It is one of the world's largest coral 
islands. As a coral island, it has limited beaches and many steep limestone cliffs. Large 
reefs limit the navigable waters to a small break close to the capital, Alofi. Though a 
majority of the population lives on the Alofi side, no part of the island is especially 
populous. Niue is approximately 500km away from its nearest neighbour American 
Samoa and is around 2,000km away from New Zealand. 
3.2 Demographics 
 With a population of 1.4 million212, Hawaiʻi is the most populous of the nations in 
this dissertation and is the largest of the small island nations of Oceania213. Fiji’s 
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of the surprise of seeing coconuts growing on the rocky island. 
212 Department of Business, Economic Development & Tourism, “2016 State Population Estimates.” 
213 Australia, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand are the only Oceania nations that have a larger 
population, but they are not considered part of Oceania under the definition used regionally.  
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population of over 880 thousand is the next largest.214 In contrast, the Cook Islands and 
Niue are both very small, with populations of a little over 15,000 and 1,600 respectively, 
making them some of the smallest countries globally.215 The only countries with a 
smaller population than Niue is Tokelau (a New Zealand colony) and the Vatican City.  
Hawaiʻi, Fiji, and the Cook Islands are all experiencing small, but positive, levels 
of population growth at present.216 Niue, in contrast, has seen a continuous slow 
population decline.217 Despite positive population growth, “brain drain” (the out-
migration of skilled workers) remains a serious problem for Fiji, the Cook Islands, Niue 
and to a lesser extent Hawaiʻi. The extremely high cost of living, insufficient housing and 
inadequate salaries have led to out-migration from Hawaiʻi. This is, however, balanced 
by a continuous influx of new, often short-term residents, drawn by Hawaii’s myth of 
paradise. Political turmoil and the promise of better opportunities have caused migration 
from Fiji, but this has been balanced by natural increase and immigration from other 
developing nations. Niue and the Cook Islands have seen considerable out-migration 
(primarily to New Zealand) as residents leave for job and educational opportunities. 
                                                 
214 “NMDI | Pacific National Minimum Development Indicators,” accessed January 9, 2017, 
http://www.spc.int/nmdi/population. 
215 Ibid. 
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3.3 Race and Ethnicity 
 The Cook Islands is one of the most racially homogeneous countries globally, 
with 88% of Cook Islanders identifying as Cook Island Maori.218 Niue is similarly 
homogeneous. Its population is almost 80% Niuean or part-Niuean.219 Fiji is considerably 
more diverse with 56.8% identifying as iTaukei, 37.5% as Indo-Fijian, and 1.2% as 
Rotuman.220 Hawaiʻi, in contrast, has been described as one of the most 
racially/ethnically diverse places in the world.221 In the last census, 38.6%  of Hawaiʻi 
identified as Asian, 24.7% as White, 5.9% Native Hawaiian, 4.1% as other Pacific 
Islander and 23.6% as two or more races. Hawaiʻi consequently has the highest 
percentage of Asian Americans and multiracial Americans of any US state and is the only 
state with an Asian American plurality. For each of the nations in this paper, their 
demographics have produced some interesting local conceptions of race and ethnicity that 
shape how nationalism operates within the nation.  
 Within Hawaiʻi, it is not uncommon to hear people listing a number of racial and 
ethnic group memberships in describing themselves. Hawaiʻi is often characterised as 
being beyond race or as being a place where race doesn't matter. Though racism does still 
                                                 
218 Central Intelligence Agency, “Cook Islands,” The World Factbook, December 12, 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ck.html. 
219 Central Intelligence Agency, “Niue,” The World Factbook, December 12, 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nu.html. 
220 Central Intelligence Agency, “Fiji,” The World Factbook, December 12, 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fj.html. 
221 Blair, “Hawaii Most Diverse Population on Earth, Says Abercrombie.” 
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exist in Hawaiʻi (most visibly towards Micronesians), race is not nearly as polarising as it 
is the rest of the United States. One big divide, however, in Hawaiʻi is between local and 
non-local. Though the conception is not actually racially based, race is often used as a 
shortcut for determining localness. Generally, the local label is seen as a result of the 
adoption of Hawai'i values (particularly a respect for the land and Hawaiʻi traditions) and 
the adoption of Hawaiʻi material culture. Further, whiteness is often used as the generic 
representation of the non-local person. It has become a shorthand for colonial mindsets, 
militarism, and modern attempts to impose mainland culture and attitudes on Hawai'i, but 
should not be interpreted typically as actually referring to race. 
 Race also becomes relevant in Hawaiʻi for some government and non-government 
entitlements that are only available to Hawaiians (discussed in a later chapter in its 
relationship to hot nationalism). Various blood quantums222 have been used for service 
eligibility, but overall these seem to be primarily a legal construct rather than a social 
one. There are a number of people who will describe themselves as Hawaiian despite not 
meeting the full blood quantum, and similarly, there are many who do meet the quantum 
standards, who do not consider themselves Hawaiian.  
Little has been written on race and ethnicity in Niue. There are no actual studies 
of the local perceptions of the concept. With limited numbers of non-Niueans residing in 
                                                 
222 The blood quantum model requires that a person have a defined percentage of their ancestry be 
composed of people who are a part of a certain ethnic group for tribal membership or access to services. 
For example, a requirement of 1/8 degree blood quantum for membership would be to having equivalent to 
one great-grandparent who was of that group, while a 1/2 degree blood quantum would require one parent 
to be a member.  
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Niue and a strict objective criteria for residency (born in Niue or having a parent born in 
or resident of Niue), race and ethnicity do not seem to have been a significant concern 
politically or socially. Anecdotally, people seem to divide others into the categories of 
Niuean, Pacific Islander and other. Due to the rapidly declining population in Niue, jobs 
are increasingly being filled by non-Niueans, particularly by people from New Zealand or 
Fiji. Further, as exposure to global discussions on indigenous rights expand many are 
proudly embracing a label that was not previously significant for them and connecting to 
a global conversation. It is possible that these trends may cause a future focus on race or 
ethnicity that would justify further research, but at present, it does not seem to be a 
particularly meaningful group level distinction.  
The vast majority of Cook Islanders identify as Māori or part-Māori. They share 
common origins with the Māori of New Zealand, and many believe that the Māori of 
New Zealand came to New Zealand via the Cook Islands. Culturally and linguistically, 
Cook Islands Māori is distinct from New Zealand Māori, however, there are many 
commonalities, and the languages have a reasonable degree of mutual intelligibility. The 
Cook Islands has extremely strict immigration laws that substantially limit long-term 
residence by foreign workers, who are limited to three years in the Cook Islands with 
extensions available only if no local worker is available and a plan to train a local worker 
to replace them is in place. Permanent residency requires ten years (three years for New 
Zealand citizens) of lawful residency and evidence of significant contribution or 
investment in the Cook Islands. Exceptions are available for people who are married to 
Cook Islanders. As such, the Cook Islands has a fairly small long-term ex-pat community 
(mostly consisting of those married to Cook Islanders) and relatively small numbers of 
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foreign workers. Given that most of the exposure Cook Island residents will have with 
non-Māori will be as tourists or short-term workers, a model in which non-Māori people 
are treated as guests in the country has developed. This is not to say that non-Māori are 
not welcomed, but some have described facing considerable resentment if they try to take 
a role that exceeds what is appropriate for a guest. 
Race and ethnicity in Fiji remain a complex and highly politicised topic. Though 
demographics have shifted following the coups, for much of Fiji's late colonial and 
postcolonial history, iTaukei and Indo-Fijian populations were reasonably similar in size. 
Out-migration has reduced the Indo-Fijian population such that iTaukei now represent 
over half the population. Concerns of Indo-Fijian dominance have been a common 
political issue, providing motivation for several of the coups. iTaukei own the vast 
majority of land in Fiji, however, Indo-Fijians own nearly all of the domestically owned 
businesses. 
In discussions of race in Fiji, iTaukei and Indo-Fijians dominate the literature, 
however there several smaller groups in Fiji. There small, but significant, numbers of 
Europeans, Rotumans, Chinese and non-iTaukei/Rotuman Pacific Islanders in Fiji. 
Intermarriage between all groups is increasing but still remains uncommon, though it is 
typically accepted. Socially and professionally, inter-group interaction is normal and 
unmarked.  
Whilst it was somewhat controversial, the Bainimarama government officially re-
designated Native Fijians as iTaukei (a Bau dialect word generally translated as 
“Indigenous”). The label of “Fijian”, which had previously only been applied to iTaukei 
people, was expanded to refer to all people of Fiji (for whom the little-used term Fiji 
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Islander had officially applied). This change was a component of the Bainimarama 
government's campaign focused on building a more inclusive Fiji in the hopes of 
addressing the underlying causes of the previous coups. 
3.4 Land 
For much of the land in Hawaiʻi, typical US/Western land models are used. Land 
is privately owned and can be sold with few abnormal limitations. The State of Hawaiʻi is 
unsurprisingly the largest landholder with 1.54 million acres including 194,000 acres 
managed through the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (which provides long-term 
leases via lottery to Native Hawaiians for homesteading at very low cost). The U.S. 
Federal Government is the next largest landholder with over half a million acres of which 
the extremely large Hawaii Volcanoes National Park on the Big Island and Haleakala 
National Park on Maui, as well as several military bases are a part.223 The vast majority 
of the land held by the State and Federal governments is former crown and government 
land.224 At the time of the overthrow, crown lands represented about a million acres and 
government land represented about 800,000 acres.225 Crown land was land that was held 
by the Hawaiian monarchy to be used as part of the fulfilment of their responsibilities to 
the people of Hawaiʻi with much of it leased to generate revenue and support crown 
                                                 
223 Jeanne Cooper, “Hawaii’s Top 10 Largest Landowners,” SFGate, June 29, 2012, 
http://www.sfgate.com/hawaii/alohafriday/article/Hawaii-s-top-10-largest-landowners-3671077.php. 
224 Jon Van Dkyke, “What Are the ‘Ceded Lands’ of Hawaii?,” Civil Beat News, October 25, 2010, 
http://www.civilbeat.org/2010/10/5914-what-are-the-ceded-lands-of-hawaii/. 
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activities.226 Government land was land held for the operation of the state and 
encompassed government buildings, public parks and similar public works.227 Both types 
of land were seized in the overthrow, and about 50 thousand acres were sold by the 
Republic to private landowners.228 The remainder was ceded to the United States, which 
later transferred much of the land to the State of Hawaii.229 Under Hawaii Act 176, public 
lands in Hawaiʻi cannot be sold or transferred without a two-thirds vote by the State 
Legislature. Developing crown land is highly controversial and legally fraught. It is thus 
not often tried. As a result, there a number of scattered plots of land that are undeveloped 
in the midst of other large developments.  
Several private landholders also own significant portions of Hawaii’s land. 
Kamehameha Schools is the largest private landholder with 363,000 acres held in a trust 
established by Princess Pauahi.230 In addition to several large school campuses, much of 
this land is leased for residential and commercial operations.231 Alexander & Baldwin is 
the next largest with 113,000 acres.232 As a major sugar producer and successor to much 
of Dole’s Hawaiʻi operations and owner of Matson shipping company (the primary cargo 
shipping company for the region), Alexander & Baldwin is highly economically 
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significant and powerful. Parker Ranch though previously the largest private landowner 
now holds 107,000 acres.233 Though much smaller today, Parker Ranch once controlled 
most of the private land on the island of Hawaiʻi and was one of the largest privately-
owned ranches in the world.  
The Cook Islands land tenure system is relatively complex and represents a blend 
of traditional style land tenure systems with a Land Court system for validating claims. In 
1901, with the transition to New Zealand administration, the transition agreement 
prohibited the sale of land, a provision that was due to concerns over New Zealand’s 
(mis)handling of native land.234 In 1902, the Land Court was established to resolve land 
claims and to arrange for land leases.235 Land in the Cook Islands cannot be sold, only 
leased.236 In 1957, the court ruled that all children are to equally inherit the land of their 
parents.237 These non-Māori judges based the ruling upon a non-existent principle of 
Māori culture, creating a situation in which the land rules no longer actually reflect 
traditional practice despite the statutory responsibility to do so.238 This ruling has become 
problematic in that there are estimated to be 130,000 Cook Islanders globally, with most 
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still maintaining rights to their customary lands.239 Absentee landowners are given 
considerable power to influence the usage of their inherited land regardless of the wishes 
of resident landowners.240 This structure also results in highly fragmented lands wherein 
land may be subdivided amongst so many relatives that it is impractical for them to use it 
productively.241 Land lease prices are for many unachievable, and the complex process 
makes it poorly suited for individuals seeking to build in the Cook Islands. There are also 
significant land shortages in Rarotonga leading such a high population density rate that it 
is actually comparable to many European countries.  
Niue’s system of land tenure is extremely similar to that of the Cook Islands.242 
Most notably, land rights can be maintained even after migrating from Niue. This has 
created an area of contention for many Niueans still living in Niue. As most changes to 
land usage require the consent of the family that collectively owns the land, it can be 
difficult for those residents in Niue to gain the agreement of the rest of the family living 
overseas on how the land should be used. Further, there remain a number of abandoned 
buildings partially destroyed by cyclones that cannot be repaired or razed due to an 
inability to gain consent from the overseas owners. There have been proposals to allow 
the cancellation of land rights for long absent landowners, but these proposals have not 
to-date been successful.243         
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Owing to its small population size, Niue has the twelfth lowest national 
population density rate in the World. The only countries with lower population density 
are those who have extremely large minimally populated areas such as Canada and 
Australia. Most small island nations, even those with reasonable land holding and small 
populations, will quickly face land shortages as the population grows. In contrast, Niue 
with its declining populations and comfortably sized island has not seen the pressures on 
land usage that other small island nations have faced. Consequently, though land titles 
may be messy, there is plentiful land on the island. 
 Fiji’s first governor established a policy that forbids any additional land from 
being sold. As a result, only about 8 per cent of the land in Fiji is freehold land.244 An 
additional 8 per cent is held by the state as Crown Land.245 The remainder is “Native 
Land” managed by the iTaukei Land Trust Board.246 These lands cannot be sold, but can 
be leased.247 Today, around a third of this land is currently leased, with the remainder 
operating under customary land traditions.248 The leases are negotiated and administered 
through the iTaukei Land Trust Board on behalf of, and with varying levels of input 
from, the customary landholders. These policies, though effective at limiting non-iTaukei 
ownership, have created a market in which the limited freehold land can be in very high 
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demand with prices that are out of reach of many Fijians, leading to foreign ownership. A 
2014 law aimed to address this concern by requiring that all rural land purchases by non-
citizens be followed by the construction of a house valued at greater than FJ$250k within 
two years. This law was intended to crack down on foreign land speculation and to 
improve housing access for Fijians, though its actual effectiveness is questionable.249  
Fiji’s land ownership model is often presented as an ideal model by native rights 
activists elsewhere (including in Hawaiʻi). It is, however, highly problematic. This 
approach is very paternalistic in preventing “landowners” from expressing their agency in 
determinations of the use and transfer of their land. Generational dispersion means that 
for many their share of the land profits is so small that it is only symbolic and uses of the 
land require very high levels of consensus or rely upon fading traditional power 
structures. Further, the system prevents people (primarily Indo-Fijians) from being ever 
able to own the land that they have lived and worked on for generations. Most people in 
Fiji (including iTaukei) are, as a result of the extremely limited amounts of freehold land, 
highly unlikely to ever become themselves landowners in the typically understood 
meaning of the term.  
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3.5 Tourism 
 Tourism is highly significant for all four nations. Tourism and related services 
contribute 75% of the Cook Island’s GDP.250 With almost ten times the number of 
visitors as residents tourism has been a significant income source for Niue representing 
about 40% of the island’s GDP.251 It is also expected that most economic growth for Niue 
will be through an expansion of the tourism sector. Though Fiji is more diversified, travel 
and tourism still contributed 37% of Fiji’s GDP in 2014 and is estimated to represent 
43.5% of the country’s GDP by 2025.252 In Hawaiʻi, tourism contributes over $14 billion 
representing about 20% of Hawaii’s overall economic activity.253  
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Indirectly, Hawaiʻi has also built a large industry selling products based on tourist 
impressions of islands. The speciality crops, such as flowers, coffee, pineapple and 
macadamia nuts, are sold using the same imagery of Hawaiʻi that is promoted by the 
tourism industry. Fiji has a similar situation in which products, most notably FIJI Water, 
is sold using images of Fiji as a paradise and on this basis, it is able to represent a 
meaningful portion of the nation’s GDP alone. Niue and the Cook Islands, with their 
minimal export industries, have no significant examples of this phenomenon, but given 
the other small island nation trends and the new focus on premium small-scale exports, it 
can be expected that as they expand their export sectors this style of branding will be 
dominant. 
 Tourism, particularly island tourism, provides a significant motivator to shape 
world perception in order to support a relaxing image that meets tourist expectations. 
Ethnic conflict, environmental concerns, political instability, and sovereignty battles can 
reduce the ability to sell the islands as a tropical paradise. Thus, there becomes a strong 
economic motivator to lessen their impact or visibility. Issues are often downplayed or 
otherwise minimised so as to allow the tourist perception of the islands to be unharmed. 
 Similarly, many tourists to island nations are seeking an experience of an exotic, 
often fictitious, version of island life with beautiful beaches, friendly natives, and no 
worries. This can be problematic as a desire for tourism dollars can cause nations to 
establish policies of national identity which favour a tourist desired sense of 
“authenticity” and “tradition” rather than inclusivity or historical accuracy. As discussed 
in Chapter 6, a pan-Pacific representation has become favoured in many presentations of 
local culture for tourists. Tourists expect certain foods, styles of dance, dress and music, 
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all of which often become what the world (and sometimes even locals) see as 
representing the nations. Along with many other tourist focused cultural presentations, 
luaus and hula are prime examples of this in that both have been adapted considerably 
from traditional practice to reflect early Hawaiʻi tourism advertising and travel stories 
better. Similar trends can be seen in most of the rest of the Pacific as well.  
3.6 History 
Each of the nations in this paper has experienced a unique colonial and 
postcolonial experience that is rarely explored. This section provides a very brief 
overview of the key historical events as they relate to the formation of the nations. Of 
particular concern in each nation is the initial settlement (which is key for the arguments 
of native nationalism), their colonial circumstances and eventual independence (except 
for Hawaiʻi).  More recent events are covered in greater detail in the subsequent chapters. 
3.6.1 Niue 
There remains some debate over when people first came to Niue. Carbon dating 
of archaeological finds suggest that humans first settled in Niue around 200 CE.254 It 
appears that there were several waves of migration from Tonga and Samoa starting at 
least 1500 years ago.255 Within the Niuean language and tradition, all islands other than 
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Niue were described as Tonga, so there is a possibility that the migration patterns 
included other Pacifica people as well256 (likely Fijians257 and Cook Islanders258). 
 For much of Niuean history, the island operated under a model of autonomous 
family groups without hereditary chiefs. Around 1700, a system of non-hereditary elected 
kings was adopted.259  
 The first European contact with Niue came in 1774 when the island was spotted 
by Captain Cook.260 His party was allowed to land but were quickly driven off by the 
Niueans.261 One narrative has Cook’s crew attacked with rocks as they attempted to raise 
a British flag.262 Cook and his crew retreated after firing a musket shot, and when they 
reapproached the island they were met by several warriors and chose to retreat.263 Cook’s 
crew described Niueans as “unsociable”, caused by the “inhospitality” of the island, and 
saw no purpose in reattempting contact.264 Cook (re)named the island the “Savage 
Island” because of this. Local stories describe the Niuean warriors as friendly, offering 
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the traditional challenge, which Cook misunderstood.265 They also say that he saw red 
dye on their lips, and clothing and believed it to be blood, implying cannibalism, but this 
was actually the juice from a local banana.266 Though Cook’s narrative was most likely 
biased, it led to Europeans avoiding the islands for some time.267 By 1828, limited trade 
was occurring with Whalers, but (almost definitely false) tales of Niueans violence, 
murder and cannibalism were common.268 Missionaries made several attempts to bring 
their mission to Niue without success.269 Eventually, in 1830, missionaries from the 
London Missionary Society were able to convince two Niueans to go with them to Samoa 
to be trained as pastors. One of these, Nukai Peniamina, returned in 1846.270 After several 
attempts at landing, they were accepted at the village of Mutalau.271 Peniamina was 
quickly successful in convincing the island to convert.272 The conversion also brought an 
acceptance of increased trade and societal change.273 After a series of missteps, regular 
trade with Niue was occurring by the 1860s and a very small number of Europeans had 
settled on the island.274  
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 Early in his reign, Niuean King Fataaiki petitioned British Queen Victoria for 
Niue to become a British protectorate in a letter sent in November 1887.275 Germany 
objected under the Berlin Convention, and Niue remained neutral territory.276 Fataaiki 
again petitioned in 1889.277 After his death, King Togia sent another petition in October 
1899.278 As the Berlin Convention had since collapsed, Niue became a British 
protectorate in April 1900.279 A year later, it was transferred to New Zealand, where, 
along with the Cook Islands, it became a protectorate under the Dominion of New 
Zealand.280  
 Under the New Zealand administration, an island council was established. 
However, until 1903, Niue was administered by New Zealand along with the Cook 
Islands leaving residents with many unaddressed complaints.281 A separate administration 
was established in 1903 with its own resident commissioner.282 The first commissioner 
was Christopher Maxwell.283 He focused strongly on infrastructure but clashed with the 
Island Council over their call for alcohol prohibition and other “immorality” 
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ordinances.284 He was replaced in 1907 for adultery. This started several decades of 
short-term minimally qualified commissioners on loan from the Post Office or Customs 
whose individual impact was minimal.285 World War I saw a large number of Niuean 
volunteers serve at great cost to themselves and the islands.286 The war also distracted 
New Zealand from its colonial administrative responsibilities.287 Niue was an undesirable 
posting for New Zealand administrators that many tried to leave as quickly as possible.288 
The longest serving of these was Commissioner Joseph McMahon-Box who, after 28 
years of service in Niue left, due to poor health and financial issues.289 He was replaced 
by Cecil Larsen, a retired Army officer with experience in the Cook Islands (the first 
qualified commissioner after Maxwell).290 He found serious financial mismanagement 
and embezzlement having occurred under McMahon-Box, along with several other 
issues.291 Larsen made a number of positive changes for the island, but was also 
described as cruel and abusive.292 A growing unemployment problem and Niuean 
concerns about European immorality (mostly related to alcohol consumption and Sunday 
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labour) created some strife under his administration.293 Having been unable to find a 
long-term police chief, Larsen unpopularly took on the role himself.294 In this role, he 
was said to physically abuse prisoners and use them for household labour.295  
Larsen was murdered in his bed by three escaped Niuean prisoners on August 16, 
1953.296 The prisoners were fairly young and had all been convicted of minor crimes.297 
After killing Larsen, they evaded capture for four days before surrendering to a Native 
constable.298 Given the small size of Niue, it has been suggested that they had assistance 
in evading capture.299 They were tried and convicted by a special court which quickly 
sentenced them to death.300 There were many procedural issues with the case, including 
the fact that one defendant had a mental age of only 10.301 The sentence was extremely 
unpopular in Niue.302 Several groups in Niue and New Zealand began to petition the New 
Zealand government for clemency.303 The cases of the three men and the larger concern 
about the racially unequal application of the death penalty in New Zealand became a 
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major issue in the upcoming New Zealand election.304 In May 1954, their sentences were 
commuted to life imprisonment in a New Zealand prison, and they were eventually 
released.305 
This case and New Zealand’s growing support for global decolonisation brought 
attention to the situation in Niue which led to the development and eventually the 
offering of autonomy in 1965 (at the same time as the Cook Islands).306 Niue asked that 
autonomy be delayed.307 Rapid development occurred over the next decade with 
significant infrastructure improvements.308 A referendum was held in 1974, which 
resulted in independence with a free association agreement.309 On the table for this 
referendum (and the Cook Islands independence) were the options of complete 
independence, full incorporation within New Zealand, self-government with free 
association, or membership in a future Polynesian federation310.  
                                                 
304 Scott, Would a Good Man Die? 
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid. 
307 Pointer, Niue 1774-1974. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Ibid. 
310 Complete independence was economically problematic, whilst full incorporation or annexation 
was unpopular as a loss of control and identity. Annexation was also concerning for New Zealanders as it 
would have high costs for the rapid development the islands would require. A Polynesian federation was 
reasonably popular in some groups but was ultimately a highly flawed proposal that had been repeatedly 
presented as the solution to British, New Zealand and Australian holdings in the Pacific. Though very tidy 
for Britain, New Zealand and Australia, it would have created an absurdly widespread set of islands that, 
though sharing a common government, would lack a common language, culture or history. Its major 
advantage would have been in creating a power bloc unavailable to small island states and allowing the 
93 
 
The first elections in 1975 saw Robert Rex, who was key to the self-governance 
process, become the first premier. He served until his death in 1992, being continuously 
re-elected every three years. Young Vivian completed Rex’s term in 1992 and was again 
elected in 2002 for a six-year term. Frank Lui and Sani Lakatani served for years and 
three years, respectively, in between Vivian’s terms. Toke Talagi defeated Vivian in 2008 
and is the current premier of Niue. All of the premiers have been either independents or 
until its dissolution in 2003, members of the country's only political party, the Niue 
People's Party. Niue continues to face issues with cyclones and depopulation leading to 
considerable concern for the long-term sustainability of the nation. 
3.6.2 Hawaiʻi 
 It is typically believed that people first settled in Hawaiʻi around 300 CE.311 There 
is, however, archaeological evidence that people may have been in there as early as 124 
CE312 or even as late as 1120 CE.313 Whilst there is a recent argument for rapid later 
Pacific migration and settlement, a two major migration model has been typically taught. 
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The first migration is said to have occurred 300-600 CE from the southern Pacific, 
particularly the Marquesas Islands.314 The second wave is thought to have occurred 
around 1000-1300 CE from Tahiti.315 Quasi-mythical Pā‘ao is said to have led the second 
migration which brought with it much of the social and religious structures that have 
become known as Hawaiʻi culture.316 Some modern sovereignty activists describe Pā‘ao 
as the leader of a “number of warlike Tahitians [who] arrived on the peaceful islands of 
Hawaii”.317 Pā‘ao’s group is credited by them as having introduced human sacrifice, war 
and oppression to Hawaiʻi. Pā‘ao is presented in this as the first wave of foreign invaders 
who have been destroying Hawaiʻi, with the American overthrow and continuing 
occupation a continuation of the same bloodthirstiness and oppression.  
 In the period following the second wave of migration, rule by chiefs rather than 
councils of elders became the norm.318 The period was also marked by rapid population 
growth, large public works projects, and the end of long-distance voyaging.319  
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 Though there is some evidence that Spanish explorers in the 1540s may have been 
the first Europeans to encounter Hawaiʻi,320 Captain James Cook is generally credited as 
the first European contact with Hawaiʻi in his January 1778 visit.321 They engaged in 
brief trade, and he soon proceeded onwards.322 In January 1779 he returned to Hawaiʻi 
and was warmly greeted and celebrated as his arrival coincided with the Makahiki (a 
major festival).323 William Bligh (the future captain of HMS Bounty) described Cook as 
welcomed as the God Lono.324 This is generally considered to be a misinterpretation of 
the situation, but one that gained significant traction and helped build the global myth of 
Natives seeing European explorers as gods. In February 1779, Cook returned, having 
suffered the loss of a mast.325 While the ship was anchored in Kealakekua Bay, one of the 
longboats was stolen by Hawaiians.326 The reasons given for the theft vary significantly 
with each narrative assigning the parties differing levels of blame. Cook, accompanied by 
nine British Marines, kidnapped the king of the island, Kalaniʻōpuʻu, to hold hostage for 
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the return of the boat (a strategy that they had used successfully elsewhere).327 Upon 
reaching the beach, Cook and the Marines were overwhelmed by Hawaiians.328 Cook was 
killed along with four Marines.329 The remaining Marines returned to the ship having 
killed several Hawaiians.330  
There were a number of stories told about Cook’s visit and death with varying 
degrees of accuracy. It has been used both as evidence of Hawaiian primitiveness and 
savagery, as well as a story of Native peoples being mistreated and subsequently being 
able to defend themselves and seek justice against a more powerful yet ignorant foe.  
 After several decades of fighting amongst the chiefs of Hawaiʻi, Kamehameha I 
with a large armada of war canoes and soldiers set out to conquer the islands of 
Hawaiʻi.331 By 1795, Kamehameha I had conquered all but the island of Kaua'i.332 In 
1810, with King Kaumualiʻi of Kaua'i becoming a vassal of Kamehameha, Kamehameha 
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had established a single Hawaiian kingdom.333 Kamehameha is typically revered as an 
excellent ruler.334  
 After Kamehameha I's death, his first-born son Liholiho was crowned king.335 
During his reign, American Protestant missionaries converted many Hawaiians to 
Christianity, ending many traditional practices.336 The hereditary rule of the House of 
Kamehameha lasted until Kamehameha V’s death in 1872.337 An election was held of 
eligible chiefs resulting in the election of Lunalilo (grandnephew of Kamehameha I). He 
died a year later.338 Kalākaua was elected by the Legislative Assembly in 1874.339 He 
ruled until his death in 1891, after which his sister Liliʻuokalani became queen.340 She 
ruled until the monarchy was overthrown in 1893.341  
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 Starting not long after Cook’s death, sugar and pineapple became major industries 
in Hawaiʻi.342 The sugarcane and pineapple plantations, like most plantations of the time, 
found themselves in need of labour. Introduced disease had decimated the Hawaiian 
population, creating a local worker shortage.343 Indentured labourers from China were 
brought over until the Chinese government suspended the program as a result of 
abuses.344 Labourers were soon brought from Portugal, the Philippines and other 
European and Asian nations thus establishing the groundwork for the diversity of Hawaiʻi 
today.345  
 The plantations brought considerable trade to Hawaiʻi with American influence 
growing rapidly.346 King Kalākaua negotiated a treaty with the US under which sugar 
could enter the US duty-free in exchange for the rights to use Pearl Harbour by the US 
military.347  
In 1887, the armed militia of the Honolulu Rifles (the Hawaiian League’s all-
white militia) forced Kalākaua to sign the 1887 Constitution, known as the Bayonet 
Constitution.348 The Constitution removed much of the King’s power and gave it to the 
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white American controlled legislature.349 It also restricted the right to vote to those with 
an income of $600 and allowed noncitizens to vote.350 This effectively removed the right 
of Hawaiians and most non-white immigrants to vote and consolidated control in the 
hands of the plantation owners.351  
 In 1893, Queen Liliʻuokalani announced plans to adopt a new constitution.352 A 
group, composed primarily of Americans and Europeans, which named itself the 
Committee of Safety, was formed to stage a coup.353 The Committee of Safety via the 
Honolulu Rifles took control of the palace and placed Liliʻuokalani under house arrest.354 
At the request of the coup leaders, a company of U.S. Marines and two companies of 
U.S. sailors provided support for the overthrow355 In a desire to avoid bloodshed, the 
Queen ordered her forces to surrender, and the Honolulu Rifles took over the 
government356  
The Committee of Safety established a provisional government.357 Newly 
inaugurated President Grover Cleveland ordered an investigation which found that the 
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"United States diplomatic and military representatives had abused their authority and 
were responsible for the change in government."358 Cleveland strongly supported 
reinstatement but was opposed by the provisional government and the US Senate.359  
On July 4, 1894, the Republic of Hawaiʻi was proclaimed with the aim of 
eventual annexation.360 In 1898, the Territory of Hawaiʻi was established through the 
annexation of Hawaiʻi under the Newlands Resolution.361 Hawaii remained a territory for 
sixty years, during which plantation owners and other members of the wealthy elite 
maintained considerable control. On December 7, 1941, the attack on Pearl Harbour by 
Imperial Japan occurred, which dragged the United States into the war and brought 
considerable attention to Hawaiʻi.362 In March 1959, Congress passed the Hawaii 
Admission Act, which allowed for a referendum on statehood.363 In June, 94.3% voted in 
favour of statehood and Hawaiʻi soon became the fiftieth state of the United States.364 
There were some procedural issues with the vote, but by then, demographics had shifted 
enough that Hawaiians had become a minority population. Further, the ballot gave no 
option for Hawaiian sovereignty in any form. Given a choice between full admittance 
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into the United States and the problematic territorial status, support for statehood cannot 
be interpreted as contentment with the lack of sovereignty.  
Since statehood, Hawaiʻi has undergone several waves of modernisation efforts 
and increased tourism and migration. In 1993, United States Public Law 103-150, also 
known as the Apology Resolution, was signed into law by President of the United States 
Bill Clinton. It formally apologised for the overthrow but has no practical legal effect.  
3.6.3 Cook Islands 
 People are thought to have first arrived in the Cook Islands around 800-1200 CE, 
though there is some evidence of humans there much earlier.365 Tradition holds that 
Aitutaki, Tangiia and Rarotonga were settled by people from French Polynesia, whilst the 
northern islands were settled from Samoa and Tonga.366 It is said that New Zealand was 
settled by Rarotongan Maoris and others who arrived around 1000 CE with the Cook 
Islands as their final stop before reaching New Zealand.367  
 The first recorded European contact is a sighting by Spanish sailor Álvaro de 
Mendaña in 1595.368 He was followed by Portuguese-Spaniard Pedro Fernández de 
Quirós in 1606 who was the first to make landfall.369 Captain James Cook visited in 1773 
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and 1777 landing on the uninhabited Palmerston Atoll.370 Russian Baltic German 
Admiral Adam Johann von Krusenstern renamed the islands the Cook Islands in 1823 
(though the name was not widely used until 1888).371 The same year, missionaries from 
the London Missionary Society brought Christianity to the islands with considerable 
success in their efforts at conversion.372  
In 1862 and 1863, the Cook Islands were visited by Peruvian slave traders 
(blackbirders) who kidnapped and enslaved people from several islands and took them to 
Peru.373 Hardest hit was the island of Penrhyn where they lost at least three-quarters of 
their population.374 
 The islands became a British protectorate in 1888 when there were fears of 
occupation by other foreign powers, including France which had recently taken Tahiti.375 
On 6 September 1900, a petition was circulated to request annexation.376 On 8–9 October 
1900, seven instruments of cession for the islands were presented by the chiefs and 
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accepted by the British thus incorporating the Cook Islands into the British Empire.377 
The island of Aitutaki did not submit a cession request, but the inhabitants of the island 
did nevertheless consider themselves British subjects and the island was annexed in the 
Proclamation accepting the others.378 In 1901, the Cook Islands was added to the Colony 
of New Zealand (and eventually the Dominion of New Zealand).  
 In 1915, the Cook Islands Act caused a shift in the way the Cook Islands were 
administered.379 Prior to the Act, they were seen as individual islands operating as 
separate political entities.380 Under the Act, the Cook Islands became administered as a 
single political unit. This marks the birth of the modern Cook Islands nation.381 It was 
administered exclusively by a resident commissioner until 1946, when the Legislative 
Council was established.382  
  The Cook Islands became a self-governing territory in free association with New 
Zealand in 1965.383 Independence was of mixed popularity with Cook Islanders, many of 
whom felt the previous arrangement with New Zealand was highly beneficial to the 
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islands.384 New Zealand has been accused of pushing for independence more to serve its 
interests than those of the islands.385 As it was a vocal supporter of the newly independent 
Asian and African nations within the UN holding colonies, regardless of the desire of 
their inhabitants, was politically embarrassing for them and harmful to their foreign 
policy objectives.386 
 Albert Henry was the newly independent country’s first premier387. He was re-
elected five times but remains a polarising figure in the Cook Islands.388 He had many 
beneficial achievements for the Cook Islands, particularly in the early part of his term. 
His later years were, however, marked by accusations of mismanagement, dictatorial 
conduct and other scandals. Many of Henry’s actions have been presented as self-serving. 
While often bringing positive developments to the Cook Islands, the actions also often 
provided for his personal gain.389  
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 The 1978 elections were hotly contested as a result of growing dissatisfaction 
with Henry’s government and his Cook Islands Party.390 His opponents accused him of 
treating the islands as his own personal fiefdom with rampant nepotism.391 He is said to 
have strictly controlled the state-run media and used the radio as a personal propaganda 
tool.392 Due to an oddity of Cook Islands law at the time, all of age Cook Islanders in the 
Cook Islands and abroad were eligible to vote, but could only do so when physically 
present in the islands.393 The parties developed a scheme to increase voting by chartering 
aeroplanes to fly in New Zealand resident Cook Islanders to cast their vote at a reduced 
cost.394 Henry’s party illegally subsided flights for his party using government funds.395 It 
was victorious in the election, but he was soon charged and convicted of corruption and 
election law violations.396 He was thus removed from his position of premier by the court, 
and his knighthood was revoked.397 Following the court order, opposition party leader 
Tom Davis (Democratic Party) became premier, marking one of the only times in which 
a court has successfully deposed a sitting government.398 The Cook Islands Party returned 
to power in the 1983 elections with Albert Henry's cousin Geoffrey Henry becoming 
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prime minister. He served for ten years, followed by a brief term by Joe Williams. The 
1999 elections saw the Democratic Alliance Party (a successor to the Democratic Party) 
taking a majority which they held under Terepai Maoate (until a no-confidence vote in 
2002), Robert Woonton (2002-2004) and Jim Marurai until their loss in the 2010 
elections. The Cook Islands Party under Henry Puna won both the 2010 and 2014 
elections and is currently the majority party.  
The Cook Islands, having significant maritime territory, focused much of its early 
foreign policy on defining these boundaries. In 1980, the United States signed a treaty 
with the Cook Islands delimiting its the maritime boundaries and dropping the US’s 
claim to the islands of Penrhyn, Pukapuka, Manihiki, and Rakahanga (on behalf of 
American Samoa). A similar treaty was signed in 1990 with France that clarified the 
maritime borders between the Cook Islands and French Polynesia. 
 Though overall fairly politically stable since the 1978 elections, on June 13, 2008, 
eight of the 15 high chiefs in the House of Ariki (an advisory body to Parliament) 
attempted to dissolve the government proclaiming themselves the rightful source of 
government.399 They argued for a return to the traditional chief structural and restoration 
of their power.400 The attempt failed to gain the support they had expected and ten days 
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later they abandoned the effort, and members of the House of Ariki returned to their 
typical duties.401  
Today, issues of overfishing, global warming and depopulation remain significant 
concerns. These concerns, along with development challenges typical of small states, 
remain problematic. The relationship with New Zealand does nevertheless soften some of 
the effects through foreign aid and migration options.  
3.6.4 Fiji 
 Fiji has generally been thought to have been settled between 2000 and 1000 
BCE.402 More recent work suggests that the first settlement may actually have been even 
earlier,403 possibly as early as 8000 BCE.404 It is typically thought that Austronesian 
peoples first migrated to Fiji followed about 1000 years later by Melanesians.405 The Tu'i 
Tonga Empire included Fiji from the 10th century until its fall in the 13th century.406 This 
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Tongan empire brought Polynesian culture and language into Fiji, though most 
indigenous Fijians are Melanesians.407  
The islands were first recorded by a western explorer in 1643 when Dutch captain 
Abel Janszoon Tasman visited north-eastern Fiji.408 European trade came heavily to Fiji 
in the early nineteenth century.409 There was extensive trade with Fijian produced 
sandalwood, and beche-de-mer exchanged for many European tools including muskets.410 
This trade led to the establishment of the first European settlement, Levuka, in 1822.411 
Missionaries first came to Fiji in 1830 from the London Missionary Society via Tonga.412 
They were followed by Methodist missionaries (supported by Tongan Prince Enele 
Ma'afu) in 1835.413  
 Fierce warfare amongst rival small kingdoms was common in Fiji for much of the 
nineteenth century, particularly heightened by recently available muskets.414 Using 
Swedish supplied weapons, Ratu Tanoa Visawaqa, the Vunivalu of Bau (essentially 
Paramount Chief of Bua), took control of much of Western Fiji.415 In 1852, Ratu Seru 
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Epenisa Cakobau succeeded him.416 He soon claimed the title of Tui Viti (King of 
Fiji).417 His claim was tolerated, but not supported by many of the local chiefs who saw 
him more in the role of first among equals rather than their ruler.418 It was also opposed 
by Ma'afu, who had claimed the Island of Lakeba.419  
 Cakobau claims were also indirectly challenged by an incident in which American 
consul, John Brown Williams’ store was looted by Fijians after a fire caused by stray 
American cannon fire during a Fourth of July celebration in 1849.420 Williams’ house 
was also burned in a suspected arson attack in 1855.421 The commander of the United 
States naval frigate USS John Adams demanded US$38,531 from Cakobau (as King of 
Fiji) in compensation for these incidents.422 Unable to pay and with his control of the Fiji 
limited, he offered to cede the islands to the United Kingdom in exchange for the debt 
and the condition that his claims as Tui Viti be upheld.423 After four years of 
consideration, the United Kingdom rejected the offer.424 In return for 5,000 km² of land, 
the Australian-based Polynesia Company paid the debt in 1868.425 Other settlers soon 
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arrived with messy land claims and limited actual governance over the settlers.426 In June 
1871, under the direction of the British honorary consul John Bates Thurston, an 
arrangement was made in which a constitutional monarchy, with Cakobau as King and a 
settler-dominated Legislative Assembly, was established.427  
 Government overspending soon produced excessive debt leading Cakobau to 
offer again to cede the islands to the British in 1872.428 The offer was revised, with his 21 
March 1874 offer being accepted leading to British annexation on 10 October 1874.429 
Though maintaining the title of Vunivalu of Bau, Cakobau, formally ceded the title of Tui 
Viti to Queen Victoria.430 
Sir Arthur Gordon was appointed the first governor of the new colony in June 
1875.431 He adopted a series of policies that were intended to protect iTaukei.432 Central 
to these was his ban on further land sales (requiring the remaining land be leased) and a 
prohibition on using iTaukei labourers on the plantations (theoretically to protect them 
from exploitation).433 He also elected to allow the chiefs to maintain control of their local 
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areas and established the Great Council of Chiefs as an advisory body.434 Fijians were 
also prohibited from enlisting in World War I, again in what was described as an attempt 
to protect them.435 Though these measures allowed for a reasonably good, though highly 
paternalistic, colonial experience for iTaukei, the prohibition on using iTaukei labourers 
was a problem for European plantation owners whose business models depended upon 
cheap labour.  
A system of indentured labourers to address the labour shortage was started in 
1878 using labourers from India.436 The program was ended in 1916 due to concerns of 
abuse. Over the course of it, around 61,000 people came to Fiji from India.437 They 
worked under a five-year contract, after which they could pay to return to India or work 
five more years to allow the choice of a paid return to India or staying in Fiji.438 The 
majority choose to stay.439 Many parts of the system were quite brutal, and recruiters lied 
heavily about work conditions and the distance from India.440 Labourers were recruited 
from several parts of India, allowing much more diversity than is typical under the 
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indentured labourer system.441 This, amongst other factors, also led to the disappearance 
of caste amongst Indo-Fijians.442 
In a shift in British policy, Fijians were allowed to participate in the Second 
World War.443 Many thousand iTaukei joined the Fiji Infantry Regiment which fought in 
the Solomon Islands campaign.444 Fiji was also used as a training base for the Allies.445 
Indo-Fijians largely did not participate in the war efforts, as their demands for equal 
treatment with Europeans was refused.446 This non-participation was used by ethno-
nationalists to justify exclusion and discrimination in the post-war years.447 
The Legislative Council became a partly elective body in 1904.448 It was, 
nevertheless, a largely European dominated and the iTaukei members were appointed by 
the Governor from a list of 6 candidates submitted by the Great Council of Chiefs.449 In 
1953, the Council became equally divided amongst the three major ethnic groups of 
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Fiji.450 Of the five members each for Indo-Fijians and Europeans, three were elected, and 
two were appointed.451 All five iTaukei members were selected by the Great Council of 
Chiefs.452  
By the mid-1960s Britain was divesting itself of its colonial empire.453 
Independence was popular amongst Indo-Fijians who felt that it would allow for an end 
of discriminatory policies.454 Indo-Fijians were by this time a larger percentage of the 
population than iTaukei.455 As such, many iTaukei feared that independence would allow 
Indo-Fijian domination and a change in land protections.456 They opposed independence 
on these grounds. Despite iTaukei opposition, the British were determined to divest 
themselves of Fiji.457 A compromise was eventually reached in which Fiji would be 
governed by a Senate dominated by Fijian chiefs and a popularly elected House of 
Representatives (with ethnic quotas).458 Under this arrangement, Fiji became independent 
on 10 October 1970.459 
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The Alliance Party of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara dominated post-independence 
politics; Mara served as prime minister from 1970 to 1992 (except a brief period in 1987) 
and as president from 1993 to 2000.460 Indo-Fijians took a majority in 1977 but were 
unable to form a coalition government.461 In April 1987, a coalition led by Timoci 
Bavadra (ethnically iTaukei) formed of Indo-Fijians parties established the 
government.462 This government was removed in a military coup led by Lt. Col. Sitiveni 
Rabuka on 14 May 1987.463 Rabuka, unhappy with the interim government, staged 
another coup on 25 September 1987.464 He declared Fiji a republic on 10 October.465 
After protests from foreign governments, he resigned on 6 December, and Mara was 
reappointed prime minister.466 A highly problematic and discriminatory constitution was 
established in July 1990 which guaranteed iTaukei supremacy.467 Facing ongoing foreign 
and domestic pressure, a new constitution was created in 1997 which addressed many of 
the issues.468 The first elections held under the new constitution took place in May 1999 
leading to the defeat of Rabuka's coalition by an Indo-Fijian coalition led by Mahendra 
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Chaudhry.469 In May 2000, Chaudhry and much of Parliament were taken hostage in the 
House of Representatives by an armed group led by George Speight.470 Speight was an 
iTaukei failed businessman who had been living in Australia.471 Though successful in 
deposing the government, Speight was never able to meaningfully gain any control of the 
islands.472 He was unpopular amongst many in Fiji, though the coup itself was seen by a 
number of iTaukei as needed to address their fears of changes to land laws stroked by 
ethno-nationalist propaganda.473 Commodore Frank Bainimarama took control of Fiji 
soon after and implemented an interim civilian government led by Laisenia Qarase.474 In 
the 2001 elections, Qarase defeated Chaudhry.475 Speight was convicted of treason in 
2002.476  
 Controversial legislation to pardon those involved in the coup and allegations of 
government corruption caused clashes between Bainimarama and Qarase.477 Tensions 
between the military and Qarase’s government intensified following the May 2006 
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election.478 As Qarase was unwilling to meet his demands, Bainimarama launched a 
military coup on 5 December 2006.479 Bainimarama arranged to have himself appointed 
Prime Minister.480 On 9 April 2009, the Court of Appeal ruled that the coup-appointed 
government was illegal.481 In response, Bainimarama dissolved the government and the 
constitution dismissing all judges, and civil servants.482 Bainimarama adopted a number 
of policies designed to address systemic discrimination, corruption and promote 
development. There were also serious allegations of civil rights violations and 
government brutality occurring under Bainimarama. A new constitution was established 
in 2013 and, after several delays, elections were held in September 2014, which were 
won by Bainimarama under the FijiFirst Party483. The coups and relationship to the 
nationalist movements are discussed in further detail within Chapter 5.  
3.7 Conclusions 
The four nations of this dissertation provide a valuable, but largely unexplored set of sites 
at which to study the effects of nationalism. Though in the same region with considerable 
similarities, the islands have noticeable differences in population, ethnic diversity and 
                                                 
478 Ibid. 
479 Ibid. 
480 Ibid. 
481 David Hegarty and Darrell Tryon, Politics, Development and Security in Oceania (Canberra: ANU 
E Press, 2013), 207. 
482 Ibid. 
483 Though the elections did have some issues (most notably restrictions on public assembly prior to 
elections and strict party registration rules), external observers described it as fair and free. There are, 
nevertheless, sceptics who describe the elections as rigged.  
117 
 
land rights. Their experiences with colonialism and independence, whilst with many 
commonalities to each other, represent a reasonably unusual experience when compared 
with that of other post-colonial nations. 
 On the global stage, all four nations have tiny populations. Even Hawaiʻi and Fiji, 
the largest of the region, are still smaller than almost 150 other nations. With Niue’s 
population under two thousand, it is one of the smallest countries in the world. The Cook 
Islands is nearly ten times larger with a population of a bit over 15,000. Fiji and Hawaiʻi 
have populations of about 880,000 and 1.4 million, respectively. The nations also differ 
considerably in ethnic diversity. Hawaiʻi is one of the most ethnically diverse places in 
the world. Fiji also has considerable diversity, particularly for a small island nation. Niue 
and the Cook Islands, in contrast, are some of the most ethnically homogeneous countries 
globally. This has had significant effects on how ethnonationalism can be utilised in these 
nations.  
 Land rights remain a major issue for the islands. Niue and the Cook Islands 
maintain a complex model intended to meld traditional land ownership practices with 
Western forms, creating a system of collective family land tenure. This has been 
problematic as migration from the islands has created issues with the ability to make land 
use decisions. Fiji mostly operates under a system of long-term land leases. The concerns 
surrounding the expiration of the leases and the land tenure system, in general, has been 
the cause of much of the instability in Fiji and is frequently presented by nationalists as 
one of the largest threats facing the Fijian nation. Within Hawaiʻi, the legacy created by 
the theft of the land taken during the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi remains one 
of the largest problems the islands face. Perceived improper land stewardship is a 
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frequent cause of tension and the fight against it has become a core part of Hawaiian 
nationalism.  
 The four nations’ colonial experiences were atypical. Fiji, the Cook Islands and 
Niue became colonies as the result of cession agreements that were initiated by the 
governments of the islands. Hawaiʻi became a territory and state of the United States 
following the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi. Their colonial powers administered 
Fiji, the Cook Islands and Niue in such a way that direct impact on the Native peoples 
was much less than colonial models typically had. Hawaii’s situation was also unusual in 
that the focus of the overthrow was eventual annexation by the United States. The 
Kingdom of Hawaiʻi maintained diplomatic relations with the United States for almost 70 
years until the government was overthrown with the support of the US military.  
 Independence also came differently to the nations (and Hawaiʻi has yet to gain 
independence). The Cook Islands, and particularly Niue, showed considerable reluctance 
to become independent states. New Zealand, however, was a vocal advocate for 
decolonisation and was in a politically embarrassing situation in having its own colonies 
whilst advocating for other to divest themselves of their colonial holdings. However, the 
islands’ relationship with New Zealand was fairly positive, and their economic and 
logistic dependancy was well recognised. These concerns led to the formation of the new 
concept of “free association”. This arrangement created a system under which the islands 
could outsource to New Zealand the governmental functions they were unable to provide, 
yet still be an independent nation. Within Fiji, independence was mostly the result of 
advocacy from Indo-Fijians. Many iTaukeis saw the colonial arrangement as serving 
them reasonably well, with no urgency towards autonomy. When Fiji did gain 
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independence, its changeover celebration was carefully designed to be a calm and 
respectful handover of power.  
 Hawaiʻi is today a part of the United States. Though calls for independence are 
frequent and many describe Hawaii’s current status as under occupation, there has not 
been a viable path to independence for decades. Hawaii’s position is relatively unique in 
that it had a recognised government prior to being invaded by a geographical remote 
larger state. Its later full incorporation into that state is also unusual.  
 Each of the nation’s histories, and particularly their colonial experiences, has 
produced a legacy that has very interesting effects upon how sovereignty and nationalism 
are manifested in these islands. There are several areas explored in the following chapters 
in which we can see these effects. The expression of sovereignty in Niue, the Cook 
Islands and Hawaiʻi has especially been shaped by the islands’ experiences with 
colonialism and occupation. The manifestation of hot nationalism in Fiji and Hawaiʻi, 
likewise has a clear historical basis. Though the effects can sometimes be subtle, much of 
nationalism in these islands can be connected back to the nation’s historical formation 
and experiences.  
 
 
 
120 
 
Chapter 4 
4 Sovereignty 
 Sovereignty and nationalism are two extremely closely connected concepts.484 As 
Ichijo notes, “nationalism is typically equated with a nation achieving independence.”485 
Protecting and asserting sovereignty is assumed to be one of the major interests of a 
nation.486 It is often one of the primary focuses of nationalists. For recognised nations, 
nationalist attention will be on protecting the sovereignty of the nation from internal and 
external threats (which may or may not actually exist). Unrecognised/under-recognised 
nations will generally see nationalists attempting to assert their nation’s sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is, however, not absolute for any modern state. Every state faces a variety of 
limitations and external pressures that prevent it from acting as a complete sovereign 
entity. Many nationalists now recognise that absolute state sovereignty is no longer an 
achievable goal today.487 Nationalist movements in several areas have as a result become 
increasingly creative in the ways in which they seek to build a sovereign nation (several 
of the more creative attempts can be seen utilised by nations within this dissertation). 
This chapter will explore what sovereignty and particularly statehood means for each of 
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the nations. None of them fit the classic model of a fully sovereign state. As such, they 
provide an interesting set of examples of how sovereignty applies to smaller nations.    
Fiji, as the least ambiguous sovereign nation in this dissertation, faces the typical 
challenges of a small state. Though there are no competing claims for its territory or overt 
attempts to undermine its sovereignty by other states, their ability to express their 
sovereignty is nevertheless limited. Economic dependency, pressure from NGOs and 
multinational organisations, and occasional breaches by its neighbours, prevent Fiji from 
operating as a fully sovereign nation. The effects of globalisation and  interference by 
larger states have meant that many small nations are unable to function as a sovereign 
state in the same way that larger more powerful states can. Despite the practical 
limitations in expressing its sovereignty, Fiji remains widely recognised as a sovereign 
nation.  
Niue’s and the Cook Islands’ situations are greatly complicated by the 
unusualness of their free association agreements. This agreement has them effectively 
outsourcing some areas of sovereignty to New Zealand. As extremely small nations, they 
are highly dependent upon New Zealand both financially and logistically. Whilst the free 
association agreement is unusual, as this chapter will show, they are nevertheless legally 
fully sovereign states. Though the legal position is reasonably clear, their size and 
uncommon governance status challenge the popular conception of what a sovereign state 
“should” be like.       
The situation for Hawaii’s sovereignty is extremely muddled. There is no 
escaping the fact that Hawaiʻi is under the control of the United States. However, its 
position under international law is debatable. The government of Hawaiʻi was 
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overthrown in 1893, with the United States providing military support for the overthrow, 
contrary to international law. Its incorporation into the United States as a territory and 
later a state are similarly legally problematic.  
Additionally, Hawaii’s geographic remoteness and the United States’ federalist 
system has allowed a level of legal sovereignty in ways that would otherwise be 
unexpected. Sovereignty is the primary battleground for nationalists in Hawaiʻi. Given 
the ambiguity of its legal status, they are increasingly focusing their energies on ways in 
which tools such as legal definitions of sovereignty can be employed in the struggle for 
the restoration of a sovereign Hawaiian nation.    
This chapter explores how these four nation’s sovereignties can be defined and 
how these definitions are utilised by nationalists. After a brief discussion of the types of 
sovereignty, I will explore how each nation fits into the various criteria for statehood 
(international legal sovereignty) and the multitude of issues they face in asserting their 
sovereignty. 
The factual basis for many of the common arguments surrounding the nations’ 
sovereignty is also looked at within this chapter so as to provide a point of reference for 
exploring the creativity of the claims of nationalists. A full legal analysis of these 
arguments is outside of the scope of this dissertation. However, by providing a brief 
exploration I hope to demonstrate the ways in which nationalists have embraced 
conceptions of sovereignty and expanded their use to activities that would traditionally be 
out of scope for studies of nationalism.  
In Niue and the Cook Islands, the way in which the legal community describes the 
states is congruent with how nationalists present its status. Despite this, there exists a 
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popular impression in other nations that Niue and the Cook Islands are not actually 
sovereign given their special status. In Fiji, without a meaningfully contested status, 
sovereignty is generally discussed by nationalists only in the context of how other nations 
are breaching it. Whilst any case in which a nation's borders are breached is concerning, 
nationalists have used these cases far beyond the actual impact of the breaches. Hawaiian 
nationalists present a fascinating case. The way in which sovereignty activists typically 
present Hawaii’s legal status differs noticeably from that which the legal community 
typically considers accepted. Many of their claims even go so far beyond the legal 
consensus that they can almost be seen as creating a new conception of what the term 
sovereignty means.  
4.1 Types of Sovereignty 
 Krasner in his highly influential book Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy presents 
four conceptions of sovereignty: international legal, Westphalian, interdependence, and 
domestic.488 This model recognises the limitations of the notion of absolute state 
sovereignty and describes the situations in which sovereignty can acceptably be breached.  
For legally focused nationalists, these provide the models under which their nation is able 
to define itself. Within nations that have contested sovereignty, discussions of exactly 
how their nation meets one of these criteria are becoming of growing importance for 
nationalist movements. As international law gains public attention, supporters are no 
longer content with vague folk notions of the meaning of independence. Increasingly 
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nationalists will frame their argument for independence around (often poorly applied) 
expressions of one of the commonly recognised sovereignty models.           
 International legal sovereignty refers to states recognising one another as 
independent.489 The two dominant models for recognising statehood are the declarative 
theory and the constitutive theory. Both are discussed in detail in the following section. 
Of the four nations, only Fiji has an entirely unambiguous case for international legal 
sovereignty. Niue and the Cook Islands have a somewhat less clear case, whilst today’s 
Hawaiʻi has virtually no ability to claim international legal sovereignty. 
 Westphalian sovereignty recognises that each state has full authority over its 
territory and domestic affairs without interference from any other state.490 Though 
somewhat eroded by globalisation and intentionally limited by principles of universal 
human rights, states are expected to respect the territorial integrity of other states. Fiji, 
Niue and the Cook Islands all have full Westphalian sovereignty (at least as much as any 
other small state today). Hawaiʻi by virtue of the continued US presence clearly does not 
have any Westphalian sovereignty. 
 Interdependence sovereignty is the ability to control the flow of people, goods, 
and capital across the state’s borders.491 It has been severely curtailed by globalisation. 
Though greatly reduced from that which could be seen in previous ages, Fiji, the Cook 
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Islands and Niue all largely maintain this power. Even Hawaiʻi has some limited 
authority in this area (though of course still subject to US federal authority).  
Domestic sovereignty refers to a state’s capacity to develop and deploy policy 
within the state.492 Fiji, the Cook Islands, and Niue all unambiguously have this power. 
Within the system of federalism which the United States utilises, the State of Hawaii has 
a reasonable amount of domestic sovereignty. Despite a number of powers reserved to the 
Federal government, the federalist system leaves most domestic government functions 
within the control of US states.  
4.2 Criteria for Statehood 
 There are two dominant theories defining the criteria for statehood (and with it, 
international legal sovereignty) under international law; the declarative theory and the 
constitutive theory. Both models have reasonably significant limitations, which becomes 
increasingly clear in edge cases, such as extremely small states and groups struggling for 
independence. Further, neither model has universal acceptance in the international 
community. They, nevertheless, represent the currently most accepted way for statehood 
to be defined. The ambiguity that these definitions feature represents one of the 
significant concerns for many nationalists. It forces a focus on the question of whether a 
state is in-fact a state. This creates a situation in several nations where much of the 
nationalist energy is focused primarily upon showing their nation’s legitimacy and even 
existence. In contrast, most larger and more recognised states typically do not have to 
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concern themselves with the question of whether they are really a state as it is self-
evident.    
4.2.1 Declarative Theory  
 The declarative theory suggests that a state is a state because it has declared that it 
is one through the meeting of certain criteria. The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States largely codifies the declarative theory of statehood and 
provides the classic definition of a state as recognised within modern international law.493 
The first article of the treaty describes a state as possessing “(a) a permanent population; 
(b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the 
other states.” Further, it declares in article 3 that "the political existence of the state is 
independent of recognition by the other states." The Badinter Arbitration Committee of 
the European Union adopted a fairly similar definition, in which they stated that “the 
State is commonly defined as a community which consists of a territory and a population 
subject to an organised political authority; that such a state is characterized by 
sovereignty.” 
4.2.1.1 Permanent Population 
 The first criterion of the Montevideo Convention is that the state494 possesses a 
permanent population. For this definition, the permanent population does not exclude 
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transitory or nomadic groups.495 Rather, it requires a more nebulous criterion of 
permanent bonds to the territory.496 It is recognised that a state cannot be solely 
composed of foreigners, however, how a person becomes counted in the state’s 
permanent population is undefined.497 This criterion seems to be best represented in most 
nation-states by the sense of inclusion that is encompassed by Anderson’s theory of 
imagined community. The vague sense of belonging to a nation seems to be what the 
Montevideo Convention is trying to clumsily capture within the notion of a permanent 
population. One opinion on this by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany)498 in Re Duchy of Sealand suggested that the 
population should form a “cohesive and vibrant community”. 
 There is not a minimum size specified for statehood.499 In theory, any number of 
people, no matter how few, could form a state.500 There is, however, a practical, though 
                                                 
of Hawaiʻi, unless otherwise stated. This distinction between the federal state and federated units (often 
also called states) is made in Article 1(2), which declares that “the federal state shall constitute a sole 
person in the eyes of international law”. This distinction becomes very messy when looking at cases where 
the borders of the unrecognised federal state align closely with the federated unit such as is the case with 
Hawaiʻi or Québec.  
495 Ademola Abass, Complete International Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 117-126. 
496 Ibid. 
497 Ibid. 
498 Though the Bundesverfassungsgericht is binding only upon Germany, this is one of the few high 
court cases globally that have directly addressed this issue. It seems to represent the most common legal 
understanding of the Montevideo Convention criteria for permanent population.  
499 Abass, Complete International Law, 117-126. 
500 Ibid. 
128 
 
ultimately undefinable, lower bound to the population; to have even a minimally 
functional government requires a certain number of people in order to provide basic 
services. Provided this minimal number is reached there does not seem to be a problem 
with having extremely small states. The United Nations in 1974, as part of the UN 
Committee 24, expressed concern about the size of non-self-governing states seeking 
statehood.501 The UN today does not seem to share this concern any longer.502 UN reports 
have repeatedly noted that they recognised the “the aspirations of the peoples of the 
[Non-Self-Governing] Territories” for self-governance and the need to find solutions for 
self-determination “without any prejudice to territorial size, geographical location, size of 
the population or natural resources”. This report on Non-Self-Governing Territories also 
expressed concern with the continued existence of Non-Self-Governing Territories and 
notes that “all available options for self-determination of the Territories are valid as long 
as they are in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned and 
in conformity with” the principles expressed in previous UN resolutions.503 Given that 
this list currently includes the sparsely populated territories of the Pitcairn Islands (pop. 
50), Tokelau (pop, 1,411) and the Falkland Islands (pop, 2,500), this would suggest that, 
at least in principle, the UN allows for statehood despite an extremely small population. 
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 Niue, as of the last annual estimate, had a population of around 1,400.504 It thus 
has a smaller population than any UN member state. The island nations of Nauru and 
Tuvalu, which are currently the smallest UN member states, have populations almost 
seven times larger than Niue.505 If Niue were to seek UN membership, it would have by 
far the smallest population within its borders of any UN member state. However, when 
considering the population size of Niue, the large number of Niueans abroad should also 
likely be included. Niueans living in other countries represent a much larger group than 
those still in Niue. New Zealand alone, accounts for over twenty thousand Niueans 
abroad.506 If this population were included in any metrics of size, it would make Niue one 
of the smallest, but no longer the absolute smallest.  
The Cook Islands, whilst still a fairly small state with a population of almost 
twenty thousand, is still larger than UN member states Nauru, Tuvalu, and Palau.507 
Population size is not an issue at all for either Fiji or Hawaiʻi. Fiji’s population of about 
eight hundred and fifty thousand and Hawaii’s population of almost 1.5 million make 
them larger than several dozen existing UN member states. Problematic for a sovereign 
Hawaiʻi, however, is the implied requirement for acceptance of the population’s inclusion 
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in the state and the fact that the population is claimed by another state. Though not 
directly expressed, it seems as a practical point that the population must acknowledge at 
some level the existence of the state which is claiming them. To allow otherwise would 
violate the principle of community that this criterion seems to seek. This point may be 
academic, though, as most states with contested populations also have more serious 
issues in defining territory.  
4.2.1.2 Defined Territory 
The criterion of defined territory has been somewhat problematic to delineate. At 
its most basic level, it seems to require only that the state be able to actually define what 
its borders are. A state needs to be able to say where the state starts and where it ends. 
This ties fairly cleanly into Anderson’s notion of the nation being bounded. Though this 
seems to be a reasonably straightforward criterion, several states have expressed concern 
with how disputed territory can qualify under this definition.508 In regards to the 
admission of Israel to the UN, the Syrian delegate in the 1948 assembly stated that “the 
first qualification is that it should have a defined territory which is not contested by other 
States”.509 A US delegate made a similar statement arguing that “the reason for the rule 
that one of the necessary attributes of a state is that it shall possess territory is that one 
cannot contemplate a state as a kind of disembodied spirit”.510 In essence, they are 
arguing that the state must have a clear title to their territory in order for it to count.  
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This definition seems to create a virtually impossible barrier to statehood if it 
were to be evenly and unhypocritically applied. There are hundreds of ongoing border 
disputes, many of which extend back to the state’s founding. Even the normally peaceful 
neighbours of the United States and Canada maintain an extremely low-key dispute 
created by an ambiguity in the Treaty of Paris over Machias Seal Island. The small island 
is on the border of the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine and is occupied only by an 
ongoing rotation of 2 Canadian Coast Guard lighthouse keepers, but both states claim it. 
To suggest that all disputes over territory, even fairly insignificant ones such as these, 
should block statehood creates serious issues for most states. Even the more generous 
interpretation of the Syrian and US suggestions that a state must have at least some of its 
territory undisputed (which would still block Israel but does not create issue for Syria in 
their dispute with Turkey over the Hatay Province), undesirably places considerable 
power to block statehood in the hands of any other state willing to make a claim. Despite 
the inconsistency in the UN, the International Court of Justice has repeatedly found that 
not all of the territory has to be free of controversy in order to be considered defined 
territory.511 As such, the control of Hawaii’s territory by the United States and the 
ongoing dispute over the rightful owners of the territory does not seem in itself to block 
Hawaiʻi from meeting this criterion.   
 The qualifying size of the territory is not defined by the Montevideo Convention. 
The German Bundesverfassungsgericht in Re Duchy of Sealand noted that size was 
irrelevant to statehood. This case centred around a 0.03km2 artificial island that was 
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claiming statehood. Given a willingness to accept this a state (though Sealand statehood 
was rejected on other grounds), there does not seem to be a meaningful lower limit to the 
size of territory. Further, Niue with a territory of 260 km2 and the Cook Islands with a 
territory of 236 km2, though extremely small, are still larger than several UN member 
states (the Marshall Islands, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Tuvalu, Nauru, and Monaco). 
Likewise, Hawaiʻi and Fiji are both significantly larger than quite a few UN member 
states with total areas of 28,311 km2 and 18,272 km2 respectively. If we are to consider 
the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of each state as a part of the defined territory, all 
four grow considerably in comparison with other states. Hawaiʻi and the Cook Islands 
both have extremely large exclusive economic zones owing to their widely dispersed 
island nature. Hawaii’s EEZ512 covers over 2.3 million km2, and the Cook Islands has an 
EEZ greater than 1.8 million km2 placing them in the top 20 largest EEZs. Fiji and Niue, 
though with somewhat smaller EEZs, are still larger than the majority of global states. In 
a comparison of total controlled territory (exclusive economic zone plus total internal 
area), the four nations of this paper actually become amongst the larger world states.  
4.2.1.3 Government 
  A government is required under the Montevideo Convention criteria. The type or 
system of government is not defined and is generally not considered a meaningful part of 
                                                 
512 This assumes that both the main islands of Hawaiʻi and Northwestern Hawaiian Islands are 
included. There is some debate over the qualification of some of the geographically spread uninhabited 
northwest islands which is used to justify an EEZ of 1.6 million km2. The islands are uninhabited and have 
a total land area of around 8km2. Since the US is in a strong world position to defend an overly inclusive 
EEZ it has been mostly accepted, but an independent Hawaiʻi whould not be as able to force the world to 
accept its claims.  
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the criteria for statehood. Along with Article 1(2), it is very strongly implied in the 
definition that the government must be independent (at least theoretically) and have 
control of their domestic affairs. Each of the nations in this paper has some form of 
government meeting this definition, though Hawaiʻi has issues with the independence 
requirement.   
The Government of Niue consists of the Premier of Niue, a 20-member elected 
Assembly, 14 village councils, the Court of Appeal and the High Court of Niue.513 Under 
the Premier is the Ministry of Infrastructure, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the 
Ministry of Social Services, the Central Agencies (Finance & Planning, Police, etc.) and 
the Commercial & Trading Arm (Broadcasting Corporation of Niue, Tourism, etc.). 
Though many of the groups within the government are extremely small, and members of 
government often hold many roles (the current Premier, for example, is also the Minister 
of Transport, the Niue Development Bank, Police and National Security, and seven other 
areas), the government is fully formed and is of similar complexity to other larger states. 
The Cook Islands is a representative democracy with a parliamentary system. It 
has a prime minister, parliamentary legislature and an independent judiciary. The 
executive branch has several dozen ministries and departments representing the typical 
governmental needs of a small island nation.  
Though interrupted by coups, Fiji has generally functioned as a parliamentary 
representative democratic republic with a well-developed executive, legislature and 
                                                 
513 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the UK serves as Niue's highest court. 
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independent judiciary. Like the other states above, there is no issue for Fiji under this 
criterion. 
This criterion of a sovereign government is very problematic for Hawaiʻi. Prior to 
the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi in 1893, Hawaiʻi maintained a fully sovereign 
government, except for a brief period of foreign occupation by the British in 1843. The 
arguably sovereign Provisional Government of Hawaii was established after the 
overthrow of the Kingdom, leading to the Republic of Hawaiʻi in 1894. The Newlands 
Resolution in 1898 established the Territory of Hawaii as organised incorporated territory 
of the United States, fully ending any form of recognised independent governance for 
Hawaiʻi. Though it has received very little legal support, the possibility of a Hawaiian 
government in exile/under occupation is explored later in this chapter. A limited 
argument could also potentially be made that the State of Hawaii fills the spirit of the 
criterion expressed in the Montevideo Convention. This argument is also explored later in 
this dissertation.   
As of today, there is not a functional government in Hawaiʻi independent of the 
State of Hawaii. Though several sovereignty groups have attempted to re-establish 
governments, they have not received much serious attention, and none have been able to 
provide even minimal government services or exercise any control over territories larger 
than personal residences or essentially squatter communities in public parks. Though 
sovereignty groups have frequently “appointed” people to various positions of their 
“government”, these appointments fail to convey any actual power or often any 
meaningful duties. Rather the governments seem to exist only as organisational charts 
online. Few groups have even managed to reach the point where they have established 
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the basic symbols of government, much less any real progress towards forming a credible 
state.   
 If we are to look at the State of Hawaii as the unit of government (somewhat 
ignoring Article 1(2)), the State of Hawaii provides the vast majority of the major 
services that are expected of a country with the noticeable exception of immigration 
services. The Federal Government also exclusively prints money and provides postal 
services. Other powers reserved to the Federal Government, and thus unavailable to the 
State of Hawaii, include the power to regulate interstate and international trade, make 
treaties and conduct foreign policy, declare war and form an army and navy.  
 Though these powers are reserved to the US Federal Government, their absence is 
not especially problematic in this case. Hawaiʻi, like all other US states, has a reserve 
military force in the form of the Hawaii National Guard. During typical operations, the 
National Guard operates under the state governor and may be called up to respond to 
emergencies or otherwise as designated by the governor. National Guard units may also 
be “federalized” in which authority is transferred to the US president under certain 
conditions. Hawaiʻi also has a currently inactive State Defense Force which is designed 
to protect the state when the Hawaii National Guard is mobilised and is under the 
authority of the governor. The State Defense Force is formed of retired military and other 
selected volunteers. The presence of a military force under the control of the local 
government could be seen to lend considerable legitimacy to the State of Hawaii forming 
its own government for the purposes of the Montevideo Convention. However, neither 
the Hawaii National Guard nor the State Defence Force would be especially useful in a 
real contested sovereignty scenario as US federal law (10 USC § 332) allows the National 
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Guard to be federalised to enforce Federal authority and the State Defence Force is 
formed primarily of US Military retirees. With respect to the power to print money, 
Section 10 of the US Constitution forbids states to “coin money” or “emit bills of credit”. 
This lack of an independent currency is not necessarily a problem, given that several 
independent countries use other country's currency (for example, El Salvador and the 
Turks and Caicos Islands exclusively use the US dollar). Finally, there exists a chicken 
and egg problem for immigration services as well as general foreign policy. As a part of 
the United States, the State of Hawaii whilst has no need nor ability to meaningfully offer 
these services and thus does not offer them (creating this gap in services). However, 
should it gain independence, there is no reason to believe that the new government would 
be unable to provide these functions514.  
4.2.1.4 Capacity to Enter into Relations with Other States 
 The requirement of a capacity to enter into relations with other states is one of the 
more obtuse requirements of the Montevideo Convention. Though it is most clearly met 
by states having active diplomatic relations with other states, the requirement seems only 
that the state has the means to enter into a relationship and the ability to bind the state to 
any agreements made in this relationship.515 However, even if the capacity exists, there 
                                                 
514 Despite the limitations, Hawaiʻi officials have increasingly involved themselves in immigration 
policy and foreign affairs including a Hawaiʻi member of Congress meeting with Syria’s President Bashar 
al-Assad in an effort to end the civil war there. In many ways Hawaiʻi has already been more involved in 
foreign policy than other small nations.   
515 David Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2002), 73. 
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does not appear to be any requirement that states actually do enter into relations with 
other states. Many small states will have fairly low numbers of diplomatic missions from 
other countries to their state and limited numbers of foreign missions to other countries.  
Liechtenstein and the Vatican City both lack any resident embassies or consulates 
located within their territory. Other small states such as Palau, Nauru, Micronesia, the 
Marshall Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Lesotho, Kiribati and Saint Kitts and Nevis each have 
less than five resident embassies. They also each have very few embassies of their own 
abroad. Micronesia, Tuvalu, Tonga and Palau each operate four overseas embassies, 
Nauru and Kiribati have two, and the others above have less than 15. Though these small 
numbers are supplemented by honorary consulates and non-resident representatives, 
many states largely lack any sort of meaningful diplomatic relations in a multitude of 
other states. This is not generally interpreted as a statement on the state’s lack of 
sovereignty, but rather a reflection of practical realities.  
Embassies can be very costly to operate. On the high side is the US Embassy in 
Baghdad with a USD$700 million facility516 and a post-war operating cost of USD$1.8 
billion a year.517 Other US embassies and consulates have been much cheaper to 
construct with lower operating costs but are still exceptionally expensive compared to 
                                                 
516 Michael. Kelley, “The Biggest And Most Expensive Embassy In The World Is About To Get A 
Massive Upgrade,” Business Insider, June 29, 2012, http://www.businessinsider.com/us-embassy-baghdad-
money-2012-6. 
517 Ernesto Londoño, “Report Projects Higher Operational Costs for U.S. Embassy in Iraq,” 
Washington Post, August 29, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/08/28/AR2009082803166.html. 
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most small states’ budgets.518 For smaller countries like Ireland, the cost can be lower due 
to reduced security and staffing needs. It remains nevertheless quite expensive. Ireland 
spent an average of €740,000 per embassy/consulate a year on operating costs (excluding 
Department of Foreign Affairs staff). Even for small island nations costs can be fairly 
high. Fiji’s current budget allocates a little over FJD$31 million for overseas missions.519 
With 20 overseas missions, Fiji is spending over FJD$1.5 million per mission (assuming 
zero cost for honorary consulates520). To have diplomatic missions to every UN member 
state, even at Fiji’s lower budgeted cost, would alone cost about two-thirds the GDP of 
the Cook Islands, 14 times the GDP of Niue and whilst overall a small portion of GDP 
would be a very noticeable increase in Fiji’s government expenditures. 
States also often lack any practical need for especially developed diplomatic 
relations. States may have little meaningful effect upon each other. Even within today’s 
increasingly globalising world, many states will never have an ongoing need to interact 
with quite a few other distant states. For example, the small island state of Seychelles 
lacks any resident diplomatic missions to any Oceania state, and there are none within 
                                                 
518 United States Government Accountability Office. ‘Embassy Construction: State Has Made 
Progress Constructing New Embassies, but Better Planning Is Needed for Operations and Maintenance 
Requirements’. Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, June 2006. 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06641.pdf. 
519 Ministry of Economy. ‘Budget Estimates 2016’. Report to Parliament, 2015. 
http://www.finance.gov.fj/s/government-budget.html?download=436:2016-budget-estimates. 
520 The cost of honorary consulates can vary wildly depending upon how the country uses them. 
Costs can be extremely low covering little more than providing the country’s flag and stamp, to almost as 
much as a typical embassy including significant physical property and meaningful expenses associated with  
conducting business. 
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Seychelles from any Oceania state. This is unsurprising given the near complete lack of 
connection they have. It is almost 10,000 kilometres away from the closest Oceania state 
and thus has no territorial connection. There is also no significant trade between them and 
Seychelles is not meaningfully competing with any Oceania state. Even within tourism, 
there is little connection. Most months saw less than three visitors to Seychelles from 
Oceania with many months having not a single Oceania visitor.521 As such, there is little 
practical need for the states to have any significant diplomatic relations beyond creating 
the basic frameworks of diplomacy. Establishing a resident embassy for these states 
would be a completely unnecessary expenditure. Rather a system in which states have an 
ambassador accredited to multiple states or outsource their consular services to another 
state is used. For example, the Fijian ambassador to the UAE is also accredited to 
Seychelles along with several other states and Canadians in Hawaiʻi are advised to seek 
consular services from the Consulate General of Australia in Honolulu.  
The Cook Islands and Niue by the handful of states they have diplomatic relations 
with seem to have demonstrated that they have the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states but choose to do so very infrequently. Fiji, in contrast, by their active 
participation in world affairs, has shown that they have both the capacity and desire to 
exercise it. Hawaiʻi is in a very problematic position in this regard. Though the pre-
overthrow Kingdom of Hawaiʻi had relations with many other states, the State of Hawaii 
and the sovereignty activists’ kingdoms have very little ability to do so. It is perhaps 
                                                 
521 National Bureau of Statistics, “Visitor Arrivals,” National Bureau of Statistics Seychelles, 2014, 
http://www.nbs.gov.sc/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/August-2014-Visitor-Arrivals.pdf. 
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meaningful for this criterion that there are a number of consulates located within Hawaiʻi, 
but as these do not recognise Hawaiian sovereignty their value in this regard is uncertain.  
4.2.2 Constitutive Theory 
 The constitutive theory provides the other major model of statehood. It suggests 
that a state exists when other states recognise it as a state.522 Recognition, in this model, 
is the only meaningful criterion for determining legitimacy.523 This theory takes a very 
practical approach. For its citizens, a state which is unrecognised is of little utility when 
they are outside their home state. Declaring the existence of the state is fairly useless to 
its citizens abroad if the state’s passports are unrecognised, its currency not exchangeable 
and it is not able to provide consular services.  
Conversely, within the state, recognition by other states may have, potentially, 
little practical effect on its citizens’ daily lives. Assuming an otherwise functional 
government, international recognition means little to the presence of police and fire 
services, garbage collection, road maintenance and the multitude of other services a 
government can provide regardless of recognition. Even completely unrecognised states 
may maintain the ability to enforce laws on their citizens independently of their 
international recognition. Though a strict interpretation of the constitutive theory 
mandates it, in practice, states do not regard unrecognised states at terra nullius (nobody's 
                                                 
522 Gideon Boas, Public International Law: Contemporary Principles and Perspectives 
(Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), 172-174. 
523 Ibid. 
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land). Even when other states are not willing to formally recognise the state, they still 
seem to maintain a form of pseudo-recognition.   
The approach of the constitutive theory seems very rational and useful in that it 
completely shifts from an impossible to precisely define criteria to something that should 
be clear and measurable. It, however, seems to rely upon a very naive worldview. For this 
model to work, states are to recognise other states as sovereign whenever they are 
actually sovereign. Though the criteria are left undefined for the ways in which states are 
to make their determination, it seems to mostly be assumed that states will recognise all 
“real” sovereign states. Unviable or unconvincing attempts that technically meet 
Montevideo Convention can be safely ignored under this model using a common sense-
esque approach. Where this theory appears to fall apart is when the decision of 
recognition is made by the state for solely political reasons. It seems absurd to say well-
established de facto states such as Taiwan, Israel or Palestine are not real states because 
others have chosen to make a political point by not recognising them. Further, it allows 
for the extremely messy notion of governments in exile. Under the model of the 
constitutive theory, a government can exist without any practical control or influence 
over its territory solely because other countries are willing to accept the claim. The utility 
or sensibility of recognising states whose ability to negotiate is on a solely theoretical 
basis is highly questionable. This model overall creates a situation in which the law no 
longer reflects facts.  
This theory is also highly problematic in regard to the right to self-determination. 
Under this approach, if states are to decide that another state does not exist regardless of 
the reality or the peoples of the state’s will, then it does not exist as far as international 
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law is concerned. More secure states thus become able to use recognition as a bargaining 
chip and a tool to enforce their will on smaller states.  
Under the constitutive theory, the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi (pre-1893) does appear to 
have a strong claim for statehood. The Kingdom of Hawaiʻi had a significant number of 
states with diplomatic presences in Hawaiʻi and Hawaiʻi likewise had significant 
representation across the world. They signed a number of treaties with other states and 
participated in the Universal Postal Union. The Provisional Government of Hawaii and 
its successor the Republic of Hawaii should also be recognised under the constitutive 
theory. Despite a brief delay by Japan in recognising the Provisional Government of 
Hawaiʻi, all of the states that had recognised the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi immediately 
recognised the Provisional Government.524 Similarly, all of these states soon recognised 
the Republic of Hawaiʻi.525 Today, though a number of states have diplomatic missions 
located in the State of Hawaii, none of these missions are actually to Hawaiʻi. Rather they 
are all consulates to the United States. The geographic distance from other consulates and 
the demographics of Hawaiʻi have resulted in an unusually high concentration of 
diplomatic missions when compared with most other smaller US states creating a clear 
impression of difference in foreign affairs. However, as all of the consulates in Hawaiʻi 
are to the United States, they do not provide any benefit to sovereignty claims under the 
constitutive theory.  
                                                 
524 Morgan, John. ‘Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations’,1894. 
525 Ibid. 
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 Fiji has no problem with recognition under the constitutive theory. They have 
diplomatic relations with much of the world and participate in a variety of international 
organisations. Further, as a United Nations member, their existence as a state is well 
recognised. It has frequently been argued that UN members have an obligation to 
recognise all other members as states.526  
 The Cook Islands’ case is somewhat weaker, but it can still be considered a 
sovereign state under the constitutive theory. Though they have limited diplomatic 
missions to other states and even fewer from other states, they do have formal diplomatic 
relations with a large number of states. The Cook Islands, however, are not currently a 
UN member state; nor have they applied to become one. Nevertheless, they do participate 
in UN associated agencies such as UNESCO and WHO as a state.  
 Niue has only a single diplomatic mission located within its borders and only two 
overseas diplomatic missions of Niue. Just a few dozen states have formal diplomatic 
relations with Niue. Similarly, to the Cook Islands, though not a UN member state, Niue 
does participate in UN associated agencies such as UNESCO and WHO as a state. Given 
the constitutive theory’s vagueness on the threshold for recognition, it remains unclear if 
Niue can be considered a recognised state. However, given the power of the states that 
have diplomatic relations with Niue (including a third of the Security Council) and the 
lack of objection to their recognition, it would seem that Niue should probably be 
considered a state under this theory.  
                                                 
526 Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination. 
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4.2.3 Exploitation of the Montevideo Convention Model by 
Nationalists 
The declarative theory, as expressed in the Montevideo Convention model, seems 
to encourage sovereignty activists across the world to essentially “play pretend”. They 
have deluded themselves into thinking that if they claim a bit of land, give their friends 
desirable titles in their play government and get an oblivious immigration agent to stamp 
their freshly printed passport527, they now have a sovereign state. The Constitutive model 
resolves this somewhat in allowing states to shut down claims of sovereignty by pointing 
to a lack of recognition. Even in this model, activists have come up with some very 
creatively absurd ways to show recognition. For example, Sealand, an extremely small 
artificial sea platform that was then in international waters, has long claimed to 
sovereignty in part because of what they argue is recognition by Germany. This 
recognition consists solely of a single incident in which Germany sent a diplomat to help 
negotiate the release of a German citizen which Sealand was holding hostage. This clear 
lack of common sense in the interpretation of the Montevideo Convention model has 
                                                 
527 For example, the World Government of World Citizens provides a fairly extensive list of passport 
stamps that they have received using their “WSA Passports” which they present as evidence of recognition. 
Despite having apparently received entry into many countries, most of these stamps are decades old and 
best represent an unaware or conflict-avoidant immigration officer rather than meaningful recognition. The 
Hawaiian Kingdom (Akahi Nui) similarly seems to be very proud to have obtained a Swiss visa using one 
of their passports and notes travel throughout Europe on a Hawaiian Kingdom passport. Hawaiian 
Kingdom passports, however, are officially considered by the EU to be unacceptable for affixing a visa (as 
are WSA Passports). These groups seem to feel that what is likely a mistake by a single border agent 
should counter clearly and explicitly stated immigration/visa policy. 
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allowed many activists to try for legalistic approaches to justify sovereignty where it 
clearly does not exist.  
4.3 Challenges for Statehood 
 Despite the clarity provided by the theories mentioned above, there remain several 
challenges for the unambiguous declaration of statehood which affect the nations of this 
dissertation. None of them are in-fact barriers to statehood, but each creates concerns for 
the popular conception of what it means to be an independent state.  
4.3.1 Unusual Approaches to Foreign Affairs 
 In discussions of the sovereignty of Niue and the Cook Islands, their choice to 
delegate some aspects of foreign affairs to New Zealand is often presented as a barrier to 
sovereign statehood. This, however, should not be considered to be the case. As per their 
free association agreement, New Zealand provides foreign affairs and defence assistance, 
but only when requested by Niue or the Cook Islands. This section will show that while 
this agreement seems unusual (only three other states have free association 
arrangements), there are actually a number of other states that have similarly atypical 
arrangements. These states have adopted non-typical arrangements in which consular 
services and diplomatic representation are provided by third parties including other states. 
These services are provided under an agreement which defines the arrangement without 
any recognised effect on overall sovereignty.  
 One form of atypical diplomatic representation is through a “protecting power”. 
During wartime, most states will suspend all diplomatic relations and withdraw its 
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diplomats from the state they are in conflict with.528 Under the rules of the Geneva 
Conventions, the belligerents appoint a protecting power to handle diplomatic relations 
between them and to oversee the application of the Geneva Conventions.529 During 
peacetime, states may select a protecting power if they would otherwise lack diplomatic 
relations with another state.530 The protecting power remains a representative of their 
own state, but anything done on behalf of the protected state is considered to be as the 
representative of the protected state.531 The protecting power’s mandate can either be 
comprehensive, wherein the protecting power provides all diplomatic functions on behalf 
of the protected state, or it can function as a way to allow for an informal exchange of 
representatives of the protected state. Australia, Canada, and the United States are 
represented under a comprehensive agreement by Sweden within North Korea.532 Canada 
and Iran have a similar arrangement in which Italy serves as a protecting power for 
Canada in Iran, and Oman serves as a protecting power for Iran in Canada.533 Special-
                                                 
528 Leslie Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1993), 234. 
529 Ibid. 
530 Ibid. 
531 Ibid. 
532 “The Embassy,” SwedenAbroad, accessed April 9, 2016, http://www.swedenabroad.com/en-
GB/Embassies/Pyongyang/About-us/About-the-Embassy/. 
533 Foreign Affairs Trade and Development Canada Government of Canada, “Canada - Iran 
Relations,” accessed April 10, 2016, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/iran/canada-iran/canada-
iran.aspx?lang=eng. 
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interest sections are also operated by Switzerland in several of its embassies.534 These 
sections are officially a part of the Swiss embassy but are staffed by nationals of the 
protected state.535 Switzerland serves as the protecting power for both Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, as well as between Russia and Georgia. They also represent Iran in Egypt and the 
United States in Iran.536 With the instability in Syria, the United States, Australia and 
Canada were represented in Syria as a protected state by the Czech Republic (US), 
Hungary (Canada) and Romania (Australia).537  
In addition to protected power arrangements, several countries have also signed 
agreements to handle consular services in countries in which they lack representation for 
reasons other than conflict. Amongst the most comprehensive of these is the Canada-
Australia Consular Services Sharing Agreement. This agreement specifies 17 Canadian 
missions that are to provide consular services for Australia and 12 Australian missions 
that are responsible for providing representation for Canada in specifically designated 
consular areas.538 All of the Australian missions are located within Oceania, whilst the 
                                                 
534 Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Protecting Power Mandates,” The Federal Council, 
November 1, 2017, http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/protective-
power-mandates.html. 
535 Ibid. 
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537 “Romanian Embassy in Syria,” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed April 10, 
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538 Foreign Affairs Government of Canada, “Canada-Australia Consular Services Sharing 
Agreement,” Travel.gc.ca, November 16, 2012, http://travel.gc.ca/assistance/emergency-
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Canadian missions are mostly in the Americas and Africa.539 Under this bilateral 
agreement, the missions are responsible for providing typical consular services (with the 
notable exception of non-emergency visa and passport processing) in accordance with the 
appropriate consular guide.540 These agreements are somewhat unique in their level of 
formalisation. However, limited consular assistance has long been provided on a “best-
endeavour basis” between New Zealand Australia, Canada, the United States and the 
United Kingdom under an informal agreement.541 
European Union states also have a mechanism for shared diplomatic services. 
Article 20 section 2c of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that 
citizens of member states have “the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in 
which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the protection of 
the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as 
the nationals of that State”. Under this arrangement, European Union citizens are entitled 
to consular representation by other EU states, if their state does not have “accessible 
permanent representation” or appropriate Honorary Consul in the area.542 The states are 
                                                 
539 Ibid. 
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541 Mirjam Van Het Loo, Susanna Bearne, Pernilla Lundin, Hans Pung, Amanda Scoggins, and 
Miriam Shergold. ‘International Review of Consular Services’. RAND Europe, 2005. 
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obligated to treat the person as if they were a citizen of their own country and provide 
equal consular services.543 
Colocation has also been adopted in several countries to lower the cost of 
operating embassies. Under these arrangements, allied states will share the physical space 
of an embassy and support staff. Though each state’s diplomatic staff is separate, counter 
staff and security will be shared allowing for greater efficiency and lower cost.544 The 
joint Nordic embassies in Berlin provide one of the more visible examples of this 
model.545 Following the relocation of the German capital, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden established a large joint complex with a shared entrance and 
communal building.546 The United Kingdom and Canada have also established a 
Memorandum of Understanding for Enhancing Mutual Support at Missions Abroad 
which provides a similar framework for establishing co-located embassies.547 This model 
only minimally reduces a state’s sovereignty in that it creates some disclarity with regard 
to whom shared staff are representing, as well as reducing the physical space of the 
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544 Great Britain National Audit Office, The Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Consular Services 
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embassy's exclusive sovereignty. It is, however, explicitly allowed under the 1963 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.548  
Several countries have entered into arrangements with private companies in order 
to outsource some consular services.549 For example, India has outsourced visa 
applications, Overseas Citizen of India status processing and passports issuance for 
residents of several states to VFS Global, a privately owned company.550 VFS, along with 
other companies including Travisa and Computer Science Corporation, are increasingly 
providing these services for several states.551 This model reflects neoliberal trends 
focused on privatising governmental services wherever possible.552 The outsourcee is 
contracted to handle “non-judgemental” tasks such as collecting fees and processing 
applications, allowing the regular consular staff to handle only tasks such as assessment 
and interviewing.553 Outsourcing of these tasks is said to reduce costs and allow for more 
efficient handling of applications.554 There is, however, a concern that whilst the 
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outsourcing firm officially does not have decision-making authority, their role in 
processing applications still allows them to shape or obstruct applications. 
Liechtenstein’s arrangement with Switzerland provides another example of 
sovereign states allowing another sovereign state to represent them. In addition to a 
common economic, monetary area, and patent system, Switzerland has been granted the 
authority by Liechtenstein to represent them in treaty negotiations and provide consular 
protection. Switzerland is also responsible for Liechtenstein national defence as it does 
not have its own military. This arrangement is by far the most similar to the arrangement 
of the freely associated states. The only meaningful difference is the lack of colonial 
history. 
This great variety of ways to handle consular services shows that allowing a third 
party to provide diplomatic services need not meaningfully harm a state’s sovereignty. 
Though Niue and the Cook Islands elect to have very minimal foreign affairs 
involvement by choosing to allow New Zealand to handle most of it, this does not seem 
to disqualify them from being considered sovereign nations.  
4.3.2 Citizenship 
 Residents of Niue, the Cook Islands, and Hawaiʻi all hold another state’s 
citizenship. Of the nations profiled in this dissertation, Fiji is the only one that currently 
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has its own passports and citizenship.555 Citizenship is often seen as a key component of 
statehood and nationhood, as the direct individualistic expression of these concepts.  
Under United States Federal law (8 U.S.C. § 1401), a person born in Hawaiʻi 
since statehood is a US citizen. The Hawaiian Organic Act (31 Stat. 141) in 1900 stated 
that any person who was a citizen of the Republic of Hawaiʻi was then a US citizen. The 
1894 Constitution of the Republic, Art. 17, had previously recognised those born or 
naturalised in the Hawaiian Islands as citizens. Given the time that has passed since the 
overthrow of the Kingdom and the establishment of the Territory of Hawaii, there is no 
longer any person alive who was recognised as a citizen of either the Kingdom of 
Hawaiʻi or the Republic of Hawaii. Citizenship in Hawaiʻi today is no longer independent 
of US citizenship.  
Niueans are granted New Zealand citizenship and travel under a New Zealand 
passport. For most lex soli citizenship purposes, Niue is considered a part of New 
Zealand. Under the Niue Immigration Act 2011, New Zealand citizens who are born in 
Niue have the irrevocable “right to travel to or remain in Niue at any time” and are 
entitled to visa/permit free access. These rights are also extended to people who have a 
parent born in Niue or whose parent was a permanent or long-term resident of Niue. 
These rights effectively form an equivalent to Niuean citizenship in granting Niueans a 
permanent and irrevocable right to remain in their country and would likely serve as the 
basis for citizenship if the free association agreement was to end. New Zealand citizens 
                                                 
555 Some Hawaiian sovereignty groups have issued their own passports and claim distinct citizenship 
from that of the US occupiers. As these efforts have received little recognition, this section will ignore 
them. 
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who are not covered under one of the conditions above are not afforded any special 
consideration in entering or working in Niue. Like citizens from other countries, they are 
required to obtain a 30-day visa. It is unclear what, if any, rights non-New Zealand 
citizens who are born in Niue have in Niue as they are not, under New Zealand law, New 
Zealand citizens. 
The Cook Islands likewise does not have its own citizenship. All Cook Island 
nationals have New Zealand citizenship and travel on New Zealand passports. The Cook 
Islands grants all people born in the Cook Islands permanent residency provided that they 
have a permanent resident parent. Children of permanent residents born abroad are also 
entitled to similar rights to that of permanent residency. New Zealand citizens, who are 
not permanent residents of the Cook Islands, are not granted any special rights to enter or 
stay in the Cook Islands. Further, the Cook Islands Ministry of Foreign Affairs & 
Immigration notes that the “grant of Permanent Residency in the Cook Islands does not 
carry any guarantee of gaining New Zealand citizenship”.556 It is thus possible for a 
person to become a permanent resident of the Cook Islands without being a New Zealand 
citizen, further emphasising the Cook Islands’ right to make its own immigration policy.  
                                                 
556 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration, “Permanent Residency in the Cook Islands,” Cook 
Island Government Foreign Affairs and Immigration, 2016, 
http://www.mfai.gov.ck/index.php/immigration/pr-and-applying-for-permanent-residency.html. 
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Niue and the Cook Islands maintain full control over their own immigration 
policy with full rights to determine whom they admit and allow to stay in the country. 
Hawaiʻi, in contrast, has almost no control over its immigration or citizenship policy.557  
In practice, there does not appear to be any actual requirement for a state to have 
its own citizenship in order to be recognised as sovereign. For a number of years after 
independence, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia did not have their own citizenship. 
Citizens of these states were considered British subjects and travelled on British 
passports. There is a noticeable delay between independence under the 1931 Statute of 
Westminster and the new countries’ granting their own citizenship. Canada did not have 
its own citizenship until 1947, with New Zealand and Australia not providing their own 
citizenship until 1949558. Despite not having their own citizenship, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, all participated in foreign affairs as sovereign nations including becoming 
founding members of the United Nations.  
4.3.3 United Nations Membership 
 Though the United Nations charter requires all members to be sovereign states, 
there is no requirement that all sovereign states become members. Several states 
including Kiribati, Nauru and Tonga chose to not become member states for a number of 
                                                 
557 A few US states have made legally unsuccessful attempts at controlling immigration policy within 
their state. As such, given the likelihood of meaningful state-level immigration control being accepted, it 
does not represent an area which the State of Hawaii can be said to actually have any control over. Hawaiʻi 
does, however, have some control over customs/agricultural policy, which is discussed further in chapter 6.  
558 The Department of Internal Affairs, “Celebrating 60 Years of New Zealand Citizenship,” New 
Zealand Government, 2009, https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Services-Citizenship-
Celebrating-60-Years-of-New-Zealand-Citizenship?OpenDocument. 
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years after independence. Furthermore, given the withdrawal of Indonesia in 1965 and 
the proposals to expel apartheid South Africa, without any attempt to de-recognise their 
statehood, it does seem possible for a state not to participate without effect on their 
statehood. Though UN membership can be seen as a clear recognition of statehood, non-
membership cannot be interpreted as a sign of non-statehood. For the Cook Islands and 
Niue, despite not being members of the UN, their "full treaty-making capacity" was 
recognised by United Nations Secretariat in 1992 (Cook Islands) and 1994 (Niue). 
4.3.4 Economic Sovereignty 
 Globalisation is frequently presented as eroding national sovereignty.559 It is 
commonly argued that in a globalised world, governments are forced to adopt particular 
economic policies over which they have little control.560 Small states have little ability to 
oppose these policies, which are often to their detriment. Further, small island states often 
suffer from severe trade imbalances, as their general remoteness and high costs render 
them largely uncompetitive in a general export market. Rather, they are forced to rely 
upon fickle industries such as tourism and limited specialised, often romanticised, 
“island” goods. Foreign aid thus generally comes to form a large portion of the 
economies of small island states.  
                                                 
559 John Quiggin, Interpreting Globalization (United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, 2005), 
http://www.unrisd.org/UNRISD/website/document.nsf/ab82a6805797760f80256b4f005da1ab/6080e2e34d
6e8934c12570b4004b2a71/$FILE/quiggin.pdf. 
560 Ibid. 
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Issues of economic sovereignty and dependence, however, are further magnified 
in foreign aid as it commonly comes with policy conditions explicit or implied. This is 
most noticeable in Niue and to a lesser extent the Cook Islands. In 2014, Niue received 
$14 million USD in official development assistance (foreign aid), whilst the Cook Islands 
received $27 million USD.561 The vast majority of this aid came from New Zealand with 
Australia also providing a smaller, yet meaningful portion. In 2014, Niue had a GDP of 
approximately $20 million USD562 and the Cook Islands a GDP of over $310 million 
USD.563 Clearly, Niue is extremely dependent on foreign aid, given that it represents 
nearly two-thirds of the country’s GDP. The Cook Islands, whilst less dependent, still 
receives foreign aid equivalent to nearly a tenth of its GDP. It also remains under fiscal 
limitations controlling taxation and spending as part of a 1998 austerity package 
negotiated with New Zealand and the Asian Development Bank.564 Under this agreement, 
the Cook Islands has entered a unique position in which the Cook Islands economy is 
strong enough to no longer need foreign aid, but policy limitations set by the aid granters 
create an ongoing dependency.565   
                                                 
561 OECD, “Statistics on Resource Flows to Developing Countries,” Development finance statistics, 
December 22, 2016, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/statisticsonresourceflowstodevelopingcountries.htm. 
562 “Niue GDP Figures,” Government of Niue, n.d., 
http://www.gov.nu/wb/media/Press%20Release%202015/gdp_figures.pdf. 
563 Ministry of Finance & Economic Management, “GDP September Quarter 2015,” Statistical 
Bulletin, 2015, 
http://www.mfem.gov.ck/images/New_Stats_Website/1.GDP/GDP_Statistics_Report_201503.pdf. 
564 Geoff Bertram, “Why Does the Cook Islands Still Need Overseas Aid?,” The Journal of Pacific 
History 53, no. 1 (2018): 44–63, https://doi.org/10.1080/00223344.2018.1435966. 
565 Ibid. 
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High dependence on foreign aid severally limits a country’s ability to exercise its 
sovereignty. Niue’s continued need for New Zealand aid requires an ongoing positive 
relationship with New Zealand and at least theoretically prevents Niue from fully 
exercising its sovereignty without fear of reprisal. The Cook Islands, with less economic 
dependence, is in better shape in this regard but is still highly dependent. It does not, 
however, seem that this economic dependence is a meaningful barrier to state 
sovereignty. UN member state Sao Tome and Principe has a slightly higher GDP/ODA 
ratio than Niue and around 30 states have higher ratios than the Cook Islands.566 As such, 
economic dependence should not alone be considered a barrier to statehood. Given the 
complete absence globally of solely self-sustaining economies, the limitations imposed 
by foreign economic dependence are universal amongst otherwise sovereign states.   
4.3.5 Monarchy 
 Being a part of an extraterritorial monarch’s realm also establishes limitations on 
the exercise of national sovereignty. Though a state may have an otherwise fully 
independent government, many states share a head of state. Whilst this may be a legally 
distinct position between states, the person in this position is the same across most of the 
former British Empire.  
From 1874 until 2012, the monarch of the UK has officially held the traditional 
title of Tui Viti of Fiji (Paramount Chief). This position has been largely symbolic since 
Fiji became a republic in 1987. The position was dissolved in 2012 when the Great 
                                                 
566 NationMaster, “Countries Compared by Economy > Aid as % of GDP.,” International Statistics, 
2016, http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Economy/Aid-as-%25-of-GDP#-amount. 
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Council of Chiefs was officially disbanded. Despite this, symbols of the monarchy 
remain throughout Fiji. Pre-2013 currency featuring the Queen remains in circulation, the 
St Edward's Crown continues to be featured on badges of the military and the police, the 
Union Jack remains part of the Fiji flag, and the military motto remains "Fear God and 
honour the King/Queen". The Queen's Official Birthday remained a public holiday until 
2013. Further, the current Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama proudly displays a portrait 
of the Queen above his desk and has stated "I'm still loyal to the Queen. Many people are 
in Fiji. One of the things I'd like to do is see her restored as our monarch, to be Queen of 
Fiji again."567  
Niue and the Cook Islands are today a part of the Realm of New Zealand with 
Queen Elizabeth II, as head of state in her capacity as Queen of New Zealand. The 
constitution of the Cook Islands recognises the position of Queen's Representative as 
separate from the Governor-General of New Zealand. The Governor-General is limited in 
role to only limited defence and foreign affairs functions. Niue's Constitution, in contrast, 
has the Governor-General of New Zealand act as the Queen's representative. Though 
officially a part of the Realm of New Zealand and indirectly subject to the NZ Royal 
Succession Act 2013, the current relationship of the Monarchy is that of any part of the 
Commonwealth realm. 
                                                 
567 Graham Davis, “Despot for Diversity,” TheAustralian, May 1, 2009, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/despot-for-diversity/story-e6frg6n6-1225705471653. 
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4.3.6 Military 
For many nationalists across the world, a military is seen as the quintessential part 
of the nation-state. Within many highly militarised countries, such as the United States, 
supporting or celebrating the nation is often closely paired with military symbols. The 
idea of a country without its own military is looked at as unthinkable. However, a number 
of states actually lack a military.568 There does not appear to be any legal nor practical 
requirement for sovereignty which requires a military. 
As an alternative to having their own military, many states choose to allow other 
states or regional consortiums to provide military defence. For example, Andorra has 
treaties with Spain and France to provide defence, Kiribati receives defence assistance 
from Australia and New Zealand under an informal agreement, and Australia is 
responsible for Nauru's defence under a similar informal agreement. Likewise, under a 
1962 Treaty of Friendship, New Zealand is responsible for the defence of Samoa. As with 
Niue’s and the Cook Islands’ agreement with New Zealand, defence for the Marshall 
Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia is the responsibility of the United States 
under their respective compacts of free association. Within the Caribbean, several states 
have adopted a consortium approach to defence. Under this, defence for Dominica, 
Grenada, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is the responsibility of the 
Regional Security System.569 
                                                 
568 Kathy Gilsinan, “Countries Without Militaries,” The Atlantic, November 11, 2014, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/11/countries-without-militaries/382606/. 
569 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, given the extremely small size of the militaries of many states, they 
cannot be seen to be able realistically to defend their territory alone. For example, 
Antigua and Barbuda have a total of 250 active and reserve members in its military.570 Its 
mainland neighbour of Venezuela in comparison has a force of 115,000 active duty 
members and 8,000 reservists.571 Should Venezuela have any desire to annex the islands, 
they have clearly superior direct military might. As such, given their size and the needs of 
the state, the Royal Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force function largely in a civil role 
rather than having any meaningful ability to protect the island from invading forces. 
Rather, Antigua and Barbuda participates in the Regional Security System and hosts U.S. 
military presence. Even larger island nations, such as Fiji, still lack meaningful military 
power to provide defence against most large state invaders; rather their military serves to 
provide civil defence functions and to supply troops to the United Nations for 
peacekeeping.  
The absence of a military, though challenging to the popular conception of a state 
has no meaningful effect on the legal status of the state. As more countries de-emphasise 
their militaries, it is likely that this popular conception will start to fade.  
                                                 
570 The International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2014, 2014 ed. (Routledge, 
2014). 
571 Ibid. 
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4.4 Nation Specific Issues 
 As well as the more general challenges small island states have in gaining 
recognition of their sovereignty, the states in this paper each have several issues specific 
to their situation.  
4.4.1 Hawaiʻi 
 Hawaiʻi as the only nation in this paper without any meaningful external 
recognition faces the most severe problems in exerting its position as a sovereign state 
and thus dominates the remainder of this chapter. Since the fall of the Kingdom and the 
later annexation by the United States, Hawaiʻi has not had an independent government. 
One of the major divisions amongst supporters of a sovereign Hawaiʻi remains the 
question of whether the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi continues to meaningfully exist. If so, 
should Hawaiʻi be considered an occupied territory? The political and social 
consequences of this divide are explored in detail in the following chapter. This 
subsection looks at the issues and justifications related to restoring Hawaiʻi as a 
sovereign state.  
4.4.1.1 United States Occupation  
 Hawaiʻi is often presented as being under prolonged United States occupation. 
Sovereignty activist Kauai, for example, suggests that Hawaiʻi was under US occupation 
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from January 16, 1893 (overthrow) until December 13, 1893 (creation of the Provisional 
Government) and again from August 12, 1898 (US annexation) to present.572  
 The first period of occupation occurred following the overthrow of Queen 
Liliʻuokalani in 1893. The overthrow was conducted by a small group of insurgents with 
support from the US military. The group formed a brief provisional government leading 
to the formation of the Republic of Hawaii in 1894. It seems fairly unambiguous that this 
period was one of US occupation. The ongoing situation is, however, much less clear.  
In 1897, recently elected US President William McKinley negotiated a treaty with 
the Republic of Hawaii to annex Hawaiʻi. Annexation had been amongst the goals of the 
plotters, but previous US President Grover Cleveland was supportive of Queen 
Liliʻuokalani and unwilling to accept annexation. The treaty of annexation was never 
ratified by the US Senate due to the lobbying efforts of Hawaiʻi officials and a petition 
from Native Hawaiians. It failed to be ratified, with 46 votes in favour out of 90 senators 
(the US Constitution requires two-thirds of the Senate to support ratification). On July 4, 
1898, the Newlands Resolution was passed by the US Congress and signed on July 7 by 
President McKinley. This joint resolution annexed the Republic of Hawaii and created 
the Territory of Hawaii.  
Using a joint resolution allowed for the motion to pass, but it has been argued that 
this is not a legal method by which a state can acquire territory. Chang notes that the only 
                                                 
572 Willy Daniel Kaipo Kauai, “The Color of Nationality: Continuities and Discontinuities of 
Citizenship in Hawai’i” (University of Hawai’i at Manoa, 2014), 
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accepted ways for a state to acquire territory belonging to another state is through 
conquest, prescription or by treaty.573 The United States has never claimed to have 
acquired Hawaiʻi by conquest and prescription does not apply in this case.574 Given that a 
treaty was not ratified, he argues that the United States cannot have legally acquired 
Hawaiʻi through a joint resolution, and thus the US’s control of Hawaiʻi is that of 
ongoing occupation.   
The US Senate debate in 1898 surrounding the joint resolution shows that even at 
the time, several senators had concerns regarding the viability of acquisition of foreign 
territory by joint resolution.575 Senator Allen of Nebraska stated that it is “impossible for 
the Government of the United States to reach across its boundary into the dominion of 
another government and 
annex that government or persons or property therein”576. Senator Spooner of Wisconsin 
concurred stating that the “Joint Resolution itself, it is admitted, amounts to nothing so 
far as carrying any effective force is concerned. It does not bring that country within our 
boundaries. It does not consummate itself”.577 Other Senators also expressed concerns 
related to the lack of mechanism for annexation by an act of Congress as well as concerns 
of validity given that if accepted any country could claim another country through 
                                                 
573 Williamson Chang, “Darkness over Hawaii: The Annexation Myth Is the Greatest Obstacle to 
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575 Ibid. 
576 Ibid. 
577 Ibid. 
164 
 
internal law.578 Senator Bacon of Georgia notes that if allowed, the Hawaiʻi legislature 
would logically be able to “acquire the United States by a Joint resolution of its own.” 579 
As Bacon argues, allowing the notion that any state can simply claim another state and 
have that claim have legal force produces a clearly absurd result. The legally sound 
approaches available to the US to annex Hawaiʻi were through a treaty with Hawaiʻi or 
by conquest. Using internal law solely was untried then and has not been employed since 
then580.   
 In support of using the joint resolution to acquire Hawaiʻi, Senator Stewart of 
Nevada and Senator Foraker of Ohio presented arguments that were poorly received at 
the time.581 Senator Stewart argued for essentially unlimited power to annex as they wish 
with the only limit being the objection of the other state.582 When asked the hypothetical 
of annexing England, he stated that a joint resolution could annex England provided 
“England did not object”.583 Senator Allen then asked “But suppose the people of 
England did object?” to which Senator Stewart responded, “Then we would have to fight 
                                                 
578 Ibid. 
579 Ibid. 
580 It has occasionally been suggested that the situation in Hawaiʻi can be seen as analogous to Texas, 
which was acquired and became a state through a single joint resolution. This is not applicable to Hawaiʻi, 
as Hawaiʻi did not gain statehood via the initial joint resolution. As Senator Bacon notes that “Congress 
was not given the power to annex a foreign state, except in the admission of that nation as a state.”  
581 Chang, “Darkness over Hawaii.” 
582 Ibid. 
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for it”.584 He further stated “We can annex anything. But we do not suppose that 
Congress is going to do those things. The fact that sovereign power exists implies that it 
might be abused. It is not abused in this case because we know that the people of the 
Sandwich Islands want to be annexed to this country.”585 He was essentially advocating a 
“might makes right” theory with a half-hearted attempt at recognising some element of 
consent of the people. Though clearly invalid under international law, this argument 
seems to be the one which continues to be used to justify the taking of Hawaiʻi.  
The other argument in favour of the resolution's validity is exceptionally 
convoluted. Senator Foraker argued that since the resolution would dissolve Hawaiʻi as a 
party to the agreement, it need not be a treaty.586 He notes that “people of Hawaii become 
merged into the United States” and there ceases to be a distinct entity to enforce an 
agreement.587 This argument did not gain much traction, and he later stated “We cannot 
by a joint resolution annex Hawaiʻi … We can recite the fact that they have manifested a 
willingness, as shown by the treaty which we had in mind when that joint resolution was 
drafted to make a cession to us, but when we do not ratify the treaty, but do something 
else, namely pass a joint resolution the transaction is not consummated until they agree to 
it.”588  
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Though it has occasionally been suggested that Hawaii’s acquisition is justified as 
part of the Spanish-American War, Hawaiʻi was not a territory of Spain and was 
officially neutral during the conflict.589 Thus, there does not exist a recognised legal basis 
for it to be a wartime acquisition. 
The use of the joint resolution to annex Hawaiʻi has been the subject of many of 
the legally focused sovereignty activists. Chang argues that absent any mechanism by 
which a joint resolution can acquire foreign territory (lacking a ratified treaty), then the 
“Republic of Hawaiʿi never did pass dominion to the U.S”. He suggests that this break in 
dominion invalidates the inclusion of Hawaiʻi islands in the Territory of Hawaii and later 
the State of Hawaiʻi.590 Thus, “there was—according to U.S. law—nothing within the 
Territory of Hawaiʿi[sic]” and “starting with the Organic Act, the Territory of 
Hawaiʿi[sic] and the U.S. simply pretended, acting as if the Hawaiian Islands were within 
the U.S.”.591 The Act of Admission (1959) defines the territory of the State of Hawaii to 
include the islands, reefs, and waters of the Territory of Hawaii.592 The Territory of 
Hawaii was defined under the Organic Act as “the islands acquired by the United States 
of America under an Act of Congress entitled “Joint Resolution to provide for annexing 
                                                 
589 Ibid. 
590 Ibid. 
591 Ibid. 
592 Palmyra Island, Johnston Island, Sand Island and Kingman Reef are explicitly excluded. This is a 
somewhat unusual choice given that Johnston Island, Sand Island and Kingman Reef along with Midway 
were never a part of the Kingdom or Territory.  
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the Hawaiian Islands to the United States”.593 This seems to create a chain wherein the 
State of Hawaii is defined as including the islands of the Territory of Hawaii which itself 
was defined as including the islands under the Joint Resolution.594 Chang suggests that 
since the Joint Resolution was invalid, the subsequent acts that use its definition are also 
invalid and result in a territory-less State of Hawaii.595 Further, he suggests that the 
territory-less-ness of the Territory and State of Hawaii were known to the US 
government, who intentionally chose to deceive the public into believing that the islands 
of Hawaiʻi were the territory of the US.596 Thus, given an absence of legitimate authority, 
the US’s effective control of Hawaiʻi constitutes an occupation.   
Chang’s core legal analysis seems potentially sound. There does not appear to be 
any mechanism under US law by which a joint resolution can annex foreign territory. 
There, however, is a lack of political will to address this issue and a widespread 
willingness to continue to ignore the constitutional issue. For example, when US 
Supreme Court Justice Scalia was asked at a talk about the constitutional issue of 
annexation via joint resolution, he stated that “there is nothing in the Constitution that 
prohibits Congress from annexing a foreign state through the means of a joint 
resolution”.597  
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Chang’s description of a vast conspiracy to avoid exposure of the deficiencies to 
the territoriality definitions seems to greatly undermine his credibility but may be very 
useful in giving him power within sovereignty activism. As is seemingly common in 
many writings on contentious sovereignty, he has chosen to adopt a style that allows for 
an exciting narrative of conspiracy to which he is the only voice brave enough to expose 
the truth rather than the far more likely explanation that the issue of the legitimacy of the 
Joint Resolution for annexation is a relatively minor point of constitutional law in the 
eyes of most politicians and government employees. Though in this case potentially 
extremely significant, there is no reason to believe that any of the drafters of later 
documents that he alleges are part of the conspiracy had any awareness of this issue. The 
exact power of a joint resolution is not a subject that is well taught or an area of common 
discussion outside of a subset of constitutional scholars. A lack of awareness rather than a 
conspiracy seems a much more likely explanation. Furthermore, assuming that they were 
aware of the issues, there is nothing other than convenience that prevented lawmakers 
from including a map of Hawaiʻi as their definition rather than referencing previous acts 
and completely eliminating the entire argument.   
There is also the practical issue of how could the deficiency that Chang identifies 
corrected. Attempts to challenge territorial jurisdiction in state courts have, 
unsurprisingly, been unsuccessful. Even if we are to accept that the issues of the joint 
resolution remain past the formation of the State of Hawaii, the remedy is largely a 
political question rather than a legal one. Again, whilst the legal issues raised are both 
largely unactionable, the ability to present a coherent legal justification for sovereignty is 
highly appealing and useful for nationalists.  
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4.4.1.2 Right of Conquest 
The right of conquest through force was used globally by colonial powers as a 
theoretical justification for seizing territory from indigenous people without their 
consent.598 Conquest is defined as “‘an act of force by which, in time of war599, a 
belligerent occupies a part or the whole of the territory of the enemy State with the 
intention of extending its own national sovereignty over that territory’”.600 Until more 
recently conquest was recognised as a valid method of obtaining territory, provided the 
action was morally justified.601 This justification would not be well received today, given 
that spreading religion, commerce, and civilisation were amongst the accepted supporting 
reasons.602 Conquest under this model would convey a clear legal title to the conquered 
territory (though obviously not a morally clear title).603 
                                                 
598 Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to 
Actors (Leiden: BRILL, 2007), 28. 
599 “Time of war” in practice should likely be interpreted fairly broadly given the frequency of 
undeclared war and the fact that the use of military force on a sovereign territory is generally considered to 
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The United States’ actions in Hawaiʻi raise the question: if a state effectively 
takes another state by conquest, but refuses to call its taking “conquest”, is it still 
acquisition by conquest? In the case of Hawaiʻi, armed members of another country took 
over Hawaiʻi by force taking control of the territory and the government. The country of 
which these combatants were citizens later took control of the state and incorporated it 
within its borders eliminating any previous government. Further, they claimed their 
actions were justified to protect the property and safety of American interests in Hawaiʻi. 
Except in name, Hawaiʻi appears to be have been claimed by conquest.  
Though after World War II the right of conquest has become codified as 
unacceptable to the international community, the right was long a principle of 
international law and a key part of the formation of many modern states.604 Considering 
that it occurred prior to the 1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact (which recognised it as unlawful to 
annex territory by force), there does not appear to be any legal barrier to the US claiming 
Hawaiʻi as acquisition by conquest and in doing so largely terminating any remaining 
legal claim to a sovereign Hawaiʻi. However, whilst it is extremely politically undesirable 
for the US government to admit that their actions constituted an act of conquest, it very 
much seems they are. It is important to note that in the case of Hawaiʻi, the US was 
unable to make use of the theory of terra nullius (nobody's land).605 Terra nullius refers 
to the idea that unowned territory is available to be claimed by a state.606  This theory 
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posits that only nation-states can own territory. Thus, any territory that is not owned by a 
nation-state is unowned.607 During the colonial period, only the territory of “‘civilized’ 
and recognizable governments” was seen as being capable of exerting territorial 
sovereignty.608 This justification was used by Western powers to seize much of the world; 
they argued that, while the land was occupied, it was not by a government that was 
recognisable and was thus “up for grabs”.609 This appalling legal fiction, however, could 
not be applied in Hawaiʻi as the United States (along with several other recognised states) 
had established diplomatic relations with Hawaiʻi thus asserting that Hawaiʻi, possessed a 
recognisable government. 
4.4.1.3 Citizenship in the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi  
 Many Hawaiian Sovereignty activists go to great lengths to explain that 
citizenship in the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi was open, inclusive and not racially based. Prior 
to the 1887 Bayonet Constitution, race was not used as part of the criteria for citizenship, 
but rather allegiance was the major criteria.610 It was not until the Bayonet Constitution 
that American conceptions of race, particularly anti-Chinese views, were imposed on 
Hawaiʻi allowing race to become a part of the citizenship process.611 Following the 
overthrow, the citizenship model became even more exclusionary and more racially 
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based.612 The model that is currently used for legally identifying Hawaiians is based upon 
these later race-based conceptions rather than the models of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi613.   
 Kauai argues that given the absence of a treaty of annexation, “Hawaiian 
sovereignty was never extinguished and continues to remain intact today”.614 He suggests 
that Hawaiʻi is under US occupation and should be subject to the obligations of an 
occupying power under Hague Convention615 Kauai interprets this to mean that the US’s 
allowing of Americans to settle in Hawaiʻi and the granting of citizenship to those born in 
Hawaiʻi is an actionable violation of international law.616 He suggests that as a result only 
those who can trace ancestry to a citizen of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi prior to the US 
occupation can be considered a Hawaiian national.617 Thus according to his estimates, 
306,000 people of 1.4 million residing in Hawaiʻi can be considered Hawaiʻi nationals 
and the rest aliens.618  
This narrow view of citizenship in a new Hawaiʻi significantly hinders 
sovereignty attempts by removing the majority of Hawaiʻi from being able to participate 
fully in the process. If we are to assume that the way forward for Hawaiian sovereignty is 
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through a democratic process (as opposed to an unlikely legal victory or the essentially 
impossible armed rebellion), it establishes a significant obstacle from the start. It asks 
voters to support a platform that will result in a choice between uprooting their lives and 
leaving Hawaiʻi or being disenfranchised. This creates an extremely difficult sales pitch 
in asking for people to go against their own self-interests in order to correct an injustice 
from over a hundred years ago. Even amongst many staunchly pro-sovereignty non-
Hawaiians, citizenship remains a point of passionate disagreement. In many ways, it 
seems that an obsession with building a legal case through international law has 
distracted activists from what is morally right and politically advantageous.  
4.4.1.4 Advantages of being part of the United States 
 One of the biggest obstacles to Hawaiian sovereignty is the practical advantages 
of being a part of the United States. There are a number of resources that Hawaiʻi has 
gained through US occupation which provide a powerful disincentive to asserting 
sovereignty. Being a part of the United States seems to have been advantageous to the 
economy of Hawaiʻi and its development. With a per-capita GDP of $55,598USD, 
Hawaiʻi dwarfs the economic output of any other state in Oceania. The next highest is 
Palau (which has a Compact of Free Association with the US) with a per-capita GDP of 
$16,300USD, less than a third of that of Hawaiʻi. In terms of human development 
metrics, Hawaiʻi likewise exceeds those of the rest of the region (though it still struggles 
compared with much of the US). Given that many other states in the region have similar 
natural resources and similar small island state challenges, the major differentiating factor 
seems to be the United States’ control of Hawaiʻi.  A study of 25 dependent and 30 
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independent small islands found that the dependent islands did significantly better in 
most economic and development metrics than independent small islands states.619  
 Many of those from Hawaiʻi also benefit greatly from their US citizenship. 
Thirty-five per cent of people born in Hawaiʻi live elsewhere in the United States.620 
Without jus soli citizenship in the United States, many of these people would be subject 
to a convoluted immigration system rendering a significant portion unable to live in the 
United States. In world travel, US occupation of Hawaiʻi is likewise very useful. By 
virtue of US citizenship, the people of Hawaiʻi gain access to a US passport. The US 
passport is widely considered one of the most useful passports.621 It allows visa-free 
access to 154 countries with preferred status for many others.622 In comparison, Fiji, as is 
typical of small island states, has visa-free access to only 75 countries.623 The ease of 
movement that Hawaiʻi residents enjoy is directly connected to their being a part of the 
United States.   
Further, given the militarily strategic location of Hawaiʻi in the Pacific, it would 
have likely been of great interest to a multitude of world powers. The Kingdom of 
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Hawaiʻi had little military strength of its own, as demonstrated by its brief occupation by 
the British in the Paulet Affair, the Sacking of Honolulu by the French, and the eventual 
overthrow of the Kingdom. It is highly likely that if the US had not taken over Hawaiʻi, 
another state would have.624 Alternatively, it is possible that the Kingdom would have 
entered into a protectorate style arrangement with another state, but even in this scenario, 
considerable sovereignty is lost.    
 US occupation, however, has not been without disadvantages, particularly for 
Native Hawaiians. They are dramatically overrepresented amongst those with health 
issues625, in poverty626, and educational problems627. Further, they have seen considerable 
efforts to intentionally destroy their cultural identity, disenfranchise them and rob them of 
their traditional land rights.628 
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Despite these issues, the people of Hawaiʻi overall do have a higher standard of 
living than most other small island states in the region. Though it is impossible to tell 
what the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi would have built had it been left alone, it does seem likely 
that Hawaii’s elevated position compared to the rest of the region is in large part due to 
its being in the United States. This creates a significant barrier in motivating people to 
fight for their nation’s sovereignty when the alternative is mostly personally 
advantageous.   
4.4.2 Niue 
 Niue has an exceptional small population and a rather tiny territory. It remains 
economically and logistically fully dependent on New Zealand. As a result of these 
factors, Niue’s sovereignty is often ignored or treated as a technicality. As the previous 
sections have demonstrated Niue can and should be considered a sovereign state under 
the accepted conventions of international law. However, despite the fairly compelling 
evidence for sovereignty, many treat Niue as if it were still a territory of New Zealand. 
Maps will often depict Niue as “Niue (NZ)” in the same way they style territories. 
Similarly, many NGOs continue to group Niue into New Zealand in reports. Socially, 
even amongst those who are aware of Niue’s existence, its sovereignty is often ignored. 
Compared with Hawaii’s much messier legal challenges to sovereignty (and of course the 
fact that it remains claimed by another state), Niue’s barriers to sovereignty are mostly 
world acceptance of a situation that many are indifferent towards.    
4.4.2.1 “Apathy/Contentment” 
 One of the biggest issues for Niuean sovereignty is simply a lack of attention to 
visibly asserting its sovereignty. There is little direct advantage to challenging the status 
177 
 
quo, and there is a variety of more pressing matters for the government and people of 
Niue to address. As Billig argues in regard to banal nationalism, for most established 
nations, there is little need for overt displays of nationalism. The fact that a place is a 
nation is a part of the fabric of daily life. Given an absence of competing claims629 (such 
as there are in Hawaiʻi), there is little practical reason to expend considerable effort in 
attempting to prove that you are sovereign. Fighting against the small and ultimately 
insignificant examples where Niue is incorrectly described as part of New Zealand would 
be very labour intensive with little of value actually gained from the efforts.    
On the other side, there is also a lack of attention towards Niue from other 
countries. Its size and absence of geopolitical or economic significance place it extremely 
low on most other countries’ diplomatic priority list. Given that it lacks even a UN vote 
with which to bargain, there is little reason for other states to justify the time investment 
of meaningful diplomatic relations. Even for a large state that has the resources to build 
diplomatic relations with every small sovereign state, Niue’s size and lack of political 
utility greatly limit any return the large state would gain. Though some have interpreted 
this prioritisation as a statement on sovereignty, this seems to be incorrect.  
The current arrangement is also quite beneficial for Niueans, they maintain their 
sovereignty, but also gain considerable advantages through their relationship with New 
Zealand. The ambiguity of the situation remains largely in their favour. They remain able 
to take advantage of the benefits of New Zealand, but since New Zealand accepts their 
                                                 
629 New Zealand fully acknowledges Niue’s sovereignty, those that attempt to assign Niue to New 
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sovereignty and other states seem indifferent, they are able to express their sovereignty in 
areas that matter to them.   
4.4.2.2 Connection to New Zealand 
As discussed previously, the free association agreement between Niue and New 
Zealand binds the two states together in a special relationship. The agreement has New 
Zealand providing financial support, some administrative assistance, and defence; and 
they previously managed virtually all foreign affairs. All of these services are provided 
on Niue’s behalf with the full consent of the Niuean government. Niueans also receive 
New Zealand citizenship.  
 Niue is extremely dependent on New Zealand. All flights into the country are 
from New Zealand (1-2 times a week from Auckland), and as a result, it supplies the vast 
majority of tourists (which in turn provides much of the GDP of the island). New Zealand 
also provides most of the materials used by the government for school-based education 
and public health campaigns. The Niuean legal and health system also relies heavily upon 
New Zealand.  
Unlike the free association agreements that several states have with the United 
States630, the agreement between Niue and New Zealand is fairly one-sided. Niue benefits 
disproportionately from the arrangement. New Zealand’s major reward, beyond the 
general benefits of supporting a safe and prosperous region, is the fulfilment of colonial-
era obligations. As a leading force in the decolonisation movement, Niue’s status as a 
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New Zealand colony was politically embarrassing to New Zealand. However, the 
complete abandonment of the island would have been economically disastrous for Niue 
and not within the spirit of New Zealand's general positions towards Oceania. Free 
association provided a compromise that allowed New Zealand to decolonise but did not 
harm the people of Niue.  
 New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade describes the relationship 
with Niue as “different from full independence” noting that New Zealand “provides 
necessary economic and administrative assistance, and is responsible for Niue's defence 
and surveillance of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).”631 The Associate-Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Joe Walding described the relationship to Parliament on the eve of 
Niue’s independence as a “new period of partnership on a basis of equality”.632 He 
further notes that “Niue will take its place as a full member of the South Pacific Forum 
along with other independent and self-governing states”.633 Given New Zealand's actual 
handling of Niue in practice as a fully sovereign state, these statements leave 
considerable ambiguity in regards to what makes the relationship cause Niue to be 
“different from full independence”.  
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4.4.2.3 Size 
 Niue’s extremely small size creates challenges in gaining recognition, particularly 
in the popular imagination. For many, it just feels “too small to be a real country”. The 
entire nation of Niue is dwarfed by most towns elsewhere. Even most medium to large 
organisation such as schools or universities will be several times the size of Niue. Though 
there does not appear to be anything that requires a sovereign state to be a certain size, it 
remains difficult to get people to look beyond their preconceptions of what a state should 
look like.   
4.4.3 Cook Islands 
 The Cook Islands remains in a somewhat ambiguous situation. Its relatively small 
size and special relationship to New Zealand has led some to question its sovereignty. It 
does, however, appear to meet the criteria of both the declarative theory and the 
constitutive theory; and in nearly every way functions as a sovereign state. In many ways, 
the fact that there is even any question about its sovereignty seems to be an artefact of a 
stubbornness to accept the sovereignty of a country that does not quite look like is 
expected. 
4.4.3.1 Connection to New Zealand 
 Though the Cook Islands is relatively small, it is not excessively so being 
comfortably in the middle of the small island state sizes. The issue that most challenges 
the Cook Islands sovereignty is its connection to New Zealand. As recognised by a 2001 
joint declaration signed by the Prime Ministers of both New Zealand and the Cook 
Islands, New Zealand maintains “some residual responsibility for the external affairs and 
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defence of the Cook Islands”.634 This, however, confers“ no rights of control to the New 
Zealand Government and can only be acted on at the request of and on behalf of the 
Government of the Cook Islands”.635 The declaration also notes that “In the conduct of its 
foreign affairs, the Cook Islands interacts with the international community as a 
sovereign and independent state.”636 Cook Islanders, however, do remain New Zealand 
citizens and the Cook Islands remains a part of the Realm of New Zealand.  
4.4.3.2 Tourism 
 Tourism remains one of the largest and most profitable industries for the Cook 
Islands. Its political closeness to New Zealand is used strategically to make the Cook 
Islands feel less intimidating and more accessible to tourists, yet at the same time exotic. 
The way in which the Cook Islands presents its national identity is also very heavily 
shaped by tourism’s demands of authenticity. Any attempt at changing the ways in which 
the Cook Islands exercises its sovereignty could be seriously limited by a desire to avoid 
negatively impacting the tourism industry of the islands.   
4.4.4 Fiji 
 As a United Nations member-state, Fiji has by far the least ambiguous 
sovereignty situation of the nations in this dissertation. It clearly meets the criteria under 
                                                 
634 “Joint Centenary Declaration of the Principles of the Relationship between New 
Zealand and the Cook Islands” 
635 Ibid. 
636 Ibid. 
 
182 
 
both the declarative theory and the constitutive theory. Fiji’s main concerns relating to 
sovereignty are related to its small size and lack of geopolitical power.  
4.4.4.1  Commonwealth 
 Though Niue and the Cook Islands participate in Commonwealth activities 
through New Zealand, only Fiji of the countries in this dissertation is itself a member of 
the Commonwealth. Headed by Queen Elizabeth II, the Commonwealth is an 
intergovernmental organisation formed primarily of states that were previously a part of 
the British Empire. Participation in the commonwealth is voluntary. The Commonwealth 
emphasises this point, noting that “when countries had recently achieved their 
independence from the UK, it was important for them to stress the change in their 
relationship, from dependent status to equal partnership.”637 Nevertheless, membership 
and the benefit of participating in the program are used to support the goals of the 
Commonwealth states. Fiji’s membership in the Commonwealth was suspended as a 
punishment for failing to restore democracy as quickly as the Commonwealth 
demanded.638 Their membership was reinstated following the 2014 elections.639 Though 
countries are theoretically equal within the commonwealth, many have seen Fiji’s 
suspension from the Commonwealth (in 2000 and 2006) as another example of Australia 
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and New Zealand exerting its power over Fiji. Fiji joined the Non-Aligned Movement640 
shortly after its suspension from the Commonwealth, which some have described as a 
protest of another nation’s bullying. 
4.4.4.2  Breaches of Sovereign Territory 
In addition to the complications of economic sovereignty and globalisation that 
are the most significant direct threats to Fiji’s sovereignty, Fiji has also alleged that there 
have been a few recent direct breaches of their sovereignty.  
Fiji accused Tonga of breaching its sovereignty when Tonga extracted Lieutenant 
Colonel Tevita Uluilakeba Mara in 2012.641 Charges of sedition and attempted mutiny 
were pending in Fiji against Mara when he was “rescued” from Fijian waters by a 
Tongan Patrol boat.642 Mara and the Tongan government claim Mara was fishing off of 
Kedavu island when he found himself in trouble and put out a distress call.643 They state 
that a Tongan Patrol boat was coincidently nearby and was able to rescue him.644 Once on 
board, he requested that he be brought to Nuku'alofa to seek the protection of the Tongan 
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crown.645 The Tongan government has denied any involvement in any planned escape 
attempt of Mara’s.646 Fijian and New Zealand maritime authorities, however, state that 
they did not receive a distress signal.647 Additionally, Tonga is over 700km from Kedavu 
island. Mara was a significant part of the 2006 coup, the commander of Fiji’s biggest 
military regiment and was close to PM Bainimarama.648 There were a variety of rumours 
about the reasons for his falling out with Bainimarama including financial irregularities 
and sexual improprieties.649 Since fleeing to Tonga, Mara has been publishing videos 
speaking out against Bainimarama.650 These videos have been embraced by foreign 
media and anti-Bainimarama social media sources.651 It has been speculated that Mara’s 
escape and Tonga’s involvement may have been supported by Australia to assert pressure 
on Bainimarama.  
In the immediate aftermath of the May 1987 coup, the Australian government 
initially sought to use the Australian military to extract the deposed Fijian Prime 
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Minister, Timoci Bavadra.652 The Chief of Australian Defence Force, General Peter 
Gration, opposed the plan owing to logistical challenges.653 There was also a proposal to 
assist in transporting Fijian military personnel stationed in the Middle East to Fiji to 
retake the islands under the command of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces commander, 
who was visiting Australia at the time of the coup.654 Lacking the support of New 
Zealand and noting the popularity of the coup in Fiji, they dropped the plans to intervene 
directly.655 They did, however, go forth with a plan to provide for the potential 
evacuation of the Australian nationals residing in Fiji.656 From May 20 until June 7, 
Australia had several Navy vessels, including two warships and an amphibious landing 
ship, off of the Fijian coast.657 The ships were initially docked in Fiji under diplomatic 
clearance which expired on May 18th.658 Australia moved the ships outside Fiji's 
territorial waters on May 20th after the Fijian government ordered them to depart. As the 
situation in Fiji never escalated to the point where military aided evacuation was 
necessary, Australia did not make direct use of these ships.659 The Australian military 
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maintains that any evacuation efforts would be done with the cooperation of the Fijian 
military and had no intention of challenging them militarily.660 Though some analysts 
have stated that Australia's deployment would not have been sufficient to challenge Fiji 
military661, Australia's military presence would have been intimidating, and given the 
disparity in armament and naval resources, quite possibly sufficient for limited hostile 
actions. It is reasonable to believe that for Australia's interest in Fiji, serving as an 
intimidating presence rather than actually engaging in hostilities best serves Australia. It 
is further concurring that Australia would even draw up serious plans to support a 
military invasion of another sovereign nation. 
Australia returned once more to Fijian waters in the build-up to the 2006 coup as 
Operation Quickstep.662 Again the stated purpose of the operation was to allow for the 
evacuation of Australian nationals with the cooperation of the Fijian government.663 This 
operation gained significant attention following the crash of a military helicopter killing 
two Australians.664 Though the mission was officially to be carried out only with the 
cooperation of the Fijian military, the mere presence of the Australian military 
immediately outside of Fijian waters created pressure. Fijian officials also accused 
Australia of breaching its sovereignty by sending people Fiji alleged were mercenaries or 
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Australian police along with weapons onto Fijian soil.665 The Australian Defence 
Department later stated that they were most likely Australian Defence Force personnel 
assigned to provide additional security for the Australian diplomatic missions.666 
These incidents could be seen as examples of a global trend of countries failing to 
respect the sovereignty of less powerful states. Australia, in particular, has been 
repeatedly accused of pushing around smaller countries in the region; Timor-Leste 
described Australia as a “bully state”.667 Its government minister, Agio Pereira, expressed 
this common sentiment stating, “Australia is a powerful country; it's a very rich country 
in this region. And sometime when you are really powerful, you think that you can do 
everything you like.”668 The commander of Fiji's Land Force, Colonel Pita Driti, 
described Australia's policy in the Pacific as "Sheer ignorance, or hegemonic shoving of 
big brother policies down our throats".669 Even for well recognised sovereign states, 
foreign interference can restrict a state’s actual autonomy.  
4.5 Political Will 
 Within a discussion of sovereignty, the concept of political will is of great 
importance. Political will is the desire of a government to carry through a policy. Though 
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a government may officially agree with a concept (such as one of international law) in 
principle, actually carrying out their obligations under it remains subject to their current 
desires. It is not unusual in international diplomacy for a state to form agreements around 
broad (and generally vague) concepts, such as human rights, but be unwilling to actually 
enact or enforce meaningful applications.  
 As well as needing the political will to incorporate international law into domestic 
law, states must also have the political will to enforce their agreements between states. As 
awful as it seems, within actual applications of international law “might makes right” 
often functions as the dominant paradigm. There are a number of countries, notably the 
United States and Russia, which have undertaken actions that seem to be very clear 
breaches of international law for which no meaningful action is taken in response whilst 
smaller states will more frequently (though still far from universally) be held to account. 
The International Criminal Court, for example, has been frequently criticised by African 
leaders for having focused near exclusively upon situations in African countries despite 
its global mandate.670  
The role of political will in the application of international law has created a 
situation that is very different from domestic law. Barring a significant miscarriage of 
justice, domestic law is generally respected in most developed nations. It is reasonable to 
expect that if a crime or civil wrong has been committed the victims will eventually be 
able to receive justice, at least in theory. The actual applications of international law, in 
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contrast, can be as much about diplomacy as it is about the law itself. In many cases, 
clear wrongs have occurred, but there is no meaningful ability to handle the wrong, or the 
application of sanctions for the wrongdoing is judged to result in greater detriment to 
various interests. Though these decisions are increasingly now framed within 
international law principles, it often seems that decisions were made, and only then legal 
principles were found and stretched to serve the political goals of the involved groups.   
As such even if claims such as that of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement can be 
determined to be morally and legally correct, they remain largely meaningless without a 
political will to respect the claim. States in deciding if they wish to support the Hawaiian 
sovereignty movement must accept the enormity that the decision to directly challenge 
the United States entails. Whilst Hawaiʻi has some military utility (though increasingly 
limited), and support for Hawaiian sovereignty could be politically useful as a way to 
deliberately show a willingness to challenge the US, there lacks any compelling strategic 
reason for a state to support Hawaiian sovereignty given the immediate threat of US 
response. A sovereign Hawaiʻi is unlikely to become a meaningful enough trade partner 
to justify losing the US market; nor would it likely command enough political power to 
be a useful international ally. Even its utility for military operations in the Pacific is 
rapidly dwindling as long-range ships and planes become more common. Calculated 
foreign support for Hawaiian sovereignty in any meaningful form would likely only come 
as part of an otherwise politically justified campaign against the United States. For 
example, in the scenario of China declaring war on the United States, support for a 
sovereign Hawaiʻi might suit Chinese interests in causing domestic chaos, as part of an 
attempt to gain limited moral authority in supporting Native rights, or to protect the 
190 
 
sizable Chinese population in Hawaiʻi. With a likely “best case” scenario of Hawaiʻi 
being a pawn in an international power play significant international support for Hawaii’s 
international law claims cannot be expected.  
Furthermore, support for a sovereign Hawaiʻi also requires states to face their 
own mistreatment of Native peoples. Most states, at least at some level, were built upon 
land that previously belonged to Native peoples taken without their consent. Even 
relatively progressive states would require fairly radical changes in their own Native 
policies to be able to unhypocritical mirror what Hawaiian sovereignty would grant to 
Hawaiians. The world looks to be a long way away from this ultra-radical reform.  
It seems that amongst many Hawaiian sovereignty activists a misconception exists 
that international law functions as domestic law will in its general compliance. They 
appear to believe that if the law is on their side, they will be victorious. Rather, in 
practice, states frequently ignore international law when doing so matches their political 
agendas. International law lacks any sort of meaningful enforcement body that would 
compel states to honour their agreements should they choose to ignore them for political 
reasons. This political reality is often overlooked (intentionally or otherwise) with 
sovereignty activists presenting their international law arguments as if there were a 
magical formula that summons justice. Though an ultimately flawed understanding of 
international law, this belief in magical justice can be useful for the sovereignty 
movement. Claims of legal superiority, even if false, misleading, or unenforceable, can 
be powerful tools in shifting public opinion and political will. As a narrative of justice 
reflecting the arguments of sovereignty activists gains traction, they gain power. The 
saying of “trying a case in the court of public opinion” is particularly pertinent when we 
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look at cases like these which are ultimately political questions and only secondarily legal 
questions. If sovereignty activists can convince the public that they are correct (even 
when their interpretation of international law is misleading and highly convenient), they 
are able to sway the political will of the voters (and with it the government) to support 
their position.  
 Similarly, Niue and the Cook Islands biggest problem seems to be a lack of 
political will to take any action. Ignoring the two states is in many ways the safest bet for 
most politicians and governments. Though both groups’ ethnic populations have become 
meaningful voting blocs in New Zealand, inaction along with continued ambiguity best 
serves most of the voters. Whilst most are quite proud of their island identity and heritage 
opposing any sort of annexation, they also benefit greatly from the special relationship 
with New Zealand. Globally, Niue and the Cook Islands have so little geopolitical or 
economic power, expending any meaningful political effort on their behalf would be of 
limited utility. This, however, can quickly shift as other states start to find the utility of 
having small states available for bargaining671.  
                                                 
671 Beyond the previously discussed use of “selling” a UN vote, small sovereign states have been 
used to dodge politically or legally inconvenient problems for larger states. An example of this can be seen 
in the Regional Resettlement Arrangement between Australia and Papua New Guinea. Under this 
agreement asylum seekers who come to Australia by boat are settled in Papua New Guinea if their asylum 
claims were upheld. In this way Australia is able to alleviate its obligations to refugees and shift blame for 
mistreatment onto Papua New Guinea (despite the situation being entirely created by Australia). Niue has 
also hosted elephants and alpacas as a way to manage New Zealand quarantine requirements that have 
prevented the animals from coming directly into New Zealand.  
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 Though in many ways international law is very high-minded and idealistic, it is 
ultimately highly subject to the political will of the states. Whilst actions are increasingly 
being taken to protect the rule of law even with minimal direct self-benefit to other states, 
it remains a fairly uncommon and recent phenomenon. This phenomenon, however, is 
being increasingly used by nationalists. They attempt to shape the issues around 
sovereignty as unambiguous cases in which international law clearly supports their 
positions. They play upon the public’s conception of law as overall just and enforceable. 
International law is presented as simply another set of laws that a country must follow 
without question. In doing so, activists are able to actually shift the political will of the 
state in such a way as to see meaningful change. Though it is too early to determine if 
these efforts will actually be successful, they remain a promising avenue for their 
supporters.   
4.6 Conclusions 
Though fundamentally a legal term, sovereignty has become a critical part of 
nationalism across the world. Sovereignty typically provides a concrete goal for 
nationalists, which is a sovereign nation-state. It represents an, at least theoretically, 
achievable outcome and an idea that must be protected once established. Threats to the 
nation are presented as threats to the sovereign state and vice versa. Sovereignty is also 
useful as a less intimidating way to frame nationalistic rhetoric. Radical overt nationalism 
is often concerning for the public, but when framed within the context of self-
determination and preserving sovereignty, it can be much more readily received. Modern 
nationalists seem to have embraced the notion that for a strong nation they must have a 
sovereign state, not just in practice, but also in law.  
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International law and legal sovereignty have become, in many ways, the dominant 
language of pro-sovereignty activists in democratic states. It provides a framework under 
which radical change is theoretically possible. Activists see the previously unthinkable 
peaceful transition of former colonial states into independent countries, seemingly guided 
largely by idealistic principles of international law, and wish the same for their nation. 
The sort of armed hot nationalistic fight for independence that for much of the world long 
defined nationalism and the struggles for sovereignty is largely unworkable today. The 
military power differential between emerging nations and their holders are too great, and 
the public has lost its appetite for armed independence struggles. Politics and the courts 
seem today to be the tool of choice. Even when the law is not meaningfully on their side, 
many nationalists have developed incredibly creative ways to suggest that they are in the 
right morally and legally and with it try to move the political will of both their state and 
the larger world community.    
 Hawaiʻi has been fighting for sovereignty since the Kingdom was overthrown. It 
provides the most significant motivator and goal for Hawaiian nationalists: the restoration 
of the Hawaiian  Kingdom. This struggle is increasingly one of shaping public opinion so 
as to convince people that this is both the correct course of action and is possible. 
Attempts to build a legal case for sovereignty using the framework of international law 
and even the less successful efforts to establish a restored state provide by far the most 
viable way for nationalists to accomplish their goals.   
Fiji is increasingly seeing use of the global conversation of what sovereignty 
means and how native rights should interact with the sovereign nation. This conversation 
largely assumes an ongoing struggle for Native peoples’ self-determination, minority 
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status, a lack of political power and mass-land theft. By and large, iTaukei have not faced 
these challenges, which has placed them in a fairly different position than their 
contemporaries. Sovereignty and self-determination though have become a convenient 
way of talking about nationalism in an environment in which the government is actively 
trying to discourage ethnonationalism in favour of a unified civic nationalism.  
The Cook Islands and Niue struggle with the challenge of their sovereignty being 
unaccepted in the popular space, despite clearly meeting the legal standards for it. This 
gap shows the challenge that many nationalists fighting for sovereignty have neglected. 
Even when the law and other nations support you, this still does not always translate into 
acceptance of your nation. 
Across these nations, sovereignty, and particularly the legal frameworks it 
provides, serves as an extremely useful tool for nationalists. It gives the impression of an 
objective factual criteria for answering what is ultimately a political question built by 
public and world opinion.  The following chapters explore the ways in which nationalism 
(and with-it public opinion in favour of sovereignty) is being developed both through 
traditional hot nationalism and, perhaps more influentially, everyday nationalism. 
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Chapter 5 
5 Hot Nationalism 
 Hot nationalism is the form in which nationalism is typically imagined. It is active 
and “in-your-face”. It is a representation of “social disruption” and struggle. Hot 
nationalism is an extremely powerful force that may call on people to commit incredible 
action on behalf of their nation. This chapter looks at how hot nationalism is expressed in 
four nations, none of which seem to match the expected model. 
Though it is often presented as a clear dichotomy, it should be recognised that the 
line between hot nationalism and everyday nationalism is extremely fluid. As Jones and 
Merriman argue, hot nationalism generally underlies the expression of everyday 
nationalism. This chapter focuses upon hot nationalism by looking at the organised and 
semi-organised nationalist movements occurring within the four nations. Whilst the 
groups of interest focus primarily on hot nationalist style actions, it is becoming 
increasingly common that groups will manipulate everyday nationalism, intentionally or 
not, to match their agenda. As there is considerable bleed-over between hot nationalism 
and everyday nationalism, there is also bleed-over between this chapter and the following 
chapter, which focuses on the subtler forms of nationalism.  
Hot nationalism within modern Oceania has been fairly rare. When it has 
occurred, it has generally been isolated short-lived flare-ups as part of larger long-
running issues. With the exception of Tonga, all of the nations in the region are former 
colonies of a Western power. Through the colonial experiences of each differed 
considerably, they remain shaped by their occupation. Fiji, Cook Islands and Niue were 
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previously colonies of Great Britain. Hawaiʻi was a territory of the United States for 61 
years until it was absorbed as a state. It was also previously briefly occupied by France 
and Great Britain. The expression of hot nationalism in these nations has reflected this 
legacy. 
5.1 Hawai'i 
Hot nationalism within Hawaiʻi is almost exclusively centred around the 
Hawaiian sovereignty movement. This movement is founded upon the notion that the 
overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi was a legal and/or moral wrong that needs to be 
corrected. The movement, however, is extremely fractured with little agreement on most 
issues. Some activists focus largely upon the right of indigenous peoples for self-
determination, whilst others see it is a non-racial issue of restoring a government that was 
unjustly overthrown. Still, others see it as a largely modern issue focused around building 
a nation that represents today’s Hawai'i. Perhaps the only commonality amongst the pro-
sovereignty groups is an assertion that the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi was 
illegal and has established an injustice that needs to be corrected. There is little 
agreement upon the appropriate methods to correct the wrong nor the desired outcome. 
Further, there is even a lack of consensus on the question of whether the Kingdom of 
Hawaiʻi still meaningfully exists. 
This section looks at hot nationalism in Hawai'i by dividing it into actions and 
desired outcomes. The actions sub-section explores the functional ways in which hot 
nationalism is being expressed in Hawai'i. The subsequent sub-section looks at the 
various outcomes Hawaiian nationalists are seeking through their nationalist efforts. This 
division reflects the common divide presented in the patriotism vs nationalism debate, in 
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which nationalism is framed in terms of action and consequences whilst patriotism is 
presented in terms of ideology.  
5.1.1 Actions 
 Hot nationalism is marked by its focus on action. Whilst everyday nationalism 
can be subtle and unconscious, hot nationalism is active and very visible. It is important 
to note that of the methods that are functioning in Hawai'i, none really match the level of 
intensity that Billig uses to contrast hot nationalism from banal nationalism672. However, 
they do represent something that is clearly different from banal or everyday nationalism. 
There is nothing subtle about the ways in which Hawaiian nationalism is expressed. The 
methods described in this section are the efforts of organised nationalist groups that are 
engaging in these intentional non-subtle actions. Though largely lacking the intensity 
implied by hot nationalism, they have a lot more in common with hot nationalism than 
what could be considered banal/everyday/soft nationalism. McVeigh’s dichotomy of 
“hard” and “soft” nationalism captures this somewhat in allowing hard nationalism to 
represent nationalism beyond the “taken-for-granted”. He, however, largely applies the 
negativity and otherness of extreme nationalism that Billig argues against. Given these 
limitations in describing nationalism using existing definitions, it thus seems appropriate 
that hot nationalism for a nation like Hawai'i should be considered to include the non-
subtle organised actions of nationalists. The rest of this sub-section looks at three ways in 
                                                 
672 This appears to largely be the case globally as well. Actual extreme hot nationalism today seems 
to be reasonably rare and fairly short lived.  
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which this form of hot nationalism is being expressed in Hawai'i and then explores how 
violence and armed resistance, both hallmarks of hot nationalism, are largely absent.  
5.1.1.1 Legal Challenges 
 Whilst traditionally the courts have not generally been seen as a significant tool of 
nationalism, it should not be surprising that it is now being used as one. Given that in 
modern conflicts, issues are increasingly settled in court rather than on a battlefield, the 
courts have become a frequent tool of sovereignty activists across the world. In Hawaiʻi, 
there have been several attempts to force state courts to indirectly rule upon Hawaiian 
sovereignty. These cases generally attempt to get the courts to find that the defendants 
should be relieved of their liability because the State of Hawaii has no jurisdiction over 
them since they are citizens of a still existent sovereign Kingdom of Hawai'i. Regardless 
of the legal merits of the cases (which are often dependent on fairly tortured 
interpretations of the law), they are fundamentally problematic in asking for an outcome 
that the court is unable to actually provide673. Despite the routine failure of the cases, 
sovereignty activists cling to the court’s acceptance of minor points of judicial 
proceedings as supporting their cause. The courts, however, have been reluctant to 
directly rule on the continued existence of the Kingdom of Hawai'i preferring to rely 
upon other reasons to dismiss the arguments. The cases are frequently fairly messy, with 
defendants attempting a variety of arguments in the hope that one of them “sticks”.  
                                                 
673 As a general principle of law, a court cannot rule itself to be invalid. They can find themselves to 
not have jurisdiction over a matter, but to actually find the state (and by extension the court) to be legally 
non-existent is logically and legally impossible.  
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 State v. Lorenzo and Nishitani v. Baker provide two cases that typify the 
Hawaiian nationalist use of the legal system. In State v. Lorenzo, Anthony Lorenzo was 
charged with several counts related to an automobile accident he was involved in. He 
sought to have the case dismissed as “the Kingdom was illegally overthrown in 1893 with 
the assistance of the United States; the Kingdom still exists as a sovereign nation; he is a 
citizen of the Kingdom; therefore, the courts of the State of Hawai`i have no jurisdiction 
over him”. The trial court dismissed his claims finding that the continued existence of the 
Kingdom and his citizenship in it would not pre-empt nor preclude jurisdiction in the 
criminal matter before the court. The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s decision. 
Nishitani v. Baker saw a similar finding. Nishitani v. Baker involved an attempt to 
enforce promissory notes and mortgages. The defendants challenged the jurisdiction of 
the court under a similar argument to that of Lorenzo. The appeals court found the case 
and the land under which the case was about to be under the jurisdiction of State of 
Hawaii. These cases, along with several others including State v. French and State v. Lee, 
have established that individuals remain subject to the state court's’ jurisdiction 
regardless of their claims to not be citizens of the state. 
 Direct legal challenges to the occupation of Hawai'i have also been completely 
unsuccessful. One of the most prominent recent examples, Sai v Obama, et al. saw 
sovereignty activist Sai naming President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Governor Linda Lingle and Admiral Robert 
Willard of the US Pacific Command as defendants wherein he asked the court to declare 
the 1898 Joint Resolution which annexed Hawai'i to be a violation of Hawaiian 
sovereignty and unconstitutional under US law. He also attempted to include as 
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defendants the ambassadors of 35 countries which have what he claims are illegal 
consulates in Hawai'i. The court dismissed the case finding that any ruling on the matter 
was barred by the political question doctrine674.  
 In contrast to the above cases (which were largely doomed from the start), Hawaii 
v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs provided one of the best hopes for a legal victory for limited 
Hawaiian sovereignty and one of the few exceptions to the above-mentioned pattern. 
Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs was a United States Supreme Court case that asked 
the court to address the issue of the State of Hawaii selling land obtained from the 
overthrow of the Kingdom in light of the 1993 Apology Resolution.675 Despite much 
activist optimism, the Court ruled against the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), finding 
the apology resolution did not confer any additional rights. Though this case addressed a 
fairly narrow portion of the wrongs created by the overthrow and a finding in favour of 
OHA would have had little direct effect on much of Hawai'i, it was hoped that an OHA 
success would establish a legal precedent for the reclaiming of stolen land.  
                                                 
674 The political question doctrine is a doctrine of American Constitutional law which holds that 
questions that are fundamentally political rather than legal cannot be settled by the courts. Typically, cases 
covered under this doctrine will involve issues that are well established as the responsibility of another 
branch of government or are issues that lack any constitutional basis which the court can use to make a 
decision. It is a poorly settled and often controversial doctrine. Ultimately, it is based on the notion of 
separation of powers and is used to prohibit the courts from creating law.  
675 The 1993 Apology Resolution was a Joint Resolution of the United States Congress under which 
they "acknowledge that the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii occurred with the active participation of 
agents and citizens of the United States and further acknowledges that the Native Hawaiian people never 
directly relinquished to the United States their claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people over their 
national lands, either through the Kingdom of Hawaii or through a plebiscite or referendum".  
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 Despite the routine failure of the cases and the apparently unrecognised irony in 
attempting to have occupier’s courts rule against their own occupation, the courts have 
been a favourite tool in recent years for expressing Hawaiian nationalism. The cases 
become a rallying point for activists who despite the record of failure seem to keep 
holding out hope that a court will eventually accept their argument.  
5.1.1.2 Attempts to use International law 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, several groups have attempted to gain 
support for their efforts by employing international law. Starting with the legitimate legal 
wrong of the unlawful overthrow of the Kingdom, these groups attempt highly 
questionable and often blatantly spurious legal arguments in an effort to get other nations 
and global groups, such as the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, to 
intervene. These efforts have met with predictably little success and completely ignore 
the political will of the groups they are petitioning, in favour of unique interpretations of 
international law principles. 
 Also characteristic of the attempts of Hawaiian sovereignty activists to make use 
of international law is the practice of over-interpreting minor portions of responses in 
ways that favour their cause significantly beyond the meaning the organisation intended. 
An example of this can be seen in the “Hawaiian Kingdom” posting regarding the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP) response to the Hawaiian Kingdom’s allegations of 
war crimes committed at Mauna Kea. Where protesters were arrested by Hawai'i police 
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676. As per the groups’ typical pattern, the complaint was sent to any organisation that 
they felt had a chance of responding favourably regardless of rational connection.  The 
RCMP unsurprisingly concluded that it did not have “jurisdiction over the issues brought 
forward based on the requirements of section 8 of the Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes act”. The RCMP cites the absence of Canadian citizen involvement as the reason 
for the lack of jurisdiction. Despite the RCMP rejecting the case, this is presented by the 
Hawaiian Kingdom as a great victory for sovereignty activists, as they claim RCMP’s 
rejection under section 8 rather than because of the substantive issues of the complaint 
means that the RCMP (and by extension the government of Canada) is accepting the 
issues as true. As is typical for the evaluation of cases, the RCMP rejected it on the first 
criteria of jurisdiction. There was likely no evaluation of the substantive issues in any 
form, and no such evaluation can be concluded from their response. Nevertheless, the 
Hawaiian Kingdom chose to reinterpret this procedural rejection as meaning the RCMP 
fully agrees with the Hawaiian Kingdom but happens to be blocked by jurisdiction, rather 
than the RCMP statement meaning only that they are blocked by jurisdiction, and any 
other issues have remained unevaluated. This sort of usage of the infrastructure of 
international law remains characteristic of Hawaiian sovereignty activists’ interpretation 
and manipulation of international law to promote the Hawaiian nation. It is very possible 
                                                 
676 The RCMP was likely contacted because Canada is one of a small number of countries whose war 
crimes laws and practices clearly allow for the prosecution of crimes committed outside of their soil. 
Canada and Canadians, however, had only incidental connections to the telescope project that the activists 
are objecting to. They also argued to the RCMP that the 1851 Hawaiian-British Treaty remains in effect 
and remains binding on Canada.  
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the members of the Hawaiian Kingdom are fully aware they are misinterpreting 
international law, but in doing so are providing very useful ammunition for enhancing 
Hawaiian nationalism. Their misinterpretation helps energise the movement in giving 
hope and helping to keep going the notion that the Kingdom of Hawai'i is still alive and 
could be restored if they could get the “correct” people to listen to their claims.  
5.1.1.3 Political Action & Social Activism 
 Political and social activism is a very visible feature of the Hawaiian sovereignty 
movement. As well as being a common way to express nationalism, it is generally a sign 
of a healthy civil society.677 Protest rallies are a fairly common occurrence within Hawai'i 
with protesters often addressing issues indirectly related to the Hawaiian sovereignty 
movement. Environmental issues are a frequent subject of protests with the issue 
commonly framed around “malama ʻāina”678 (to care for the land). The protection of the 
land and its resources have become a persistent rallying cry for sovereignty activists. 
There is often an underlying implied (or occasionally overt) message that the destruction 
of the Hawaiian environment is a direct result of the occupier's lack of respect for the 
land. The solution suggested is thus both an end of whatever destructive project that is 
being protested, as well as an end of US occupation of the islands.  
 The controversy surrounding the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT) typifies this kind 
of activism. The Thirty Meter Telescope is a planned “Extremely Large Telescope” to be 
                                                 
677 Boulding, NGOs, Political Protest, and Civil Society. 
678 ‘āina can translate to “that which feeds us”. Though, its common usage is to mean land, the term 
implies a more direct connection to the land then the English word does. 
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built on Mauna Kea on the island of Hawai'i.679 Despite opposition extending back to 
1964, 13 telescopes have been built on Mauna Kea, a 4,205m mountain located on the 
island of Hawai'i. Though uninhabited, it is a very sacred site. Kealoha Pisciotta, of the 
opposition group Mauna Kea Anaina Hou, describes the mountain as “where our origin 
story begins. It’s a place where significant ancestors are buried, so it’s a burial ground. 
It’s the abode of the gods and goddesses”.680 The construction on the mountain has been 
said to desecrate the sacred site.681 Protesters have also brought up a number of 
environmental and economic issues related to the development of Mauna Kea.682  
 On October 7, 2014, during the ground-breaking of the TMT, protesters 
interrupted the ceremony and obstructed the roadway with picketing and chanting.683 
Further up the mountain, protesters laid down in the road to block the progression.684 In 
March 2015, protesters again blocked the road leading to several arrests685. Protests have 
continued despite a temporary halt in construction686.  
                                                 
679 Poladian, “Maunakea Update: Third Telescope Decommissioned While Thirty Meter Telescope 
Construction Remains Halted.” 
680 Ibid. 
681  Poladian, “Maunakea Update: Third Telescope Decommissioned While Thirty Meter Telescope 
Construction Remains Halted.” 
682 Knapp, “Understanding The Thirty Meter Telescope Controversy.” 
683 Kelleher, “Protesters Halt Mauna Kea Telescope Groundbreaking.” 
684 Ibid. 
685 “Police, TMT Issue Statements on Mass Arrests on Mauna Kea.” 
686 Witze, “The Mountain-Top Battle over the Thirty Meter Telescope.” 
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 Hawaiian opinion has been very mixed, especially amongst young adults. One of 
the more visible faces of the protests, Joshua Lanakila Mangauil, sees his task as 
protecting the mountain and allowing the sacred place “to rest”.687 There are many who 
do support the construction, even amongst Hawaiians. As well as the significant 
economic and scientific benefits, supporters note that Hawaiians have traditionally placed 
a great emphasis on astronomy. The telescope’s function, its focus on the stars, is they 
suggest fully compatible with the sacredness of the mountain. Others reject the 
complaints as being a part of a proxy battle for Hawaiian sovereignty. They suggest that 
the controversy over the TMT is really only an attempt to readdress issues of the self-
determination and land management stemming from the overthrow of the Kingdom.  
The debate has grown significantly beyond the issue of the telescope itself and 
has become a place in which people are able to centre their frustration and other feelings 
towards the US government and its history in Hawai'i.688 Social media has seen a wide 
variety of people weighing in to support the protesters, including several global 
celebrities. Far beyond the issue of the telescope itself, the TMT has become a rallying 
point for the Hawaiian nation and has been slowly gaining global attention for the cause.  
State holidays have repeatedly served as the catalyst for protests directly related to 
the issue of Hawaiian sovereignty. Hawaii Admission Day689 (also known as Statehood 
                                                 
687 Ibid. 
688 Ibid. 
689 This day marks the anniversary of the 1959 admission of Hawaiʻi as a state. 
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Day) has been particularly controversial, stirring up several protests and limited counter-
protests, as well as an attempt to occupy ‘Iolani Palace.  
The overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi can be seen as one of the core symbols 
of the modern Hawaiian nation. ʻIolani Palace and particularly the Quilt Room in which 
Queen Liliʻuokalani was imprisoned after the overthrow has often served both as a 
symbol of defeat, but also as a rallying point for restoring the nation. Though it has much 
less of an invented quality than many other nations symbols, the emphasis placed here 
mirrors the role in identity Steven Mock describes. As he notes, there is a seemingly 
contradictory practice in which nation will use symbols of their defeat as central to their 
national identity.690  
5.1.1.4 Violence 
 Nationalism has frequently been described as fundamentally connected to 
violence.691 Depictions of nationalism in the media stereotypically present it in a 
framework of excessive violence.692 Nationalism is popularly seen as directly connected 
to “images of bloodshed, killing, dying, martyrdom, suffering, and destruction” as well as 
“insurgencies and terrorism”.693 Despite this perceived fundamental characteristic of 
                                                 
690 Steven Mock, Symbols of Defeat in the Construction of National Identity (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
691 Malešević, “Is Nationalism Intrinsically Violent?” 
692 Ibid. 
693 Ibid. 
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violence in nationalism, there are “no natural linkages between nationalism and 
violence”.694 Hawaiian nationalism appears to largely support this finding.  
The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) notes that there are no known hate 
groups in Hawaiʻi and there is a “much-trumpeted spirit of aloha or tolerance”.695 There, 
however, does remain a serious issue with racism which does occasionally result in 
violence.696 Though many groups have been targeted, anti-white sentiments are the most 
relevant to this paper’s discussion of Hawaiian nationalism. This sentiment has been 
described as being caused in part by an “ancestral memory”.697 The invasion and 
overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, along with the resulting theft of the land and loss 
of culture is passed down between generation breeding resentment.698 More recent 
attempts to deracialize Native Hawaiian benefiting entitlement programs have created 
further resentment.699 Whilst Hawaiian sovereignty in its modern form is generally not 
presented as a racial issue, in the frustrations of the struggle, a narrative of white 
oppressors can emerge.  
Haunani-Kay Trask, a Hawaiian Studies professor at the University of Hawaiʻi, in 
one of the stronger expressions of anti-white sentiment, wrote "Just as … all exploited 
peoples are justified in feeling hostile and resentful toward those who exploit them, so we 
                                                 
694 Ibid. 
695 Keller, “Hawaii Suffering From Racial Prejudice.” 
696 Ibid. 
697 Ibid. 
698 Ibid. 
699 Ibid. 
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Hawaiians are justified in such feelings toward the haole700. This is the legacy of racism, 
of colonialism".701 Despite this resentment, hostility and racism, racial violence has been 
very minimal.  
Hawaiʻi reports an extremely low number of hate crimes each year. In the first six 
years that hate crime data were collected (2002-2008), only 12 hate crimes were 
reported.702 Given the size of Hawaiʻi population, national data would suggest that there 
should be over 800 hate crimes during this period. With these low rates of documented 
hate crimes, unreported “schoolyard” and “alleyway” violence also needs to be explored 
to get a fuller picture of the relationship between nationalism and violence in Hawai'i. 
Unfortunately, these data are largely uncollected. There are numerous anecdotes of white 
targeted violence, but little evidence of a systematic problem. In a dissent by Judge 
Reinhardt of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, he wrote that “the last school day in 
Hawaiian schools, for example, has long been known as “Kill Haole Day,” with white 
students—“Haoles”—targeted for harassment and physical abuse”. Yet there remains a 
lack of documented incidents of this sort of ritualised racial violence actually occurring. 
                                                 
700 Haole is used within Hawaiʻi to refer to Caucasians. Its usage, however, is complex and 
controversial. The Civil Rights Commission of the State of Hawaii has stated that “the word “haole” is a 
non-derogatory term used to denote a person of the Caucasian race” They noted, however, that the term can 
be used as a racial slur. In a 1994 case in which a Caucasian employee was allegedly called a “fucking 
haole”, a “fucking haole bitch” and a “haole bitch”, by an angry employer the terms became “racist and 
sexist slurs”. The term “haole” is used within medical and science academic journals unmarkedly up 
through the early 90s as a way of identifying white populations living in Hawaiʻi. Since then, its usage in 
academia seems to have largely been limited to those writing within a Native advocacy framework.  
701 Trask, From a Native Daughter. 
702 Keller, “Hawaii Suffering From Racial Prejudice.” 
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Honolulu Advertiser reporter Cataluna notes that "in terms of actual, first-person, 
eyewitness accounts of Kill Haole Day, no one had any that happened in the last three 
decades. Not one teacher, not one police officer, not one victim or perpetrator".703 
Interviews I conducted with teachers and former public-school students similarly 
revealed little knowledge of the concept of Kill Haole Day and no first-hand knowledge 
of it ever actually occurring.  
Individual cases of racial violence are challenging to identify because of 
frequently unclear motives. In many of the violent incidents that could be labelled as 
racially connected, the offender cites a non-racial slight that the victim is said to have 
made that the offender claims to have reacted to rather than attacking them largely 
because of their race. Road rage or typical bar fight motivations generally accompany 
these incidents of potential racial violence. There is also a lack of clear data on bullying 
motives. It has been suggested that while white students have been bullied in ways that 
include racial taunts, it is not at any higher rate than bullying with racial elements 
directed at other races. Race is argued to be just one of many features that bullies can 
taunt their victims using (similarly to wearing glasses or hair colour) rather than being a 
key motive in victim selection.  
An example of the ambiguity of racially motivated violence can be seen in a 2007 
assault which received significant media attention. In this case, a white soldier and his 
wife were attacked by a Hawaiian man and his teenage son near Pearl Harbor after the 
                                                 
703 Cataluna, “‘Kill Haole Day’ Myth Diverts Attention from Real Problems.” 
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soldier’s car hit the other man’s car.704 The soldier and his wife were pummelled and 
kicked by the two men.705 The son shouted "fucking haole" during the assault.706 
Following the attack, a prosecutor stated that the incident should not be considered a hate 
crime, but rather it was a road-rage incident.707 The case combined anti-military 
sentiment (only some of which is connected to the Hawaiian sovereignty movement708), 
road rage and a racial slur. It remains impossible to tell if the same violent response 
would have occurred if the couple had been of a different race or had been local. As such, 
as in many similar cases, it becomes very hard to classify it as a case of racially 
motivated violence.  
The low number of hate crimes and directly connected to racial violence would 
suggest that there does not appear to be any (or at least very little) systematic violence 
directly tied to Hawaiian nationalism. Whilst racially connected violence justified by 
perceived white oppression likely does occur, it does not appear to be a meaningful part 
of Hawaiian nationalism. 
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5.1.1.5 Armed Resistance 
 Armed resistance is a common part of the imagined stereotypical nationalism.709 
Particularly given that the issue at stake is one of independence and sovereignty, armed 
resistance, even if only by a fringe group, is to be expected and can be seen to have 
occurred in many historic independence struggles. 
 Following the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, a counter-revolution by 
royalists took place in 1895 known as Kaua Kuloko 1895. This conflict lasted three days 
with three battles and a decisive victory for the Republic. At the end of the conflict, 
Queen Liliʻuokalani and other political leaders were convicted of misprision of 
treason710. Robert Wilcox and other plotters were convicted of treason by a military 
tribunal and sentenced to death (which was reduced to 35 years imprisonment). Queen 
Liliʻuokalani formally abdicated her throne in an effort to avoid further bloodshed on 
January 24, 1895, 15 days after the end of the counter-revolution. This marked the last 
significant attempt at restoring the Kingdom through military action. Given the 
overwhelming military power of the United States and the complete lack of popular 
support for a modern-day counter-revolution, armed resistance is likely to never be an 
effective tool again for Hawaiian sovereignty.  
 Despite the lack of viability for armed resistance, China threatened in early 2015 
to provide arms to Hawaiian independence activists.711 This came in response to U.S. 
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arms sales to Taiwan against the wishes of China.712 Whilst it is almost certainly just 
political sabre-rattling failing to present a meaningful consideration directly, of 
significance, is the implication that Hawaiian sovereignty could be a geopolitical 
bargaining chip in the future.  
5.1.2 Desired Outcomes 
 The Hawaiian sovereignty movement has little agreement on what outcome the 
movement should try to achieve. Whilst there is general agreement that something needs 
to be done to correct the wrongs created by the overthrow of the Kingdom, the proposed 
solutions have ranged from enhanced social programs to a fully independent nation. 
There is a definite trend within the movement to advocate for the more extreme solutions, 
even whilst recognising the lack of political viability. This seems to match the ways in 
which hot nationalism is typically expressed. It is very difficult to raise the same level of 
excitement characteristic of hot nationalism for relatively minor increases in entitlements 
compared to the promise of a restored homeland. As increased sovereignty becomes more 
politically viable, it remains to be seen if softer compromise solutions gain traction or if 
the hardline full sovereignty position continues to dominate.  
5.1.2.1 Increased (or Maintenance of) Entitlements 
Today, there already exists a system of entitlements that aim to help correct some 
of the imbalances created by the overthrow of the Kingdom. The continued maintenance 
and expansion of these programs provide ways to correct for the overthrow of the 
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Kingdom without creating any meaningful increases in sovereignty. They provide 
concrete advantages to Native Hawaiians and further legitimise the idea that Hawaiians 
are a distinct group entitled to differing benefits, but largely leaves sovereignty 
unaddressed directly. Additionally, as several of the programs were actually established 
prior to the overthrow, the continued maintenance of the programs and their power 
demonstrates a continued legitimisation on the system of entitlements from a nation 
perspective rather than purely a correction of imbalances.  
One of the clearest examples of these entitlements is Kamehameha Schools. 
Kamehameha Schools were established by the will of Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop 
who was the great-granddaughter of King Kamehameha I.713 The trust was granted 
375,000 acres of crown land.714 Today, it holds 365,000 acres of land, making it the 
largest private landowner in Hawaiʻi.715 Whilst the vast majority of its holdings are kept 
for conservation and agriculture, over 15,000 acres are used commercially (including 
some of the most valuable commercial properties in Hawaiʻi).716 The trust is estimated to 
be worth nearly US$8 billion.717 These holdings are used to support the school’s mission 
of educating Native Hawaiian students both directly within the Kamehameha Schools’ 
campuses and through scholarships for K-12 and postsecondary education.718 
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Kamehameha Schools has long held a policy that gives “preference to children of 
Hawaiian ancestry”.719 This policy has been extremely controversial but remains in place 
despite several legal challenges. 
 As the number of Native Hawaiian applicants generally greatly exceeds the 
number of slots available, very few non-Hawaiian students are ever admitted.720 On 
Maui, which sees fewer applications for the number of slots it has compared to other 
campuses, only one non-native Hawaiian student has been admitted in the past 40 
years.721 Prior to the mid-1960s, non-Hawaiian children of school employees were 
permitted to attend.722  
The school currently requires students to demonstrate that they have at least one 
ancestor who lived in Hawaiʻi prior to 1778.723 This policy was challenged in 2003 by 
Brayden Mohica-Cummings, a seventh-grader, who was rejected from the school after 
being unable to supply proof of Native Hawaiian ancestry.724 Brayden Mohica-
Cummings’ mother was adopted by a Hawaiian family and considers herself and her son 
to be Hawaiian.725 They brought a lawsuit against the school alleging violation of federal 
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anti-discrimination laws.726 The school eventually settled, allowing Brayden to attend the 
school.727  
A 2003 suit (John Doe v. Kamehameha) also challenged the admission policy 
under the federal Civil Rights Act. Though a District Court Judge ruled against Doe 
stating that the policy served "legitimate, remedial purpose by improving native 
Hawaiians' socioeconomic and educational disadvantages"728, in 2005, a three-judge 
panel of the 9th Circuit of Appeals reversed the lower court; they found that the policy 
was in-fact racially exclusionary.729 This finding was itself reversed by a 15-judge en 
banc panel in February 2006 reaffirming the lower court’s finding 8-7.730 The case was 
expected to be heard by the US Supreme Court, but was settled for $7 million US dollars 
in favour of Doe, immediately prior to the court’s decision on accepting the case .731 
Additional challenges are expected with uncertain results. The school has already stopped 
accepting federal funds due to fears of further civil rights challenges.732 Future challenges 
could also result in the trust's tax-exempt status being revoked which could cost the 
school US$80 million a year and up to a billion in back taxes.733   
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 Na Pua Ke Alii Pauahi (an organisation of Kamehameha Schools students, 
parents, teachers and alumni) collected 84,000 signatures opposing the Mohica-
Cummings’ challenge to Kamehameha Schools' admission policy, with many alums 
expressing strong opposition to any change in school admissions.734 One alum described 
the Mohica-Cummings settlement as being like “another overthrow of the monarchy” and 
claimed that the school represented “the last icon for native Hawaiians”.735 Kamehameha 
Schools has also been described as the “only forum in which native Hawaiians can get 
together as native Hawaiians”.736 The later admission of a non-Native Hawaiian in Maui 
also drew strong emotional responses. Haunani-Kay Trask, a professor of Hawaiian 
studies and an alum, said that the admission of the student “really hurt people, … and the 
pain was so palpable you could almost smell people's anger”.737  
Kamehameha Schools maintains that their policy is not race-based and should not 
be treated as a racial issue.738 The vast majority of students are of mixed-race with 78 per 
cent of the students identifying as part Caucasian, 74 percent as part Chinese, 28 per cent 
as Japanese, and 24 per cent stating that they were of other ancestries.739 The courts, 
however, have largely disagreed, finding that ancestry is being used as a proxy for 
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race.740 Though in similar cases, courts have allowed the use of federally recognised 
American Indian statuses for entitlements, this usage does not apply to Hawaiian groups 
as American Indian groups are said to represent political units, not racial groups.741 Given 
the current lack of recognised Native Hawaiian tribal governments, this option remains 
unavailable to Kamehameha Schools and similar groups.  
The strong emotions the Kamehameha Schools issue provokes, and its clear 
framing as one of keeping Native Hawaiian culture and connection are emblematic of the 
position of entitlements as a nationalist issue. The language and emotions surrounding it 
differ greatly from typical affirmative action justifications of correcting inequality and 
more closely resembles other nation-building efforts.  
Another significant entitlement is the Hawaiian Home Lands program. This 
program was established by the US Congress through the Hawaiian Homes Commission 
Act of 1920 under the guidance of Prince Jonah Kūhiō Kalaniana’ole.742 It provides for 
the creation of a commission to allocate select public lands (over 200,000 acres) for use 
by Native Hawaiians as homesteads743. In addition to providing financing assistance, the 
commission provides “99-year homestead leases at $1 per year for residential, 
agricultural, or pastoral purposes”.744 In contrast to Kamehameha Schools and several 
other entitlements programs, Hawaiian Home Lands defines Native Hawaiians as persons 
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with at least 50 per cent Hawaiian blood.745 The program’s primary focus has long been 
on single-family homes through returning families to the “ʻāina” (the land746).747 The 
program is reasonably successful, though it has faced a number of problems related to 
inadequate funding and inappropriate allocations of land away from the program. In its 
management of former crown lands for the purposes of supporting Native Hawaiians, the 
Hawaiian Homes Commission provides a reinforcement of the continued existence of 
Native Hawaiian entitlements. 
 A variety of other entitlements also exists which provide special benefits within 
education, healthcare and a variety of other areas. They remain very problematic legally 
but are generally unchallenged as there is reasonable popular support for these 
entitlements.  
 
5.1.2.2 State-within-a-State: Integrating Hawaiian Self-Government 
into the State of Hawai'i 
The state-within-a-state model provides the weakest form of self-governance. 
This model provides for an increased role for Hawaiians in the operation of the state 
government, most equivalent to that of a county. It would allow for the creation and 
enforcement of ordinances but also leaves its members fully under the jurisdiction of the 
existing government of Hawaiʻi.  
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 This model would likely start with the movement of existing entitlement 
programs to a new entity and the granting of this new entity limited powers over selected 
areas of concern to Hawaiians.748 This model is supported by the Office of Hawaiian 
Affairs, as a precursor to the nation-within-a-nation. They advocate moving its assets to a 
“new Native Hawaiian governing entity”.749 The creation of family courts focused on 
supporting Hawaiian values has also been proposed in SB992.750 This highly 
controversial bill would have allowed a tribunal to receive jurisdiction over divorce and 
paternity cases where one of the parties is Hawaiian.751  
 The state-within-a-state model provides limited recognition of Hawaiian self-
government, whilst not requiring a meaningful change to the lives of non-Hawaiians. 
There, however, remain legal concerns of race-based discrimination. Attempts at 
establishing separate systems of government or government services exclusively for 
Hawaiians have met with significant legal opposition.752 As such any state-within-a-state 
style programs would likely need to be open to all peoples and participation would 
probably have to be voluntary to avoid drawing the attention of the courts. This clearly 
limits its nationalistic utility.  
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5.1.2.3 Nation-within-a-Nation: Hawaiian self-government within the 
United States 
The nation-within-a-nation model proposes a system similar to the status of many 
Native American Indian and Alaskan nations. This model would allow for limited 
sovereignty whilst remaining under the authority and control of the state and/or federal 
government. In following the Native American Indian and Alaskan model, the Hawaiian 
nation might have sovereignty over a geographically bounded area and its member 
inhabitants but would otherwise be subjected to US governance. This model is often 
suggested as an intermediary phase towards full independence.  
Unfortunately for its advocates, Hawaii’s modern geography is poorly suited to 
traditional forms of the nation-within-a-nation model. In contrast to many Native 
American Indian and Alaskan nations, Hawai'i lacks clear geographic borders on which 
to establish a Hawaiian nation. Though a few islands are predominantly Hawaiian, the 
vast majority of Hawaiians live in areas that are racially mixed. Barring a mass-
resettlement program, a geographically bounded Hawaiian nation would either be so 
under or over-inclusive that it would lack utility.  
The nation-within-a-nation model has been suggested by the popular sovereignty 
group, Ka Lahui Hawai'i, as a “realist” option.753 The group has called for the return of 
former crown land to re-establish the Hawaiian nation.754 This would allow for a 
reasonable level of Hawaiian sovereignty in a bounded area with limited effect upon on 
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the rest of Hawai'i. The group, however, faces serious obstacles in that it needs to 
convince both the state and federal governments and sway public opinion. Additionally, it 
would require people to relocate to currently unused land, whilst providing the 
infrastructure required.  
5.1.2.4 Free Association: An Independent Hawaiʻi in Free 
Association with the United States 
Free association provides a possible compromise model. In this approach, Hawaiʻi 
becomes an independent state, but still maintains close ties to the United States. In 
adopting this strategy, Hawai'i and the United States would sign a "compact of free 
association". This agreement would define the terms under which the two nations 
cooperate. In other nations that have compacts of free association with the United States, 
the United States provides a defined set of government services and is responsible for 
military defence. In exchange, the United States receives the right to station military 
forces in the freely associated state755. Other, often less tangible, benefits are also enjoyed 
by the states. The associated state generally maintains full legal sovereignty over their 
territory but elect to “outsource” some government functions to the other state. This may 
include allowing the other state to manage significant government functions, such as 
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foreign affairs and national defence or it may take the form of allowing the host state to 
handle smaller tasks such as consular services and supplementary law enforcement.  
 If Hawai'i is successful in gaining independence, there is a reasonable chance that 
this is the model that would eventually be adopted. It provides virtually all of the 
advantages of independence but allows for the practical challenges independence would 
create which are numerous.  
A withdrawal of the federal government from Hawai'i would create a number of 
significant gaps in critical services. At the present time, no sovereignty group is 
anywhere near ready to form a government and whilst the State of Hawaii could feasibly 
replace many of the federal government services, it too is not in the position to easily do 
so. Though many of the local offices of federal services could be transferred without 
significant problems, most are still very dependent upon a support structure provided 
from outside of Hawai'i which would need to be replaced.  
There are also a number of direct economic consequences to any form of 
independence that would need to be handled. Federal funds formed 21.54% of the state 
budget in 2015 with the federal government contributing $1.46 for every dollar paid in 
Hawaiʻi in federal taxes (thus Hawaiʻi is being heavily subsidised by the other US 
states).756 Additionally, the federal government directly employs almost 6% of the 
Hawai'i workforce (excluding active duty military, who are also economically 
significant).757 The newly independent Hawai'i would need to find a way to cover these 
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costs without federal funds, as well as potentially pay for its own military. Increased 
taxes and reduced spending might cover some of the deficit, but the levels of taxes and 
service cuts this would require would likely be highly unpopular and probably alone 
unworkable (at minimum a 10-15% across the board income tax increase would be 
required). This also ignores the economic effect independence would likely have on 
tourism and the probable out-migration from Hawai'i due to the uncertainty surrounding 
the formation of any new country. Additionally, direct and indirect military spending 
currently form one of the major pillars of the Hawai'i economy758 and would need to be 
economically replaced. Barring new creative solutions or socially undesirable solutions 
(legalised gambling, offshore banking, etc.), this deficit would likely have to be met by 
foreign aid. A compact of free association between the newly independent Hawai'i and 
the United States could provide this economic assistance, federal support services and 
military protection. 
Free association, at least theoretically, requires both states to reach an equitable 
agreement in which both states provide value to the other. For Hawai'i, the benefit would 
likely be largely economic whilst for the United States, the strategic utility of Hawaii’s 
location is significantly advantageous militarily. Both states also maintain a likely strong 
interest in supporting continuity as much as possible. 
For many members of the general public who support sovereignty, this form 
seems to be the one which they favour, even though few actually recognize it as being 
called free association. In discussing sovereignty options, I have found that most of those 
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who favour independence  (outside of sovereignty activists) are still hoping for little 
practical effect on their daily lives. They support the general principles of sovereignty but 
are unsurprisingly not in support of a radical change to services or dramatically increased 
taxation. Additionally, whilst many favour reduced military presence, having to rely 
solely upon the Hawaii National Guard for military defence is a scary prospect for them. 
There is also a very practical concern that an independent Hawai'i would not be 
financially viable causing serious changes in daily quality of life. Free association, either 
indefinitely or for a transition period, largely addresses these concerns.  
The most significant problematic aspect of free association remains the 
psychological and moral issue of ridding Hawai'i of the colonising force. Free association 
would mean a continued dependence upon a country that illegally overthrew the 
Kingdom and then occupied it. Much of the call for Hawaiian sovereignty relies upon the 
moralistic argument of correcting the illegal overthrow and returning the land to its 
rightful owner. Thus, whilst free association may be more practical, it fails to correct the 
moral wrong fully. Under it, Hawai'i would remain, at least partially, subjugated to the 
United States. 
There are also concerns relating to how the United States has handled people 
under existing compacts of free associations. Though Micronesians form a 
disproportionate percentage of the US military and the islands provide many benefits to 
the US, the federal government continues to seriously under allocate resources to support 
Micronesians. Micronesians also continue to face significant issues with housing, 
education, healthcare and employment when living in the US. Whilst Hawaii's larger 
population and greater importance to the US would likely provide them with a stronger 
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bargaining position, free association does put Hawai'i in the position of negotiating with a 
much more powerful country which already has a history of neglecting its obligations 
under compacts of free association.   
Free association was initially advocated by Robert Wilcox in 1899 through the 
founding of the Home Rule Party.759 The party was successful in the first territorial 
legislative election in 1900, but after losses in subsequent elections, it was dissolved by 
1912.760 A short-lived version of the party re-emerged in the mid-1970s761 and again in 
the 1990s. Despite its history, the parties have not received much attention nor have the 
proposal of home rule or free association.  
Free association provides a compromise solution which, while ultimately 
desirable, is of lessened utility in the current phase of the struggle for independence. 
Within a simple negotiating strategy approach, one basic principle is that “whichever 
negotiator starts with the more ambitious opening position wins the compromise”.762 As 
such, opening negotiations for independence by asking for the compromise of free 
association would place activists in a weak negotiating position. Yet as acceptance and 
political viability for independence increases, proposals such as this will likely become 
more common.  
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5.1.2.5 Full Independence: Hawaiʻi as a fully sovereign nation 
Under this model, Hawaiʻi would become completely legally separate from the 
United States and any arrangements between the two countries would be negotiated as, 
theoretically equal, separate nation-states.  
Prior to the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i, Hawai'i was recognised as a 
fully sovereign state having formed treaties with many European nations as well as the 
United States.763 The Kingdom had established almost one hundred diplomatic and 
consular posts and was a member of international organisations including the Universal 
Postal Union.764 Supporters of the full independence model argue that they are merely 
calling for the restoration of this internationally recognised kingdom that was illegally 
overthrown. With several nation-states within the Pacific having gained their 
independence in the last few decades, independence for Hawai'i is presented as being a 
realistic possibility. 
There is little agreement, however, on what this new nation-state should look like. 
The groups largely accept the idea of permitting residence for non-Hawaiians and most 
provide a pathway by which non-Hawaiians could obtain citizenship.765 There is a 
complete lack of agreement on how land ownership should function in the new kingdom, 
ranging from immediate or phased eviction of noncitizens to restriction on their land 
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ownership.766 The different sovereignty groups generally accept the idea of non-
Hawaiians in government positions, though many advocate for the highest level or 
culturally significant positions being restricted to Hawaiians.767 They are very mixed on 
tourism and immigration in general.768 Whilst sovereignty groups have provided several 
models of how their theoretical government could function, the immense political 
challenges that remain until independence can be obtained would make it likely that the 
eventual government will have little actual resemblance to their proposed hypothetical 
models.  
The most significant challenge of establishing full sovereignty is the lack of a 
clear successor government. With the death of Prince Jonah Kūhiō Kalanianaʻole in 
1922, all subsequent potential heirs to the throne were born long after the overthrow of 
the Kingdom and are only distantly related to the monarchy. Quentin Kūhiō 
Kawānanakoa (the great-nephew of Prince Kūhiō), a lawyer and former Republican state 
representative, provides the most direct connection to the throne. Kawānanakoa has 
stated in regards to the prince title that he does not “allude to myself in that fashion, but I 
certainly am proud of my forefathers who in fact were of the royal family”, and it was 
noted when he ran for office that he neither “claims nor rejects the title”.769 The other 
most direct descendant of the royal family is Abigail Kinoiki Kekaulike Kawānanakoa 
                                                 
766 Ibid. 
767 Ibid. 
768 Ibid. 
769 Brannon, “Kawananakoa Eager for Comeback.” 
228 
 
(the great-grandniece of King David Kalākaua). However now over 90 she is unlikely to 
be able to head a newly independent nation, nor has she shown any interest in doing so.770  
 Several sovereignty groups have people whom they claim should be the successor 
to the throne. Almost a dozen groups claim to be the legitimate government of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom.771 These groups range greatly in numbers of members, though most 
still have fairly small numbers.772 Many of these groups are centred around a person 
whom they claim has a direct linkage to the Hawaiian monarchy (though it is often fairly 
tenuous) and should thus be considered to be the legitimate heir to the throne.773 There is 
little recognition that any of the other groups have any legitimacy, with most choosing to 
completely ignore the others claims.774 The currently operating sovereignty groups who 
claim to be a successor government are seen across Hawai'i as being radical fringe 
groups, none of whom would be in any way suited to form a new government (both in 
terms of popular support and logistical capacity).  
One greatly underexplored option is allowing the State of Hawaii government to 
break away from the United States. In this model, the Governor would become the 
executive of the new country, at least on an interim basis. This mirrors the peaceful 
handoff of many other postcolonial states. It would minimise disruption and respects the 
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democratic process. This option however largely fails to answer the moral wrongs 
committed by the overthrow and rather only addresses the legal wrongs.  
 Full sovereignty, despite being the ultimate goal and what many would argue is 
the legal and moral obligation, is by far the most unlikely outcome of Hawaiian 
nationalism. In a 2014 poll by the Honolulu Star-Advertiser, only six per cent of 
respondents envisioned independence for Hawaiians.775 The process of forming a new 
country is frequently messy and risky. Barring some major change in US policy or a 
significant shift in Hawai'i public opinion, full sovereignty seems more like a dream than 
a realistic future.  
5.1.3 The Counter-Sovereignty Movement 
 Given the intensity of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement, the minimalism of a 
counter-sovereignty movement is remarkable. There is a complete absence of organised 
groups advocating against sovereignty. Rather there are a small number of fringe activists 
and scattered court cases which form the major opposition to sovereignty. 
The federal government of the United States has largely maintained a status quo 
policy towards the sovereignty issue despite a 1993 Joint Resolution apologising for the 
overthrow and some limited efforts by the Obama Administration. The State of Hawaii 
maintains a somewhat more nuanced view, but largely effectively operates under a status 
quo policy as well. Though both would likely be very involved in combating any actually 
viable attempts to establish a sovereign Hawaiian nation, neither can really be said to be 
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acting as part of a counter sovereignty movement at this time, at least as far as 
nationalism is concerned.  
Outside of the purely legal space (such as Rice v. Cayetano and Akina v. Hawai'i), 
Kenneth Conklin and the group to which he is connected, “Aloha for All” provide the 
closest resemblance to an organised counter-sovereignty movement. Conklin is a prolific 
commenter online and is frequently selected by reporters to quote when seeking a 
counter-sovereignty perspective for “balance”. He remains a highly controversial person 
who has accused the Hawaiian sovereignty movement of advocating for racism and 
apartheid.776 
 The group Aloha for All states that their mission is “to ensure that ALL citizens of 
Hawaii are treated equally under the law”.777 Though the group was involved in some 
legal challenges and political advocacy, they never reached the level of attention that the 
pro-sovereignty groups found. Whilst the website remains online, Aloha for All’s was 
dissolved as a non-profit corporation in January 2015.778 It appears that the counter-
sovereignty platform seems to exist today largely as a handful of commenters online 
without much of an active response beyond that. 
There are also scattered discussions on white-supremacist websites that provide 
typically racist arguments about why Hawaiians should not be trusted or permitted to 
operate an independent state. Rather than provide any sort of meaningful political, 
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historical or legal argument, they rely solely upon claims of white superiority over native 
groups. As these white-supremacist groups do not form a meaningful contingent within 
Hawaiʻi, there is little value in attempting to analyse their position further, other than 
noting its existence.  
5.2 Hot Nationalism in Niue 
Amongst the islands that are the focus of this dissertation, the lowest level of hot 
nationalism is found in Niue. Indeed, there does not seem to be any active nationalist 
groups nor any sort of noticeable pro-nationalist action. Rather there is a more subtle and 
passive expression of nationalism. Niueans do consider themselves to be a separate 
people than New Zealanders. This, however, does not seem to have resulted in much 
efforts to make this distinction clearly known. The fact that Niueans are not New 
Zealanders seems to simply be accepted as an unchallenged statement within Niue, and 
there has been virtually no call for Niue to end the free association agreement in favour of 
full independence. Also, apparently absent is the sort of identity conflict that other groups 
in similar circumstances have felt, such as what can be seen in New Caledonians 
relationship with France.  
It has been argued that the mass emigration from Niue has resulted in a situation 
in which Niuean identity is rapidly fading.779 Barnett argues that, as a result, “national 
pride is a rare feeling in Niue”.780 He suggests that this lack of national pride is closely 
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tied to the lack of “signs and symbols of the nation”.781 For whilst Niue “has a flag and a 
song, these are hardly the powerful icons of nationalism associated with most modern 
nation states”.782 Further, he suggests that the weakness of Niuean nationalism, 
particularly in comparison to other Pacific Island nations, is the result of the way Niue 
gained independence.783 Most other countries, even those who have obtained 
independence peacefully, have a narrative of struggle surrounding their independence.784 
Niue, in contrast, obtained independence largely as a result of New Zealand’s offer and 
subsequent 1974 referendum rather than a long struggle. Even the way in which it marks 
its independence shares this theme. October 19-20 is celebrated as “Constitution Day”, 
rather than Independence Day or Nation/Niue Day. It places the focus on the legal 
document rather than a victory over outside control or even a celebration of nationhood.   
 As a result of the free association agreement with New Zealand, Niueans carry 
New Zealand passports. Niueans can receive an optional stamp in their passports that 
identifies them as Niueans so as to allow for one-way travel to Niue.785 This has led the 
former premier of Niue to say that “‘the only document that tells us who we are is our 
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passport, and it shows that we are New Zealanders’”.786 Niueans do not, however, 
consider themselves to be New Zealanders787; and the assumption that they do because of 
their passport seems to be unequivocally rejected by Niueans and by the New Zealand 
Government.  
Despite the mass migration away from Niue, Niueans abroad still maintain a 
strong connection to their homeland. Many people I interviewed expressed the sentiment 
that whilst few people wanted to stay in Niue, everyone wanted to ultimately be buried in 
Niue. Though for practical purposes, New Zealand is where they live and work, Niue 
remains what they consider “home”. There is a common feeling that they will eventually 
return to Niue (at least when they get old), despite their lives being in New Zealand and 
the resulting infeasibility of return.  
 Niuean nationalism seems to be most clearly expressed through cultural 
strengthening and revival efforts rather than a focus on hot nationalism. The formal 
efforts have come under the heading of Taoga Niue. This program is designed to build a 
stronger Niue through the promotion of traditional Niuean cultural practices. Though this 
mission could produce hot nationalistesque results, at least at present, it seems to fall 
more under the heading of everyday nationalism.  
Whilst Niue’s independence is well recognised, there have been occasional calls 
to reintegrate with New Zealand.788 As increasing numbers of Niueans emigrate, it 
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becomes increasingly difficult to provide services to the standard desired.789 Many 
residents feel that they could improve the quality of life on the island by again becoming 
a part of New Zealand.790 The Niuean Premier strongly rejected this notion in 2005.791 He 
called it “immoral” and noted that the infrastructure needs of Niue would not be different 
if they were to reintegrate with New Zealand.792 The discussions of reintegrating with 
New Zealand largely focus on the change as a practical decision rather than a reflection 
of Niuean nationhood. Supporters are not calling for reintegration because the nation of 
Niue no longer exists, but rather because of resource limitations. Cyclone Heta, which hit 
Niue in 2004, renewed concerns of the continued viability of Niue as an independent 
nation.793 The cyclone killed one person, seriously injured several and destroyed many 
homes and government buildings including the island’s only hospital. It also seriously 
damaged the island’s infrastructure and cut off power and communications.794 Even a 
decade later, many homes affected by the cyclone remain derelict with the owners having 
left for New Zealand. The storm also devastated the island’s young commercial 
agricultural industries.795 As a result, there was considerable concern with the lasting 
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viability of an independent Niue.796 Rapid depopulation was expected, and many 
predicted a necessary end to Niuean independence.797 New Zealand stated that decision 
would be left to the government of Niue, noting "we need to acknowledge what the 
people on Niue want, rather than being seen as a former colonial country imposing our 
will".798 Niue ultimately remained independent with the population loss being much less 
than was predicted. Niue, however, remains at the edge of the minimum number of 
people to practically continue to maintain an independent nation. Niuean government 
agencies are already extremely small with many people filling several roles in 
government and the community. Another major wave of emigration, such as the result of 
another cyclone, could be devastating. This precarious position may mean that Niue may 
become the first modern nation to fail, not because of conflicts of national identity or 
because of foreign actors, but rather an inability to maintain the resources required to 
form the functions of a nation.  
Whilst there is a clear absence of hot nationalism within Niue, it does not appear 
to be the result of a lack of national pride nor a belief that Niue is not an independent 
nation. Rather it appears that the lack of hot nationalism is the result of a combination of 
a strong presence of everyday nationalism (discussed in detail in the following chapter), 
and perhaps a lack of motivation given the continued recognition of their sovereignty by 
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New Zealand and the significant burden many Niueans are under in maintaining the 
nation’s infrastructure.  
5.3 Hot Nationalism in the Cook Islands 
 The Cook Islands has experienced more hot nationalism than Niue. It has 
emerged during several different periods, the first of which came during World War II.799 
With the recent failure of New Zealand’s attempts to revive the fruit industry and 
increasing migration to New Zealand of young people, many Cook Island leaders became 
dissatisfied.800 An American Air Force unit stationed in Aitutaki provided increased 
development and wages to the island which had been previously fairly poor.801 They also 
provided a strong voice for what they perceived as New Zealand’s neglect of the 
island.802 Growing dissatisfaction led to the formation of the Cook Islands Progressive 
Association (CIPA).803 Though the group lacked a clear mandate or programme, it helped 
develop a critical voice against New Zealand administration.804 Over time, the CIPA 
developed labour union style methods to focus on wages and political reform.805 The 
group’s pro-Cook Island nationalist message was very popular in the islands, but its 
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leadership was fragmented.806 The CIPA and the government engaged in a series of 
minor scuffles, after which the CIPA’s militant opposition to the New Zealand 
Administration gradually faded.807  
 As noted several times already, New Zealand was a fervent supporter of the UN’s 
calls to ensure the political, economic, and social development of its non-self-governing 
territories.808 Amongst several programs to address this within its territories was the 
granting of limited home rule in the formation of the Cook Islands Legislative Council in 
1946.809 With this shift, the CIPA altered their Cook Island nationalist agenda to focus 
their opposition to the New Zealand Administration into the Legislative Council.810  
 Though the nationalist fervour faded, the CIPA continued to exist, eventually 
playing a large role in the formation of the Cook Islands Party.811 The Cook Islands Party 
though a nationalist party advocated for maintaining ties with New Zealand.  
 During the 1965-1974 period of Albert Henry's (Cook Islands Party) government, 
a very controlled type of nationalism emerged.812 In this form, Albert Henry's 
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government promoted a number of carefully designed performances to show the world a 
version of Cook Islands unity and identity.813  
5.3.1.1 Ending Free Association 
There have been occasional calls for ending the free association agreement with 
New Zealand, but these efforts have failed to gain meaningful traction. Under the 1946 
agreement, the Cook Islands has the right to unilaterally end the arrangement and become 
fully independent. New Zealand PM Helen Clark said in 2000, that “If they [the Cook 
Islands] want to exert complete independence, New Zealand would not stand in their 
way”.814  
Cook Island politicians have suggested that full independence would facilitate UN 
membership and increase foreign relationships.815 The vote in the UN and the new 
foreign relationships are presented as allowing for increased bargaining power in 
obtaining foreign aid and investment.816 This approach would likely generate additional 
income for the Cook Islands. Several small nations have also successfully monetised their 
UN votes by offering larger states their support on issues in exchange for foreign aid.817 
For example, Nauru (a small Pacific island state) was offered $50 million by Russia in 
exchange for extending diplomatic recognition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.818 
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Similarly, Iran gave $200,000 to the Solomon Islands (another small Pacific island state) 
to support Iran’s opposition to Israel joining the UN General Assembly.819 China and 
Taiwan have both also contributed significantly to several small states in exchange for 
recognition or de-recognition of Taiwan.820 Deals favourable to small island UN 
members are common, resulting in aid and other concessions.821 This has resulted in 
many small states supporting larger players on issues that are of little direct concern to 
them.822 As these deals are commonplace and are generally seen as legal823, the Cook 
Islands would likely stand to gain significant financial advantages via UN membership. 
Whilst the Cook Islands could probably join the UN under its current system824, its 
relationship with New Zealand would limit its ability to fully negotiate freely and thus 
may leave them unable to fully reap the financial benefits.  
 Of great concern for full independence efforts, is the automatic New Zealand 
citizenship that Cook Islanders currently receive as a result of the free association 
agreement.825 It is under this arrangement that many Cook Islanders live, work, and 
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receive schooling in New Zealand and Australia826. Ending the free association 
agreement would almost certainly mean an end of the automatic New Zealand 
citizenship.827 New Zealand citizenship is seen as providing many jobs and opportunities 
that do not exist within the Cook Islands.828 Unless nationalist politicians are able to 
secure an alternative arrangement for citizenship, any referendum on ending free 
association is highly likely to fail.829  
5.4 Hot Nationalism in Fiji 
 Fiji across its four coups and the instability surrounding them has seen several 
flare-ups of hot nationalism. This has almost entirely manifested as pro-iTaukei 
ethnonationalism. The Bainimarama government has however in recent years attempted 
to establish a unified nation with deliberate attempts to replace ethnonationalism with 
civic-nationalism.  
 Ethnonationalism is built around the idea that the nation should be formed on the 
basis of common ethnic ancestry. The nation, in this view, is characterised by a shared 
heritage, language and religion.830 In Fiji, this is manifested primarily through the notion 
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that the nation of Fiji should be defined in terms of iTaukei heritage. For iTaukei 
ethnonationalists, their long connection to the islands as the indigenous people of Fiji is 
used to justify measures to ensure their continuing control over the nation.  
 Civic-nationalism refers to nationalism that is built around the notion that all 
people who live within the geopolitical borders of the nation should be considered part of 
the nation regardless of ethnicity, religion or other similar factors.831 Bainimarama has 
spearheaded efforts to redefine the language used to talk about Fijians as well as shape 
how the nation is reflected in sports, music and other national celebrations. Much of these 
efforts fall within the realm of everyday nationalism and are discussed within the 
following chapter.  
5.4.1 Actions 
5.4.1.1 Land Laws 
 The policy that most strongly defines iTaukei supremacy is Fiji’s land ownership 
laws. Under policies established by Sir Arthur Gordon in 1882, about 82% of land in Fiji 
is held as “customary” land or “native” land.832 This land is considered to be owned 
collectively by a clan, tribe or family.833 It cannot be sold, even to other iTaukei.834 It can 
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only be leased.835 Of the native land, two-thirds have been leased to non-iTaukeis.836 The 
vast majority of these leases are held by Indo-Fijians.837 This has created a situation in 
which despite having been in Fiji for several generations, owning the land on which they 
live and work is a completely unattainable dream for most Indo-Fijians. They are instead 
trapped in a cycle of land leases, that each time may or may not be renewed. The expiry 
of land leases in the late 1990s caused considerable concern amongst Indo-Fijians as 
many were not renewed.838  
Fiji’s land restrictions are codified within the Constitution of Fiji.839 As such they 
serve as a powerful reminder that despite any work to the contrary in building a united 
Fiji, iTaukei will always have a more privileged position in the fundamental area of land 
ownership. 
 The strong protections for native land ownership used within Fiji are often 
presented as a model of preserving native rights form which other nations can learn. This 
sort of support from academics and activists in other countries has been routinely used to 
justify the continuance of the system and the whitewashing of its problematic limitations. 
Fijian land tenure, as well as being used as a tool of ethnonationalism, is not even ideal 
for iTaukei peoples. It imposes a paternalistic model which robs people of their agency in 
the disposition of what is supposed to be their land, whilst granting the Land Trust Board 
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enormous powers. It does not even actually reflect a traditional model of land 
ownership.840 Exclusive rights to land was a concept introduced to Fiji by European 
settlers841. Even the model of mataqali842 land claims, on which the policy was based, is 
the model of the Bau group, not all of Fiji.843 
5.4.1.2 Constitution 
 The constitutions of Fiji have served as one of the most hotly contested 
battlegrounds of iTaukei ethnonationalism. Various revisions have been used to provide 
constitutionally guaranteed dominance for iTaukeis.  
The first post-independence 1970 constitution granted significant power to the 
entirely iTaukei Great Council of Chiefs and the Fijian Affairs Board.844 It also 
guaranteed the Native Land Trust Board’s control of all “native land”.845 A 22 member 
senate was also created and composed in a manner that would ensure iTaukei control.846 
Whilst the lower house of Parliament used an electoral system that gave equal seats to 
Indo-Fijians and iTaukei (along with a lesser number of seats for other ethnic groups), the 
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iTaukei controlled senate held veto power over issues related to iTaukei interests.847 
Constitutional change would also require two-thirds of the Senate to approve it.848 
 Following the 1987 coups, the interim government announced a new 
constitution.849 This constitution expanded the lower house of Parliament to 70 seats of 
which 37 are to be elected by iTaukei, 27 by Indo-Fijians, one by Rotumans, leaving five 
seats for other races.850 The Senate was adjusted to give iTaukei an even greater 
majority.851 This constitution established a process wherein the Prime Minister was 
selected by the President from amongst the iTaukei members of the lower house.852 Both 
the president and the iTaukei members of the Senate were to be selected by the Great 
Council of Chiefs.853  
The National Federation Party and the Fiji Labour Party Coalition described the 
proposed constitution as “profoundly authoritarian, undemocratic, militaristic, racist and 
feudalistic. It would be derisive and sow the seeds of terrible violence. It would retard our 
social and economic development. It would isolate us from many of our valued 
neighbours, the Commonwealth and the international community”.854 Despite heavy 
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criticism both domestically and by the international community, the constitution was 
adopted in 1990.855  
 Constitutional change became one of the key political issues of the 1992 and 1994 
elections with Indo-Fijians groups advocating for repeal and many iTaukei groups 
strongly supporting it.856  Facing growing international pressure, a commission was 
eventually established to review the constitution and form recommendations as provided 
under Section 161 (which required a review before seven years).857 The three-person 
multi-ethnic commission provided 697 recommendations.858 After eight months of 
debate, Parliament and the Great Council of Chiefs endorsed most of the 
recommendations859. The recommendations were incorporated into the Constitution 
(Amendment) Bill 1997 which was adopted in July 1997.860 This constitution allowed for 
equal representation in the lower house and removed the ethnic requirement for Prime 
Minister.861 
The 1997 constitution was abrogated in 2009 following the Appeals Court’s 
ruling on the constitutionality of the 2006 coup.862 In 2012, a commission was established 
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to draft a new constitution in preparation for the 2014 elections.863 After significant 
community consultation,  the Commission submitted a draft constitution to the 
government.864 The government rejected the proposed constitution and elected to adopt a 
modified version written by Fiji's Attorney-General.865 Though fairly similar in many 
areas, the government's version rejected the Commission regional constituencies 
model.866 It also preserved military power.867 The constitution contains a number of 
provisions aimed at promoting a single national identity and countering 
ethnonationalism.868 It also formally lowered the voting age to 18, adopted a one-person-
one-vote model (ending the ethnic electoral roll system) and recognised multiple 
citizenships.869 Despite its positive changes, the constitution has been heavily criticised 
by human rights groups, including Amnesty International, who state that the “new 
constitution not only erodes basic human rights for the people of Fiji but grants military, 
police and government officials absolute immunity for past, present and future human 
rights violations”.870 
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5.4.1.3 Political 
 Political parties in Fiji have historically been divided largely along ethnic lines.871 
Despite this division, most have adopted a somewhat centrist policy.872 Though several 
parties such as the Alliance Party under Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, have advocated a “Fiji 
for All” platform, they do not generally see great cross-ethnic support.873 Other parties 
such as Sitiveni Rabuka’s Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei party started as staunch 
ethnonationalists, but eventually shifted to be more inclusive.874 Further, for several 
parties, despite being officially committed to national unity and multiracial cooperation, 
many of the parties that have held power have been perceived as supporting one group 
over the other.875 Of the recent governments, Chaudhry’s was popularly perceived as 
being too strongly Indian oriented, whilst Qarase was seen as too focused on iTaukei 
issues.876 The political parties have though whilst generally taking an officially 
multiracial stance used their power to reinforce more subtle ethnonationalist agendas.  
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Interestingly, despite the ethnic divide and rhetoric, strongly ethnonationalist 
parties do not seem to have been especially successful. This is particularly evident in the 
2014 election in which no strongly ethnonationalist parties ran.877  
5.4.1.4 Coups 
Matching what many imagine when they think of hot nationalism, Fiji has seen 
significant political upheaval. Fiji has undergone four coups since independence in 1976. 
Three of the four coups were directly related to ethnonationalist policies, whilst the fourth 
was presented as necessary to counter ethnonationalism.  
The first coup came in 1987 following the April election of a coalition 
government led by Timoci Bavadra (an iTaukei), with a majority Indo-Fijian 
membership.878 Though the government was multiracial, the power of Indo-Fijians within 
the coalition government greatly concerned many iTaukei nationalists.879 A strongly 
racist and ethnonationalist movement known as the Taukei Movement held a number of 
protests demanding a government formed of only iTaukeis be created.880 
With ethnonationalists becoming increasingly vocal, Lt. Col. Sitiveni Rabuka 
removed the Bavadra government in a military coup less than a month after the 
election.881 Rabuka accompanied by ten armed soldiers entered the Fijian House of 
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Representatives and ordered the Members of Parliament to leave the building.882 They 
complied with his demands, allowing Rabuka to dissolve the government and declare 
himself head of state.883 He claimed to be acting to prevent racial violence and maintain 
order.884  
Having lost faith in and control of the post-coup interim government he 
appointed, Rabuka staged a second coup on September 25th.885 In December, facing 
international pressure, Rabuka resigned as head of state allowing the previous PM Ratu 
Sir Kamisese Mara to be reappointed and Rabuka to become Minister of Home Affairs.886 
A discriminatory constitution (discussed above) was put into effect in 1990 which 
prevented Indo-Fijians and minorities from holding a majority in parliament.887 Under 
this constitution, Rabuka became Prime Minister in 1993.888 
 In May 1999, in the first elections held under the 1997 Constitution, Indo-Fijian 
parties led by Mahendra Chaudhry won, and Chaudhry became Fiji's first Indo-Fijian 
prime minister.889 His election was used by many iTaukei nationalists to enflame anti-
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Indian sentiments.890 In May 2000, Chaudhry and Parliament were taken hostage as part 
of a civilian-led coup.891 The coup leader, George Speight, has been described as a failed 
businessman who had recently been dismissed by the Chaudhry government from his 
position as head of the Fiji Hardwood Corporation and was facing charges of extortion.892 
Speight described his actions as being in the interests of promoting “the supreme rights of 
our indigenous people in Fiji”.893 He made heavy use of ethnonationalist rhetoric, though 
many questioned his sincerity894.  
The Fijian military was able to retake control eight weeks later895, and by 
September 2001, general elections were held restoring democracy, leading to four years 
of reasonable stability.896 In May 2005, the government proposed a highly controversial 
Reconciliation and Unity Commission which could grant amnesty to those involved in 
the 2000 coup.897 In response to the commission and accusations of government 
corruption and racism, Commodore Frank Bainimarama seized power, appointing 
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himself Acting President of Fiji on 5 December 2006.898 In contrast to previous coups, 
Bainimarama presented his coup as anti-ethnonationalist and necessary to “clean up” the 
damage ethnonationalism had done to the country.899 Bainimarama had previously served 
as the leader of the interim military government in 2000.900 In early January, he restored 
Iloilo to the Presidency, who formally appointed Bainimarama the Prime Minister in an 
attempt to legitimise the coup.901 In 2009, the Court of Appeals rejected these actions as 
unconstitutional, leading Iloilo to revoke the constitution, prior to re-appointing 
Bainimarama.902 Though this government has made significant changes aimed at 
improving civil rights and correcting systematic racial discrimination, there have also 
been serious issues with censorship and human rights abuse. Following five years of 
delays, elections were finally held on 17 September 2014.903 In a “fair and free 
election”904, Bainimarama's FijiFirst party won with 59.2% of the vote allowing 
Bainimarama to become an elected Prime Minister of Fiji.905 
In 2014, at least 65 people were arrested and face charges of sedition as part of an 
alleged plot to form a breakaway Christian state.906 The group is accused of being 
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engaged in military-style training under the direction of a former British army soldier.907 
The group is said to have been preparing to declare a portion of the northern province of 
Ra independent, establishing the Ra Sovereign Christian State.908 With several of those 
arrested traditional iTaukei chiefs909 and the identification as a Christian State, the 
attempt appears to be a rejection of Bainimarama’s plans for a “unified nation” and 
another example of pro-iTaukei ethnonationalism. 
The first three coups are undeniable examples of hot nationalism. They used 
ethnonationalistic rhetoric to convince significant portions of the nation that the coups 
were necessary to avoid serious harm to Fiji. Enthusiastic support for the coups was fairly 
short-lived, and in retrospect, many have expressed regret for their role.  The leader of the 
1987 coups, Sitiveni Rabuka, has since apologised for the coup and advocated for 
multiracialism. Similarly, Ratu Meli Vesikula, one of the most prominent and extremist 
leaders of the ethnonationalist movement later asked for forgiveness from the Indo-Fijian 
community. In the 18 years since the 2000 coup, ethnonationalism has not been well 
received in Fiji. The Bainimarama government has made it very clear that they are not 
willing to tolerate divisive ethnonationalism, including deploying often oppressive 
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restrictions to protect against it. As such, ethnonationalism and most traditional 
expressions of hot nationalism have largely faded away from modern Fiji.   
5.4.1.5 Military 
The military’s position within Fijian nationalism is one that is rife with 
contradictions. The military is unusually large for a nation of Fiji’s size and has played a 
significant role within Fijian governance. It is overwhelmingly composed of people of 
iTaukei descent910 with Brigadier General Mohammed Aziz serving as one of the only 
senior Indo-Fijians officers in the military. Overall, the Fijian military can be seen as an 
organisation of ethnic iTaukei power. Interestingly, the military sees very little 
ethnonationalist ideology and for the past several decades has largely served to combat 
the rise of ethnonationalism. 
The military under the command of Bainimarama took control of the government 
following the ethnonationalist 2000 coup and quickly re-established a civilian 
government. The military-led 2006 coup resulted in the establishment of a military 
government that actively combated ethnonationalism and implemented a series of 
policies to strengthen civic nationalism. Though members of the military have 
participated in ethnonationalist events, the ideal of an inclusive Fiji built on civic 
nationalism seems to be widely shared in the Fijian armed forces.  
                                                 
910 The Bainimarama government no longer collects employment data by ethnicity. Estimates place 
Indo-Fijians at between two and five per cent of the Fijian military.   
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5.4.2 Desired Outcomes 
5.4.2.1 Supremacy of iTaukei 
“Fiji for Fijians” has long been the rallying cry of iTaukei ethnonationalists. It 
calls for a privileged position for iTaukei peoples within the nation. What this should 
actually mean is often left undefined, but it remains a frequent slogan of those who 
oppose civic-nationalism.  
 It has been suggested that modern iTaukei ethnonationalism can be traced to Sir 
Arthur Gordon’s 1876 policies that strongly favoured iTaukeis.911 This principle of 
paramountcy of iTaukeis interests was expressed repeatedly by the colonial 
government.912 Built out of an apparent concern for native rights and as a way to avoid 
Indo-Fijian demands for representation, the principles remained into the independent 
Fijian state.913  
Ethnonationalism in Fiji is not occurring within a vacuum. Many iTaukei 
ethnonationalists have made great use of global discussions on native rights in order to 
support ethnonationalist superiority. Sakeasi Butadroka, one of the most vocal 
ethnonationalist politicians, justified his party’s strong ethnonationalist agenda as 
necessary so as to “prevent Fijians from succumbing to competition, as the North 
American Indians, Hawaiians, and Maoris had done”.914 Global calls for justice and self-
                                                 
911 Kotobalavu, “Fijian Ethno-Nationalism.” 
912 Lal, “Current Developments in the Pacific.” 
913 Ibid. 
914 Srebrnik, “Indo-Fijians.” 
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determination for indigenous people have been repeatedly perverted by ethnonationalists 
to gain support and justification for discrimination and racism. There remains no legal 
basis within international human rights law to differentiate between peoples based upon 
native-versus-settler status.915 The right of self-determination is recognised as belonging 
to “all peoples”.916 
5.4.2.2 Removal of Indo-Fijians 
Conspicuously absent in iTaukei ethnonationalism is the lack of a serious 
politically viable call to remove Indo-Fijians from modern Fiji. The only major exception 
was when Sakeasi Butadroka, a strongly ethnonationalist politician, proposed a motion to 
Parliament calling for the repatriation of all Indo-Fijians to India.917 The motion quickly 
failed, and the proposal badly fragmented his party.918 The severity of this failure to his 
party and his own career can be seen as indicative of the nation’s feelings.  
There is a reasonably widespread recognition that Indo-Fijians contribute 
positively to the country.919 Despite the lack of a call to remove Indo-Fijians, the 
conditions within Fiji have encouraged mass emigration, with most of those leaving Indo-
Fijians.920 As the migrants are disproportionately skilled and educated persons, the 
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economic impact is significant with some estimates placing the loss as high as F$274.7 
million.921  
5.4.3  Other Ethnonationalism 
 In looking at the strength of iTaukei ethnonationalism, there becomes a noticeable 
absence of Indo-Fijian Nationalism in Fiji.922 Though now having been in Fiji for several 
generations and having been mistreated and discriminated against at many points in Fiji’s 
history, despite holding substantial economic power, there has never been calls for an 
Indo-Fijian nation. This appears to be the result of an acceptance of the narrative that 
Indo-Fijians are visitors with limited legitimate claim to the nation.923 Ease of emigration, 
particularly to Australia and New Zealand, has also helped to provide an outlet for the 
most frustrated Indo-Fijians.924 Rather than fight for a nation within Fiji, the most 
agitated, who would otherwise be motivated to fight, elect to leave the country. 
 Whilst iTaukei ethnonationalism has received most of the scholarly and non-
academic attention, there is also the long-standing issue of the Rotuma nation. The 
Rotuma islands were ceded to Great Britain in 1881 to be administered as part of Fiji 
following a war amongst the chiefs of Rotuma.925 Rotumans are of a different ethnic 
group than iTaukei Fijians, with the joint administration being the result of practical 
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administrative concerns by Britain, rather than natural commonality between the 
colonies. Though there was widespread dissatisfaction with the way in which the islands 
were represented, there was little call to split from Fiji when it was granted its 
independence in 1970.926 The 1987 Fijian coup, however, led to vote of Chiefs and 
representatives of Rotuma districts. They elected to remain part of Fiji. A vocal minority 
objected and formed a group which declared the islands of Rotuma to be an independent 
nation.927 Fiji sent police and military several weeks after the declaration “to restore 
order” and again a month later.928 Though the secession efforts have largely faded with 
Rotumans now being able to elect one representative to the Fijian House of 
Representatives and appoint a representative to the Fijian Senate, there still remains some 
discontent.  
5.5 Conclusions 
 The classic image of hot nationalism is one of an extreme, typically violent, fight 
for the nation. In this traditionally imagined form, it is marked by flags, protests, riots and 
marches. It is assumed to be an emotionally driven time of upheaval and radicalism 
fighting for their nation’s sovereignty. Despite these images’ place in the popular 
imagination, the vast majority of separatist movements today have abandoned most of the 
extreme forms of hot nationalism. Even most of those that still have a militant component 
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to their movement has seen a transition into becoming the military of a de facto state 
rather than remaining as a “rebel” militant group.   
 Modern hot nationalism has taken on a new shape. The courts and political action 
have come to replace the displays and violence of the past. Groups will engage in highly 
visible attempts to promote their idea of the nation to the public. The energy and 
brazenness that marks hot nationalism remains completely present within these efforts, 
but the methods by which they act have only become more refined, as the public’s taste 
has shifted and its tolerance for violent extremism has waned.  
 Fiji is an excellent example of the transitions in hot nationalism. Though extreme 
hot nationalism existed in Fiji only in extremely short bursts, Fiji has still had several 
coups with rather fiery rhetoric surrounding them. The first three coups heavily utilised 
hot nationalistic style ethnonationalism to build support for the coups. Public tolerance of 
the coup’s culture has rapidly faded, such that the last coup was sold with the premise 
that it would prevent future coups through the building of a strong, unified sovereign 
state. 
Hawaiian nationalism has seen a similar reimagining of hot nationalism. Its 
opponent in the struggle for sovereignty is so much more powerful that there is little 
chance of success with an armed independence struggle either directly or in a guerrilla-
style effort. Furthermore, there is a near complete lack of public support for any sort of 
violent method. As such, the technique required is one that shows that it is a distinct 
nation and makes a moral appeal to convince the world to correct a historic injustice. 
Though many directions have been employed, the current favourite seems to be utilising 
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a twin approach of showing a strong, recognisable national identity and by making an 
appeal to people’s sense of justice with a legalistic approach.  
Both the Cook Islands and Niue share in a lack of appetite for traditional style hot 
nationalism. They are by and large happy with the current arrangement. They are 
independent states with a distinct national identity without any need or desire for blatant 
nationalism.  
 Whilst hot nationalism has changed considerably across these nations to its 
modern and more politically focused form, many nationalists are increasingly turning 
their attention to the subtler everyday nationalism. Though everyday nationalism is 
traditionally the result of unconscious expressions of the nation, it has become 
increasingly part of the tool chest of nationalists as they work to shape what their nation 
looks like. 
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Chapter 6 
6 Everyday Nationalism 
Every day we encounter many reminders that we are situated in a nation. Even in 
the smallest of nations (such as several of those in this paper), subtle symbols of 
nationhood are a significant, though oft-ignored, part of daily life. These symbols are 
highly pervasive and include those which are both very obviously nationalistic, such as 
flags and anthems, and ones which are much less commonly seen as nationalistic, such as 
food and sport. Billig argues that even some of the obvious symbols of nationalism can 
be a part of the realm of everyday nationalism. He uses the example of the waved and 
unwaved flag to differentiate between these two ways of using nationalistic symbols. The 
waved flag represents the classic imaginings of nationalism; the flag being waved 
proudly calling attention to itself. The unwaved flag describes the seemingly ever-present 
but mostly ignored flag depictions. It encompasses the times in which the nation’s flag 
has become a part of the background. This can include most of the times it is flown from 
a flagpole in front of a business or attached to a uniform. Passerbys may subconsciously 
register that the symbol of the nation is being flown but are unlikely to think much about 
it or the nation it represents. This chapter explores the ways in which these unwaved daily 
expressions of nationalism are expressed within the four nations of this dissertation. 
One of the challenges with banal nationalism is that many expressions of it 
involve decisions that are made for ostensibly practical reasons. The actor did not 
typically set out to create a nationalistic representation but rather chose a course of action 
based upon what they see as ordinary concerns.  These decisions, however, are strongly 
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influenced by ingrained, unconscious values relating to nationhood. Take, for example, 
Billig’s classic case of newspaper layout. An editor may have directly chosen to divide 
the paper into “national” and “world” news for practical reasons based on printing 
limitations, reporter allocation, etc. Ultimately, however, the fact that this division even 
seems logical to the editor (versus arbitrarily splitting the paper into fifteen-page sections 
or other content-neutral policy) is because of the pervasiveness of nationalism in our 
everyday lives.  
Further, whilst everyday nationalism is generally reproduced through 
unconscious, or at-least minimally examined, behaviour, it can be orchestrated or 
manipulated intentionally to serve nationalist agendas. Particularly within sovereignty 
movements, activists will commonly encourage smaller, less offensive, changes to 
aspects of daily life in order to normalise their idea of a sovereign nation. In doing so, 
they encourage a gradual acceptance that allows for change that might otherwise be 
unachievable.  
Though attempts at gaining recognition of Hawaiian sovereignty have to-date 
largely been unsuccessful, subtle recognition of a Hawaiian nation is present across daily 
life in Hawaiʻi. There, however, remains some challenges in interpreting these symbols. 
By co-opting the symbols of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, early state leaders managed to rob 
those in favour of sovereignty of any of the clearest symbols of the movement. The 
differences between the Kingdom version and the co-opted version are often too subtle to 
be useful as a protest. The flag gains only a tiny amount of additional white space around 
the cross between the Kingdom and the State of Hawaii versions. Even, the State coat of 
arms differs from the Kingdom’s version only in replacing the centre with a star and 
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some extremely minor stylistic changes. Sometimes there are no differences at all. The 
anthems of the Kingdom and the State of Hawaii are identical. As such, it would be 
unclear if a person singing “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” is supporting the State of Hawaii (by 
singing the State anthem) or protesting against statehood in singing the Kingdom's 
national anthem, as they are the same song. For many of the other symbols, there is a 
similar challenge; the differences are noticeable only when in direct comparison to each 
other. Simultaneously, however, the symbolism also works against the State of Hawaii by 
the fact that nearly all of the State’s official symbols symbolically undermine the 
legitimacy of the State by promoting the kingdom. As discussed later in this chapter,  
“Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” praises the monarchy, the State seal has symbols of the crown, and 
many State holidays honour the monarchy. 
The Cook Islands and Niue also feature meaningful contradictions in their 
nationalist efforts. Both nations have a high dependence on New Zealand to fund 
government activities. Any pro-nationalist government actions are likely to be undertaken 
with funds that ultimately come from New Zealand, the very state that nationalists are 
aiming to express distinction from. These contradictions may also be meaningful 
evidence of these states’ independence and sovereignty. If they were truly just puppet 
governments under New Zealand's control, it would be unlikely that they would be 
undertaking official action that affirms a nationalistic distance from New Zealand. 
 Fiji represents a more traditional exploration of nationalism. With its sovereignty 
fully recognised, the nationalistic fight is one of building an identity within historical 
circumstances, rather than a struggle for recognition. As we have seen, unlike most of the 
South Pacific island nations, Fiji has significant cultural and ethnic diversity. Fijians face 
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challenges in building an inclusive identity while preserving traditional culture and land 
rights. Where traditional expressions of hot nationalism have been largely divisive in Fiji, 
evidence of everyday nationalism suggests that a unified identity may already be 
occurring with much greater success than official or most academic narratives suggest.  
 Despite contradictions and challenges, the expressions of banal nationalism do 
reasonably reflect each nation’s typically recognised sovereignty status and version of 
nationhood. Fiji’s symbols are those of a fully sovereign nation. Hawaiʻi clearly 
represents a special status: not really fully part of the U.S. nation, but also still undeniably 
not that of a fully sovereign nation. Niue and the Cook Islands express most of the 
symbols of everyday nationalism, but in a much subtler and more muddled way than in 
many other small, clearly independent island states.  
 This chapter opens with a discussion of some of the more banal aspects of banal 
nationalism and progresses into an exploration of the more typically studied areas of 
everyday nationalism. Though each of these areas can be highly important for identity, 
many are seen as the result of more seemingly practical minor decisions rather than 
statements of nationalism. These apparently insignificant decisions when looked at a 
nation level form a meaningful part of their expression of everyday nationalism. Further, 
even when practical reasons provide a reasonable explanation, the acceptability of the 
choice and the climate that allows that choice would suggest that banal nationalism is 
functioning across many areas of daily life in each of the nations studied. 
6.1 Customs and Immigration 
Crossing through customs and immigration provide the clearest and often first 
encountered demarcation that a person is entering another nation. It provides an 
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exceptionally obvious symbol of the state’s recognition of its own boundedness. Going 
through customs and immigration is an unavoidable ritual for most border crossings929. 
This ritual and the physically demarcated space associated with it serves as a place in 
which boundary identities are confirmed, and the rules of acceptable goods within a 
nation are enforced. As the first point of contact with the state, there is a highly 
significant opportunity for the state to express its identity and define its relationship with 
the world. 
Travellers to Niue (including those coming from New Zealand) are required to 
complete an arrival card, which must be submitted to an immigration officer along with 
their passport. Baggage is screened by customs, and strict biosecurity limitations are 
imposed. Although processing relatively small numbers of people, both immigration and 
customs officials attach the same seriousness and attention to detail as any other state’s 
inspection services. The Cook Islands maintains largely the same system as Niue. There 
are no special exceptions made for New Zealanders. In this regard, both Niue and the 
Cook Islands act indistinguishably from any other sovereign state to protect their borders 
from unauthorised immigration, biosecurity concerns and control importation. This 
contrasts with the model typically employed for overseas territories (like Guam or Puerto 
Rico) where no passport is required when travelling between the territory and the state. It 
thus reaffirms the sovereignty of Niue and the Cook Islands in following the model 
expected of a sovereign state.   
                                                 
929 Even within a group of countries that have common travel areas such as the Schengen Area, there 
is still typically the physical infrastructure for controlling immigration and customs checks.  
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Fiji operates a customs and immigration service typical of a nation of its size. All 
visitors complete an arrival card, present their passport, and submit their baggage for 
customs screening. There is no special priority given to citizens from any other state. This 
procedure contrasts with the model under which many other states operate. In those 
states, there will be dedicated immigration queues for citizens of countries that have 
special relationships with the state. For example, New Zealand has dedicated immigration 
queues for Australian citizens, reflecting the privileged status of Australians under the 
Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement930. Fiji, however, lacks these sorts of close ties with 
other states and has only citizen and noncitizen immigration queues (as well as 
logistically necessary disability assistance, VIP and crew queues). 
Although Hawaiʻi does not have its own immigration requirements for travel 
originating in the United States, it does have strict customs-style agricultural 
enforcement. All travellers are required to complete a form documenting what 
agricultural items they are bringing into the state, with significant penalties for failing to 
complete the form or for bringing in prohibited items. Though serving a slightly different 
function, this process is most similar to the experience of travel to a foreign country, 
rather than typical domestic travel. Budget cuts have reduced the agricultural inspection 
process to a largely honour-based system, but visitors used to be required to submit their 
agricultural inspection form to an inspector with random bag searches prior to exiting the 
                                                 
930 This agreement between Australia and New Zealand allows for citizens of the two nations to live 
and work in the other country with only a few limitations. For the vast majority of Australians and New 
Zealanders, except those with criminal charges, it allows unrestricted free movement between the two 
countries.   
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baggage area. There have been frequent calls to return to this stronger system or an 
otherwise more intensive formulation. Departing Hawaiʻi, all baggage is screened by 
USDA inspectors. In this way, Hawaiʻi is fairly unique. It is exceptionally rare for states 
to have inspections like this at their domestic borders. This system of formal inspection, 
though legally different from customs and immigration, provides a similar feel of 
crossing a nation’s border.  
In all four nations, visitors are typically greeted with local style music prior to 
going through the above-mentioned entry rituals (in all but Hawaii, typically performed 
by a live band). This could be seen as further increasing the ritual of the border crossing 
by demarcating it further and adding a non-practical, solely symbolic element to it.   
6.2 Air Travel 
The typical division between domestic and international as it relates to air travel 
provides a very obvious, though not very frequently encountered, reminder of the 
boundaries of the nation. Flights are generally sorted into domestic and international 
within the physical spaces of the airports. This flagging serves to remind travellers of 
what can be considered within the nation and what is outside it. Though not mentioned by 
Billig, this is an extremely clear example of the style of banal nationalism he describes. 
The differences between domestic and international travel are explicit, but often 
underexamined by most travellers. The ways in which the two differ are generally clearly 
noticed in the numerous logistical distinctions, but few reflect at the time upon the fact 
that these are required because of the arbitrary boundness of their nation. For example, a 
flight from Toronto to Windsor, Ontario is treated completely differently than a flight 
from Toronto to Detroit, despite the two airports being only 34km apart. The notion that 
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some flights have one set of characteristics because they are “domestic”, and others 
should have another because they are “international” is accepted without question, 
demonstrating the internalisation of the idea of the nation. 
Given the division of flights into domestic and international, we would expect that 
nations would have flight divisions that reflect their national status. Flights within the 
nation's borders should always be treated as domestic, and flights outside its borders 
would be treated as international without further distinction. This is the case for Niue, the 
Cook Islands and Fiji, reinforcing their sovereignty and identity as a nation. Hawaiʻi, 
however, provides an unusual case.  
 As is to be expected, flights from Auckland to Niue and the Cook Islands operate 
out of Auckland Airport’s international terminal. Like all other international flights, 
travellers to Niue and the Cook Islands must complete a New Zealand departure card and 
clear outbound immigration on departure. As is typical for independent countries, 
travellers to these islands are treated as would any international passenger departing 
Auckland without any regard to the special status of Niue and the Cook Islands. 
 Niue International Airport currently has flights only to Auckland, and due to the 
small size of the country will never have domestic flights (perhaps with the exception of 
sightseeing circle tours). As such, all flights out of the Niue International Airport are 
international and are treated that way operationally. Rarotonga International Airport in 
the Cook Islands, however, has both domestic and international flights. The airport is 
split into a domestic gate area and an international area. International flights require 
travellers to go through exit immigration. Flights to Auckland and Christchurch are 
treated no differently than non-New Zealand international flights. 
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 Fiji has two international airports: Nadi International Airport and Nausori Airport 
near Suva, the capital. Nadi has separate international and domestic terminals. All flights 
within Fiji leave from the domestic terminal. All international flights, including flights to 
neighbouring island-states, leave from the international terminal. Due to its very small 
size, Nausori Airport has only one terminal. They, however, do divide the terminal into a 
domestic section and an international section. Scheduled air service within Fiji is 
operated exclusively by Northern Air and Fiji Link. The national flag carrier, Fiji 
Airways, operates no domestic flights. Fiji Link, however, operates flights to five 
international destinations in Tonga, Tuvalu, Samoa and Vanuatu. Though unusual for 
what is otherwise a small regional carrier, this model has been used in other parts of the 
world to serve neighbouring countries on routes where larger planes are not economically 
sound. For example, the Canadian carrier Jazz Aviation serves over twenty secondary 
U.S. destinations from Canada under the brand Air Canada Express, along with its 
extensive domestic route network. 
 Honolulu International Airport, Hawaii’s main airport, has three terminals. 
Dividing flights into “overseas”, “inter-island” and “commuter” (inter-island flights 
operated by prop planes). U.S mainland domestic and international flights are operated 
out of the same gates of the overseas terminal without any differentiation. This division is 
fairly unique as no other major U.S. airport separates intra-state flights from other flights. 
This separation creates the impression of the typical split between domestic and 
international as if flights within Hawaiʻi are domestic and flights to everywhere else are 
international. Flights to Hawaiʻi also share this unusual division. Though not universal, 
many flights to Hawaiʻi from mainland U.S. airports are operated out of dedicated gates 
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or gates shared only with international flights, often in terminals or concourses separate 
from most other domestic flights for a combination of logistical and marketing reasons. 
 Flights to the U.S. mainland are referred to as “domestic” flights, but there is a 
sense that they are not really domestic flights. Though there are a handful of longer 
domestic flights within the continental U.S., the flight to Hawaii is still significantly 
longer than the majority of domestic flights and spends more time over water than any 
other U.S. domestic flight. Hawaiʻi is almost twice the distance from the mainland United 
States than is the furthest point in the U.S. from any other country. Flights to Hawaiʻi are 
frequently over twice the cost from the U.S. mainland compared with international flights 
to Canada, Mexico or the Caribbean. Even flights from Hawaiʻi to other countries (such 
as Japan or Australia) are often cheaper than domestic flights to the U.S. mainland. 
Furthermore, many airlines operate service to Hawaiʻi using a hybrid of their domestic 
and international service models. For crew scheduling purposes on most airlines, 
Hawaiʻi-U.S. flights are considered international and flights are typically catered 
differently with meals specially marketed for the route. Additionally, a handful of 
Hawaiʻi routes still have complimentary meal service long after it was discontinued on 
other domestic routes. These differences all serve as reminders to travellers at every step 
of the process that they are not on a typical domestic flight. 
 The division between domestic and international flights is largely arbitrary. Air 
France’s Paris to Papeete flight takes over 22 hours, flys 15,715km and crosses two 
oceans, but is a domestic flight. However, their Paris to London flight takes less than an 
hour to fly 348 km yet is considered an international flight. Though both flights cross the 
ocean, the difference is solely within how the nations are conceptualised. Fiji, Cook 
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Islands and Niue use a domestic/international split that is fully in line with what is 
expected of them as sovereign nations. Hawaii’s situation is unusual in that not treated 
fully as a domestic nor an international destination. This sort of ambiguity can help to 
establish a national identity that is unique from the rest of the United States. 
6.3 Shipping 
 How mail is expected to be addressed, though typically seen to be of minimal 
importance in daily life, like many areas of banal nationalism can actually serve as a 
reminder of the nation.  One aspect is the designation of mail as foreign or domestic with 
changes in shipping cost and process. Another aspect is how the mail is addressed, which 
differs based on its status as domestic or international. Fiji, Niue and the Cook Islands all 
have their names listed in the country field of an address (i.e., PO Box 42, Alofi, Niue 
Island for the Niue Tourism Office). This is to be expected of an independent nation that 
is a member of the Universal Postal Union. In contrast, non-sovereign territories will 
generally include the host country’s name (i.e., PO Box 1030, Cocos Keeling Islands, 
Indian Ocean WA, Australia 6799). Hawaiʻi, since statehood, has been considered a 
domestic shipping destination for mail from mainland U.S. Mail from other countries 
should include U.S.A in the address field. Although considered a domestic destination by 
the U.S. Postal Service, many merchants choose to treat Hawaii differently. It is not 
uncommon for companies to advertise free shipping within mainland U.S., but then 
charge to ship to Hawaiʻi (often without any disclaimer of this fact). Although this 
decision is generally based on practical cost or logistical reasons, the fact that merchants 
see it as acceptable indicates that they do not fully consider Hawaiʻi a U.S. destination. 
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Again, Fiji, Niue and the Cook Islands operations are congruent with their status, and 
Hawaiʻi operates in a hybrid position.  
6.4 Sense of Foreignness 
Many visitors to the islands of this dissertation note a strong sense of foreignness. 
One guidebook suggests that you should “approach Hawaii like you would another 
country”, and another notes that “it’s not outside the United States yet seems like another 
country”. “Do I need my passport to get to Hawaiʻi?” is a common question across the 
travel websites for Hawaiʻi.  Various campaigns and travel guides have described the 
Cook Islands, Fiji and Niue as being “like another world”, “totally unique” and other 
similar representations that visitors are going to experience something different than their 
home nation. This sense of foreignness is extremely difficult to quantify but seems very 
present in each of these nations. 
Like much of banal nationalism, the sense of foreignness that these nations have 
is very much a self-reinforcing concept. An initial impression of foreignness or historical 
difference sets visitors onto a mindset of foreignness in which each example of it (no 
matter how small) is perceived as significant evidence of such. Furthermore, given the 
utility of marketing exoticism in tourism, this sense of foreignness is often used to 
establish a specific pro-tourism impression of the islands. This can be seen within many 
tourist-audience oriented practice of mixing in of traditional language (such as the 
frequent seemingly random context-less incorporation of Hawaiian words in tourism 
materials), statements along the lines of “here in the islands we do X” and other high-
profile expressions of mildly “exotic” culture. Though it is often a blurred line, this sort 
of cultural usage generally has the feel of cultural appropriation rather than genuine 
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attempts to incorporate local culture. Rather what is presented is a version of the culture 
built to fit tourist’s preconceived notions of the islands, rather than the island's culture 
would be otherwise. Tiki bars and the like are clear examples of this sort of model. 
Regardless of the authenticity and motivations for the sense of foreignness, it could help 
strengthen the nation in defining mental borders. The feeling of foreignness helps to 
internalise the idea that it may actually be another nation. 
6.5 Remoteness 
 All of the subject nations are a considerable geographic distance from other 
nations. As small island states, none share land borders with any other state. Further, 
whilst all have navigable waters, their distance from other states means there is no 
scheduled passenger service by sea to any of them. Air travel is the only viable option to 
travel to these states. Niue is a 3.5-hour 2,484 km flight from Auckland, and the Cook 
Islands are a 3,014 km and almost four-hour flight from Auckland. Fiji, though having 
flights to many of its smaller island neighbours, is still over 2,000 km and three hours 
away from Auckland, the nearest of Fiji’s larger neighbours. Hawaiʻi is an over five-hour 
flight from San Francisco, almost 4,000km away (the nearest major city). All of these 
island nations are quite geographically remote with Hawaiʻi being described as the most 
remote population centre in the world. As such, regardless of the islands' actual status, 
travellers to each will feel that they have completed a long journey to a remote place. The 
rituals of travel associated with a journey of this type create a gravitas that is not felt on 
shorter journeys. Travel to any of these nations is not something that can be done lightly. 
The trip is not a short hop across the border, but rather a meaningful, typically well 
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planned, journey. As such, travel to these nations fully feels as if you have in-fact entered 
another nation.   
6.6 Language 
 Language has long been one of the major battlegrounds of nationalism. It 
provides a way in which diverse populations can be artificially united around a common 
identity. This can be seen quite clearly in the Soviet Union's Russification policy. 
Although not overly successfully, use of the Cyrillic alphabet and imposed learning of 
Russian was a key part of forming a larger Soviet nation. Though the nations of this 
dissertation have historically discouraged native language usage (including an outright 
ban in Hawaiʻi), today, language is a key battleground of banal nationalism. All the 
nations of this dissertation have a native language as an official language, but English 
continues to dominate public life. Having already obtained official language status, the 
focus for pro-Native nationalists must then be to encourage the language’s acceptance 
and usage in everyday life. The goal for them will be to shape the expressions of banal 
nationalism. Using the native language should become unconscious and normalised 
wherein every usage further strengthens the nation’s identity in reminding people that it 
is a distinct nation. 
Despite Hawaiian being one of the two official languages of Hawaiʻi (along with 
English), there is only minimal visible use of it. Hawaiʻi lacks any sort of language policy 
on the level of Canada's Official Languages Act (in which services must be delivered in 
both languages) or Québec’s Charter of the French Language (requiring French in 
commerce and other areas of daily life). Rather, Hawaiʻi has a much weaker standard in 
which, per the state constitution, “Hawaiian shall be required for public acts and 
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transactions only as provided by law”. The state government has virtually no obligation 
to provide services in Hawaiian, and private entities have no obligation at all. As a result, 
beyond limited services specifically targeting Hawaiian populations, Hawaiian is not 
used for most areas of daily life for actual conversations. Many Hawaiian phrases, 
however, have become a normal part of daily life in Hawaiʻi. “Aloha” and “Mahalo” is 
likely used more commonly across Hawaiʻi than “hello” and “thank you”. Similarly, puka 
(hole), keiki (child), and kuleana (responsibility), amongst others, are used quite 
frequently within conversations that are otherwise in English.  
Despite the commonality of incorporating short Hawaiian phrases or emblematic 
statements within state-sponsored or official activities, Hawaiian sees only minimal and 
often symbolic usage. For example, airport arrival announcements are pre-recorded in 
both Hawaiian and English, and a bilingual video is available for airlines to play to 
welcome travellers to Hawaiʻi. Flight boarding announcements, however, are typically 
entirely in English (and sometimes in the destination country’s language) with minimal 
Hawaiian mixed in (often little more than aloha, mahalo or other phrases of greeting or 
thanks). Across the websites of the University of Hawaiʻi, virtually no content is 
available in Hawaiian. Even the Hawai‘inuiākea School of Hawaiian Knowledge at UH 
Mānoa switches to English after its introductory paragraph. UH Hilo’s College of 
Hawaiian Language website is the only part of UH’s online presence that is fully 
bilingual. The State of Hawaii’s website has virtually no Hawaiian language content, 
offering only the option to translate the site using the automated Google Translate tool. 
Similarly, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, though making heavy use of Hawaiian phrases, 
is entirely in English. The Department of Education has only a single page, “Hawaiian 
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Education”, available in Hawaiian. Even within those actively promoting the Hawaiian 
language, English remains the primary language for communications. Of the twenty-one 
Hawaiian language immersion schools listed by the Hawaii State Department of 
Education, only one has a website that is fully available in Hawaiian (and English).  
Additionally, the website of ‘Aha Pūnana Leo, a state-wide set of preschools focused on 
Hawaiian language and cultural support is largely available in both Hawaiian and 
English, but it defaults to English and has several gaps in its translations. 
 Despite the limited public usage of Hawaiian, there has been a concerted effort to 
promote Hawaiian as the language of daily life. The most significant of these would be 
Hawaiian immersion schools. Though Hawaiian has been taught in schools for some 
time, it has been limited to language and cultural education courses (often only one to 
two hours of instruction per week). Most students learn only basic phrases and have 
limited ability to converse in Hawaiian. Hawaiian immersion programs, in contrast, aim 
to provide instruction fully (or primarily) in Hawaiian, allowing students to gain a 
mastery of the language. There are currently twenty-one public Hawaiian immersion 
schools and a handful of private ones. These programs aim to restore the Hawaiian 
language and culture. There are also a number of churches that offer services fully in 
Hawaiian, as well as a small number of health clinics that provide service in Hawaiian 
(often along with traditional/blended Hawaiian health care). Despite these services, it 
remains difficult for a Hawaiian speaker to use only Hawaiian in daily life, as for 
example, store clerks, wait staff, utility workers and most government employees would 
be unable to assist in Hawaiian. Though most Hawaiian usage is symbolic and minimal, it 
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does still serve an important function in building national identity. This function is 
reinforced as intentional efforts to improve daily Hawaiian usage increase. 
 Niue’s constitution grants equal legal status for Niuean and English for legislative 
business. Proceedings of the assembly are to be translated on request, and all bills are to 
be in both English and Niuean with no preference given to either language. However, 
there does not appear to be any statutory requirement for other government functions or 
services to be provided in either language.  
 Though many speak Niuean, English remains widely used. The website of the 
government of Niue is almost exclusively in English, with a few Niuean phrases 
incorporated. Tāoga Niue (the agency tasked with promoting Niuean culture, language 
and tradition) has significant portions of its website in Niuean, but it falls far short of a 
full translation. Throughout Niue, a small amount of signage is printed bilingually, with 
the English text dominant. The vast majority is, however, in English only. A notable 
exception is the “Welcome to Niue” sign at the airport, which has the Niuean statement 
“Fakaalofa Lahi Atu” first. 
 Niue’s migration patterns, with frequent immigration and travel between New 
Zealand and Niue, have necessitated strong English-language skills. English remains the 
primary language in schools. Given the lack of higher education options on the island, all 
higher education would be received overseas, likely in English-speaking New Zealand 
universities. Niuean is, however, frequently used at home and socially. Both within Niue 
and abroad there have been efforts to promote and preserve its language. The New 
Zealand government, through its Pacific Language Weeks program, has coordinated Niue 
Language Week with events designed to celebrate and promote Niuean culture and 
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language in New Zealand. A resource book is also supplied for teachers and students to 
build language skills. As these efforts are largely funded by the New Zealand 
government’s Ministry for Pacific Peoples, they share the same contradictions of the New 
Zealand government’s other cultural identity promotion in strengthening a non-New 
Zealand national identity. 
 In the Cook Islands, the official languages are English and Cook Islands Maori. 
The Te Reo Maori Act 2003, which established Māori as an official language, tasks the 
Ministry of Cultural Development with raising Maori to equal status with English. 
Beyond that, the act adds no obligation to the government or others to offer services or 
publications in Māori. English is the most typically used language in Rarotonga, with 
casual Māori usage declining. Similar linguistic shifts appear to be occurring in the other 
islands as well. 
Most web pages of the Cook Islands' government are exclusively in English. The 
Ministry of Justice translates some of the content, but the majority is available only in 
English. Tauranga Vananga (Ministry of Cultural Development) mostly uses English on 
its site with Maori headings. Select notices of the Ministry of Health are published in 
both languages. Physical signage across the islands is mostly in English, though some 
government-printed signs are in Māori as well. A few protest signs (such as those 
opposed to Sunday flights) are written only in Māori. 
 Cook Islands Māori is a compulsory school subject up to Year Eleven, with full 
bilingualism as the stated goal. In practice, however, Māori language learning is seriously 
limited by the lack of teachers, instructional materials and other needed resources. There 
278 
 
have been a number of efforts to improve Māori language learning and reverse the harm 
done by previous Māori bans in schools, but results have been slow. 
 As is the case with Niuean, the New Zealand government sponsors a Cook Islands 
Language Week. Additionally, New Zealand Māori has a special legal status in New 
Zealand, allowing it to be used for official business within the country. This is of limited 
assistance because Cook Islands Māori, while closely related to New Zealand Māori, is a 
distinct language. Like other Pacific languages, its usage is frequently accommodated in 
New Zealand, but there is no legal obligation to support it.  
English serves as the de facto lingua franca in Fiji. The vast majority of Fijians 
speak English as either a first or second language. Fijian is spoken by most iTaukei, and 
Hindi is spoken by most Indo-Fijians as either a first or second language, with English as 
the other language. It is extremely common to hear Hindi or Fijian spoken in public, with 
speakers frequently switching between English and Fijian. Business is frequently 
conducted in any of these languages. Though there is an increasing number of Indo-
Fijians who speak Fijian and iTaukei who speak Hindi, it is not expected. English 
competency (or at least confidence in English competency) varies greatly. Many prefer to 
communicate when possible in their other language, despite their bilingualism. 
Particularly in rural areas, it is entirely possible for a Fijian to communicate solely in 
Fijian or Hindi without any need to switch to English. Although English dominates 
signage, Fijian or Hindi is frequently used, with many signs written in all three 
languages. All three are taught in government primary schools as compulsory subjects. 
The Constitution of Fiji recognises English, Fijian and Hindi as Fiji’s official 
languages (since the 1997 Constitution). The 2013 Constitution also mandates that it be 
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translated into all three languages. The English edition is recognised as the legally 
authoritative version, with the Fijian and Hindi editions considered translations. As part 
of the Right to Education section, the 2013 Constitution added the mandate that 
“Conversational and contemporary iTaukei and Fiji Hindi languages shall be taught as 
compulsory subjects in all primary schools”. 
Although standard Hindi is constitutionally recognised, there is a lack of clear, 
official recognition of Fijian Hindi. Fijian Hindi, through derived from standard Hindi, is 
linguistically distinct. The language blends several regional dialects of Hindi and 
incorporates loan words from Fijian and English and is typically written with Roman 
script. Though more commonly and widely spoken in Fiji than standard Hindi, Fijian 
Hindi is often seen negatively as a “broken” or “corrupted” Hindi and inappropriate for 
formal settings. Denial of the linguistic validity of Fijian Hindi, though typically done by 
Indo-Fijians, is extremely useful to pro-iTaukei nationalists. Fijian Hindi remains one of 
the most visible markers of difference between Indo-Fijians and other Indians. By 
denying the language, pro-iTaukei nationalists can support the argument that Indo-Fijians 
should be treated as guests in Fiji without any obligation towards cultural preservation. 
Though the 2013 constitutional mandate seems to be fairly clear that Fijian Hindi should 
be taught in school, in practice it appears that Standard Hindi is what is typically taught. 
Despite constitutional guarantees of language equality, English is the primary 
language of government services. The website of the Fijian government is nearly entirely 
in English without any translations available. The constitution, however, is available from 
the government site in Hindi and Fijian, in addition to English (though not Fijian Hindi). 
The government also publishes a Fijian language news sheet entitled Noda Viti, which is 
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paired with but is not a translation of, the English language Fiji Focus. The last edition of 
both was in late 2015. There does not appear to be a Hindi edition. Individual interactions 
with the government can and often will be in the citizen’s preferred language, but this 
choice seems more a function of the individual government official’s personal language 
competence than an official policy.  
Languages policies vary greatly across states. They are frequently a target of 
nationalists looking to use them to strengthen feelings of connectedness or as a boundary 
marker. All four nations have policies that promote the indigenous language of the 
nation. Only Fiji’s, however, seems to be particularly effective. The Cook Islands and 
Niue have declining numbers of Māori and Niuean speakers, as practical limitations 
overwhelm nationalistic and cultural preservation goals. Hawaiʻi has one of the most 
active sets of language revitalisation efforts of any nation931. These efforts, though very 
effective at strengthening the Hawaiian nation, are still in their infancy. Fiji, in contrast, 
sees frequent use of all three of its official languages. Its official language policies, in 
creating equal status for all three languages, seem to be fairly effective at promoting a 
civic-nationalism agenda. Language policy, however, does remain an active battleground 
for ethnonationalists fighting the government's position towards civic unity.       
                                                 
931 Efforts to promote New Zealand Māori would likely be the only other language revitalisation 
scheme to see the same level of energy and acceptance. Its number of native speakers, however, never fell 
as low as Hawaiian.    
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6.7 Newspapers 
 Print media have traditionally been highly significant for nationalism. They have 
historically been a key way in which nationalist agendas are spread to the masses (though 
this role has increasingly been replaced by the Internet). As I noted earlier, Newspapers 
are also one of the classic areas of study for banal nationalism. Beyond the overt 
nationalistic agendas of many papers, is a much subtler reproduction of nationalism in the 
way in which the paper is arranged. The common division of news into “local”, 
“national” and “world” sections (typically with the paper’s resources placed in this order 
as well) normalises this division of the world. It assumes that there is a natural reason 
why news should be divided up in this way. News occurring within the nation is 
presented as if it is more relevant than that which is occurring geographically closer but 
on the other side of a national border. Each of the nations in this paper has newspapers 
that have adopted various conventions on how they define local and national news. 
The Fiji Sun and the Fiji Times are Fiji’s largest print newspapers. Both are 
dailies published in Suva. They are widely available and read. Issues of the Fiji Sun are 
typically divided into large “National News” and ”National Sports” sections; one page for 
“International News” and “Australia/NZ updates”; and another page for “Bollywood 
News”. The Fiji Times labels its national news section, which occupies the majority of 
the paper, simply as “News”. Issues also include small sections labelled “Pacific News” 
and “World”. The sports section, however, mixes both national and world sporting events 
under the title “Sport”. 
The Jet Newspaper claims to be Fiji’s first community paper and is published 
monthly out of Nadi. The bulk of the paper features “Local News”. The national news 
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and sports sections lack any section headings. No international or regional news is 
included. 
Hawaiʻi has five daily newspapers as well as a number of weekly and specialised 
papers. The Honolulu Star-Advertiser is Hawaii’s largest paper. Issues are divided into a 
“News” section that is primarily local news with high-profile national news incorporated; 
a “National” section, including news from across the U.S.; a “World” section; and a 
“Local” section covering news within Hawaiʻi. The Hawaii Tribune-Herald, which 
serves the east side of the island of Hawaiʻi (the Big Island), focuses more heavily on 
Hawaiʻi. Hawaiʻi news is presented without a section heading; non-Hawaiʻi news is 
under “Nation and World” or “News”. This grouping suggests U.S. news and world news 
are interchangeable and need only be distinguished from news occurring in Hawaiʻi. The 
island of Hawaii’s other paper, the West Hawaii Today, uses an identical model. The 
Garden Island, which serves the island of Kauai, uses a model in which issues are split 
into “Hawaii News”; “Nation News” (covering U.S. News); and “World News”. The 
Maui News, which serves the island of Maui, uses the headings “Local News” (covering 
stories about Maui County); “Hawaii News”; “National News” (covering U.S. news); and 
“International News”. All the newspapers in Hawaiʻi, except the Maui Time Weekly, are 
owned by non-Hawaiʻi publishers. The Canadian company Black Press Ltd. owns The 
Garden Island, the Hawaii Tribune-Herald, the Honolulu Star-Advertiser and the West 
Hawaii Today. The Maui News is owned by Ogden Newspapers of West Virginia. 
The Niue Star is Niue’s only newspaper. Though claiming to be a weekly, it 
currently seems to publish an edition roughly once a month. It is published in Niuean 
with an English translation. It is available exclusively in print at limited news-sellers in 
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Niue and New Zealand. Since Cyclone Heta in 2004, the paper has been printed in New 
Zealand by a Niuean living in New Zealand. According to its editor, Michael Jackson, the 
paper is “the community newspaper”; “it's mainly information, village happenings, 
community happenings, family interest stories like hair cuttings and ear piercing.” With 
such a large portion of Niueans living abroad, the paper serves an important role in 
connecting Niueans in diaspora with the island. Most issues are under twenty pages and 
focus almost exclusively on Niuean news. A section labelled “Regional News” provides 
events of interest to Niueans living elsewhere by reprinting selected New Zealand Herald 
articles. No attempt is made to cover general-interest world news. 
The Cook Islands News is published five days a week. It divides the news into 
national and regional. National news is split into “local” (Rarotonga) and “other islands”. 
Regional news appears to cover the other Pacific Island nations and New Zealand. The 
Cook Islands Herald is a weekly paper. The issues published in February 2016932 average 
twenty-two pages. With the exception of foreign lottery numbers on the cover, the entire 
paper is about domestic topics and foreign news solely as they relate to the Cook Islands;  
only a single article per paper covers general world news. Even the world news articles 
cover only Pacific island topics of direct interest and relevance to the Cook Islands, such 
as “Concern over dead fish in Fiji and Vanuatu” and “Zika virus monitoring continues in 
Pacific”. The paper is mostly in English, but the “Te Kave Korero” section has quotations 
in Maori, with an English translation sometimes provided. 
                                                 
932 The most recent month available on their site when studied 
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The newspapers of these nations share the typical divide noted within studies of 
banal nationalism globally. They split newsworthy events into national and international 
news with a greater emphasis on national news. Of interest in Hawaiʻi is the trend of 
frequently grouping news about the United States with the international news. This 
division seems to feel natural to readers even though it does not reflect current political 
borders.  
6.8 National Anthems 
National anthems are in a hybrid position between hot and everyday nationalism. 
Though undeniably a highly visible part of displays of hot nationalism, most renditions of 
a state’s anthem are banal; and, barring significant secondary politicisation (such as that 
which occurred recently within U.S. sports), they are not often examined. 
 “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī”, the official state song of Hawaii, was also the final national 
anthem of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi. It was written in 1874 by King David Kalākaua with 
music by the king's royal bandmaster, Captain Henri Berger. The song is similar in spirit 
to many other national anthems. With the title translating to “Hawaii’s Own”, the song 
calls on the people of Hawaiʻi (“Hawaii’s own true sons”) to be loyal to their king and 
respect their duty. It praises King Kamehameha I and has an implied message of unity 
and protection in this praise. 
As part of the ceremonial marking of the annexation, “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” was 
played by the Hawaiian band as the flag was lowered over the Iolani Palace.933 The 
                                                 
933 “The Passing of Hawaii,” The Independent, September 7, 1898, 
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85047097/1898-09-07/ed-1/seq-
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American flag was then raised, and the military band of the U.S.S Philadelphia played 
the “Star Spangled Banner”.934 Nineteen members of the Hawaiian band refused to play 
because they saw it as the “funeral hymn of their dying country”.935 A Hawaiʻi 
newspaper, The Independent, described the ceremony as “more like a funeral than a feast 
day”, with many, including supporters of the annexation,  described as openly crying 
during the event.936 One person present for the ceremony noted that it marked a 
welcoming into a new nation, “but the history of Hawaii as a nation was, nevertheless, 
ended forever; its annals for the future are to be blended with those of the great republic 
over the sea. Never again, except as an echo of the past, will [“Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī”] be sung 
as the national hymn of Hawaii”.937 This prediction, fortunately, proved to be false. 
“Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” regained popularity and eventually became the state anthem. “Hawaiʻi 
Ponoʻī” has traditionally been used to close music performances. Although this tradition 
faded following the overthrow, by 1902 it had been revived.938 “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” became 
the de facto song of the territory of Hawaiʻi (typically played with the “Star Spangled 
Banner”) and became the official state song by an act of the Hawaiʻi State Legislature in 
1967. This decision is interesting, considering the lyrics and politicisation of the song.  
                                                 
1/#date1=1789&sort=relevance&rows=20&words=Hawaii+Ponoi&searchType=basic&sequence=0&index
=6&state=&date2=1922&proxtext=hawaii+ponoi&y=9&x=17&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=2. 
934 William A. Mowry, The Territorial Growth of the United States (New York: Silver, Burdett and 
Company, 1902), https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100121976. 
935 “The Passing of Hawaii.” 
936 Ibid. 
937 Mowry, The Territorial Growth of the United States. 
938 “Concert for Lepers,” The Pacific Commercial Advertiser., January 13, 1902. 
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A post-overthrow column in an 1894 issue of The Pacific Commercial Advertiser 
suggested that “If Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī is to be retained as the national anthem until it is 
exchanged for America, it is at any rate high time to adopt some words which will not be 
a standing invitation to insurrection”939 They suggest a “Patriotic version with the royalist 
sentiments elided”, noting that “Hawaii Ponoʻī is a good old song, but it contains too 
much feudal sentiment to suit these progressive days. Here is a version which strikes out 
the too effusive references to the Alii, etc.”940 The proposed version replaces references 
to the monarchy and chiefs with vague sentiments about the nation. The same year an 
ultrapatriotic version of “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” was published by the stridently pro-Hawaiian 
monarchy newspaper Hawaii Holomua, possibly in response to the proposal in The 
Pacific Commercial Advertiser. This song, entitled “a Mele for Liliuokalani”,941 called on 
“Hawaii’s Own” to “Look to your Sovereign Liliuokalani” with a chorus of “Queen 
Lolokulani For Hawaiʻi nei942 Prevail”. It is unclear if either version gained any sort of 
meaningful traction, as neither paper mentioned its version again.  
With “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” becoming the official state song in 1967, an unusual 
situation has arisen. One of the officially endorsed symbols of the government is itself 
anti-government. When “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” is played it covertly undermines the very state 
it is meant to promote. This situation is different from past historical examples of the 
                                                 
939 ‘Page 4’. The Pacific Commercial Advertiser., January 8, 1894. 
http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85047084/1894-01-08/ed-1/seq-4/. 
940 Ibid. 
941 Mele typically translates to song or chant 
942 Hawaiʻi nei is best translated along the lines of “this beloved Hawai'i”.  
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absorption of state symbols by successor governments because no attempt is made to 
adapt the symbol. “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” is left completely intact, despite its extremely pro-
monarchy message (and thus anti-state of Hawaii message). This sort of counter-
government usage can be seen in the hearings over federal recognition of Hawaiians. In a 
public hearing conducted by the U.S. Department of the Interior, several attendees started 
singing “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī”, emphasising the line Nānā i kou moʻī (Be loyal to your 
king).943 
Since independence in 1970, “God Bless Fiji” has been Fiji's national anthem. 
This song asks God to bless Fiji while its people “stand united under noble banner blue” 
and “honour and defend the cause of freedom ever”. The national anthem does not appear 
to have been codified at any point, although the People's Charter for Change, Peace and 
Progress (a nonbinding precursor to the recently adopted constitution) did state that the 
national anthem should be in the country's three main languages: Fijian, Hindi and 
English. “God Bless Fiji” is typically sung in English. When Fiji competes in World 
Rugby events, “God Bless Fiji” is sung (in English) even though the team is entirely 
iTaukei. “Meda Dau Doka” (a Fijian language song) is often also sung. Though 
commonly reported as the Fijian version of the national anthem, it remains unclear what 
the actual official status of “Meda Dau Doka” is. The Fijian Embassy to Brussels lists the 
lyrics to “Meda Dau Doka” as the “Fijian Lyrics” to the national anthem,944 and the CIA 
                                                 
943 Taylor Kate Brown, “Aloha to the US: Is Hawai’i an Occupied Nation?,” BBC News, November 2, 
2015, sec. Magazine, http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34680564. 
944 “National Anthem of Fiji,” Fiji Embassy - Brussels, accessed September 25, 2016, 
http://www.fijiembassy.be/index.php?page_in=national_anthem. 
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World Factbook vaguely notes that “the anthem is known in Fijian as "Meda Dau Doka". 
It is not, however, a translation and has not been codified as an anthem for the country. A 
Hindi version of either song, or any other national anthem like song, does not appear to 
have ever been created. The anthem “God Bless Fiji” is routinely played at Fijian 
sporting events and often at other civic functions. “Meda Dau Doka” is less frequently 
played at sporting events.  
Niue has used "Ko e Iki he Lagi" (The Lord in Heaven), as its national anthem 
since 1974 when it became a self-governing state. The song recognises that the “Lord in 
Heaven, Who loves Niue … rules completely over Niue”. “God Save the Queen” is also 
retained as the anthem for the monarchy. "Ko e Iki he Lagi" was a popular song in Niue 
and seen as representative of Niue even prior to self-governance. Before independence, 
however, there were few occasions that needed the song. One of those times was during 
the 1963 South Pacific Games in which the organisers asked countries to select 
"identifying tunes" to represent them, rather than only their national anthem (many of 
which shared "God Defend New Zealand" or "God Save the Queen"). Niue elected to use 
"Ko e Iki he Lagi”, though it still competed using the flag of New Zealand. However, 
Niue failed to win any events, so there was no occasion on which to play it. With Niue’s 
limited participation in multinational sports and other occasions of public anthem 
performance, there is still little opportunity for the anthem to be played outside limited 
state functions. 
The Cook Islands national anthem is defined in the constitution as "Te Atua mou 
e" (“ To God Almighty”, though the song is typically titled “God is Truth” in English). 
The song is a prayer “To God Almighty” to “protect and guide us; and give us your 
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crown of truth; so we can be successful; and so that love and peace will rule forever over 
our beloved country.” The song was composed by Sir Tom Davis, then prime minister of 
the Cook Islands, with the lyrics by his wife, Pa Tepaeru Terito Ariki. It was adopted in 
1982 to replace the no-longer-relevant New Zealand anthem, "God Defend New 
Zealand"945. “Te Atua mou e” reflects the Cook Islands' strong religious identity. A 1994 
referendum to change the anthem was overwhelmingly defeated with 80 per cent of the 
voters opposed to the change.  
National anthems serve as very noticeable nationalist symbols. They are used to 
evoke feelings of pride in the nation and often to energise the audience’s connection to 
their team.  Though its usage is clearly nationalistic, listeners often don’t feel this way. 
The anthem blends into the background as just another part of the ritual of the event. In 
this way, the lyrics of the anthem can be ignored, but they are nevertheless serving a role 
in promoting the nation.  
Hawaii’s anthem is highly unusual. It is a clearly nationalistic song, but the 
nationalist message run contrary to the State’s own existence. The other nations have 
national anthems that are mostly in-line with what would be expected, given the other 
ways in which they imagine their nation. Their anthems recognise the religiosity of the 
                                                 
945 New Zealand legally has two national anthems, "God Defend New Zealand" and "God Save the 
Queen". Both have equal legal status, but "God Defend New Zealand" is by far the most commonly used. 
Typically, "God Save the Queen" is used only in the presence of a member of the royal family or the 
governor-general. The Cook Islands, when a colony of New Zealand, would have also had "God Save the 
Queen" as its anthem until independence. It is likely that this was sung on the occasion of her visit to the 
Cook Islands in 1974. 
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nation, but in contrast to many others where there was a struggle for independence, they 
do not tell of victory or otherwise promote specific nationalistic messages.  
6.9 Flags 
 Flags share a hybridity similar to that of national anthems. They can be a highly 
visible component of hot nationalism (and are virtually required to be so) when 
nationalists loudly and proudly wave the flag as they rally. However, most of the time 
flying the flag is a quieter more everyday occurrence more characteristic of banal 
nationalism. Studies of nationalism have traditionally focused on the waved flag when we 
see it being shown off and the remainder of nationhood is explicit. The unwaved flag, 
Billig argues, is actually more significant in the reinforcement of nationhood. When it 
appears on shoulder patches, products and other subtle everyday depictions that we see 
constantly rather than the occasional overt patriotic display that reminds us of our nation.  
The flag of the State of Hawaii is essentially the same flag as that which was used 
by the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, and later the protectorate, republic, and territory of Hawaii. 
Unique among U.S. states, the flag features a British Union Jack in the top left corner. 
According to a popular, though somewhat historically dubious, story, the flag was 
designed to be a hybrid of the British and U.S. flags. King Kamehameha I flew a British 
flag for much of his reign to honour the gift of the flag from King George III. During the 
War of 1812, he raised a U.S. flag to placate American concerns. British members of his 
court objected, and the new flag was said to be commissioned to honour both allies as the 
new flag of the Kingdom. Kamehameha also had a personal flag known as the Kanaka 
Maoli. It features a shield at the centre and green, red and yellow stripes. Though the flag 
stopped being officially used after the five months of British occupation in 1843, it has 
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re-emerged in the last few decades as a protest flag. Given that the Kingdom flag was co-
opted by the State of Hawaii, those advocating for sovereignty would be unable to use it 
as a meaningful symbol of protest. However, even among many supporters of 
sovereignty, the flying of the Kanaka Maoli often produces negative responses. It has 
become increasingly associated with fringe activists who deny the practical existence of 
the state of Hawaii (such as by driving without state license plates or occupying state-
controlled beach parks946).  
Flying either the U.S. or the State of Hawaii flag is much less common in Hawaiʻi 
than it is in the rest of the United States. Few private residences or businesses routinely 
fly either flag. The Kanaka Maoli is often seen, but it is less frequent than the already 
infrequent flags of the State or the U.S. 
The patch and badge of the Honolulu Police Department and the Honolulu Fire 
Department feature two Hawaiian flags and a Kanaka Maoli coat of arms. The uniform, 
however, does not include a flag patch or pin (either of the Hawaiʻi flag or the U.S. flag). 
Some turnout gear worn by HFD does have a U.S. flag947. Maui, Kauai and Hawaiʻi (Big 
Island) police and fire personnel also lack flag patches on their uniforms, but it can be 
seen on some turnout gear of each fire department. Whilst it is not unique (the NYPD and 
NYFD for example do not wear flag patches), it has become increasingly uncommon for 
                                                 
946 Typically, the land they select to occupy will be disputed crown land. Though the State of 
Hawaii’s claim to the land is itself legally questionable, the occupying activists will rarely have any 
legitimate claim themselves, such as a pre-overthrow land grant, to justify their taking of the land and it is 
thus often poorly received by the public.  
947 This may be solely a function of the way this gear is acquired, rather than an intentional statement.  
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emergency workers uniforms in the U.S. to lack flag patches or pins. Hawaiʻi Emergency 
Medical Services wear a state of Hawaii flag patch, as do many private security guards.  
Unlike many “made in” campaigns, none of the “made in” campaigns for Hawaiʻi 
features the state flag. Rather, other symbols are used, such as the hibiscus, taro leaf and 
monstera leaf948. The “Made in Hawaii with Aloha” program, administered by the Hawaii 
Department of Agriculture in its statutorily protected mark, uses a Hibiscus brackenridgei 
(a native plant and the official state flower), along with the tagline “Made in Hawaii with 
Aloha”.  
The Niuean flag is yellow with a modified Union Jack in the top left corner. As 
noted in the Niue Flag Act of 1975, the yellow represents sunshine and “the warm 
feelings of the Niuean people towards New Zealand and her people”. The Union Jack 
symbolises the protection Great Britain gave Niue as British Protectorate. The four stars 
are for the New Zealand historical administration and “the continuing close relationship 
between Niue and New Zealand”. Finally, the largest star and blue circle “represents the 
self-governing status of Niue, standing alone within the deep blue sea.” The symbolism 
of the flag, codified in the Flag Act, sends a strong message about how Niue would like 
to be represented. Niue has a strong connection to its past administrators but is today 
sovereign and alone. This message is reinforced every time the flag is displayed both in 
waved and unwaved contexts.  
                                                 
948 Oddly, the monstera plant is actually non-native, but is so frequently used to imply the tropics and 
is so common that it has become strongly associated with Hawaiʻi.  
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Niue's government building flies the Niuean flag out front, but it seems that not 
many others choose to fly it. The flag does still adorn a number of government-connected 
items like driver's licenses and vehicles. The Niue police uniform includes a small 
Niuean flag pin over the right breast pocket. Niue appears to lack a formal “made in” 
campaign, and though the Niuean origin is clearly branded on the products exported from 
Niue, the flag does not appear.  
The flag of the Cook Islands features the Union Jack in the top left corner and a 
ring of fifteen stars. The Union Jack represents the historic ties to Great Britain. The 
fifteen stars stand for the fifteen major islands of the Cook Islands. The current flag was 
adopted in 1979 and replaced a green ring with a yellow ring of fifteen stars. The green 
represented growth and life, with the yellow stars symbolising faith and the unity of the 
islands. Following the collapse of the Henry government, the green flag was replaced, 
owing to its connection to Henry-style nationalism. Cook Islands nationalists would, soon 
after, adopt the green flag to represent their movement. A referendum held in 1994 to 
change the flag failed with slightly under half supporting the current flag.  
 Though designs featuring the Cook Islands circle of stars are common, actually 
flying the flag seems infrequent. The “Buy Cook Islands, Made in Cook Islands” 
campaign uses the flag of the Cook Islands encircled by a traditional pattern. The 
uniforms of the Cook Islands Police and Fire Service do not include a flag. Given that 
their uniforms are virtually identical to their New Zealand counterparts, which are also 
flagless, this is unsurprising.  
Fiji’s flag, only slightly modified from the colonial Fiji flag, contains the British 
Union Jack in the upper left corner and a shield featuring a lion holding cocoa pod, sugar 
294 
 
cane, a coconut palm, a bunch of bananas and a peace dove. The light blue background 
symbolises the Pacific Ocean, and the Union Jack represents the historic connection to 
Great Britain. The shield is formed of symbolically significant elements of Fijian life.  
The first raising of the flag at Albert Park on October 10, 1970, differed 
significantly from the typical independence ceremony. The British flag was lowered the 
previous night, leaving a bare flagpole on which to raise the Fijian flag. Ratu Mara (the 
first and longest-serving prime minister of Fiji) notes that he "had seen films of 
independence ceremonies elsewhere, where the British flag had been lowered at midnight 
and the new independence flag raised, both to frenzied cheering. I did not think this 
appropriate to our relationship with the British Crown. We decided to have a final beating 
of retreat before independence when the Union flag would be lowered with the quiet 
dignity and respect our long association warranted."949 Fiji’s transition was neither the 
jubilant occasion of victory over oppressors nor one of solemn loss like Hawaii's. It was a 
happy and optimistic event that marked a hopeful new era for Fiji.  
As part of his New Year's Day address in 2013, Bainimarama announced plans to 
change the flag as part of his overall reforms with the intention "to reflect a sense of 
national renewal, to reinforce a new Fijian identity and a new confidence in being Fijian 
on the global stage". A competition to pick the new flag was established with a final 
shortlist of twenty-three designs submitted to the cabinet. After several delays and a 
reopening of the competition, Bainimarama announced in August 2016 that he no longer 
                                                 
949 Sophie Foster, “Fiji’s Flag: How Our Noble Banner Blue Came to Be,” The Fiji Times, October 
12, 2008, http://www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=103227. 
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intended to change the flag. "While I remain convinced personally that we need to 
replace some of the flag’s colonial symbols with a genuinely indigenous expression of 
our present and our future, it has been apparent to the Government since February that the 
flag should not be changed for the foreseeable future".950 Though the competition for the 
new design generated considerable enthusiasm and over 200 proposals, support for the 
change was very mixed.  
The Fijian flag is very present throughout Fijian daily life. Many businesses and, 
increasingly, a number of private residences routinely fly the flag. Fiji’s government-run 
“Fijian Made” campaign, though choosing to include a stylised map of the islands in its 
mark, uses the Fijian flag heavily in its promotional materials. A digitally added Fijian 
flag serves as the backdrop for all the photos on the official site, and in-person events are 
blanketed with dozens of small flags. The flag is also featured as part of many 
government functions. Several uniform styles of the Fiji police feature a Fijian flag patch 
on the left shoulder. The introduction of the flag patch appears to have come as part of 
the post-coup police reforms and professionalisation efforts.  
6.10 Currency 
 Currency provides a visible representation of a state’s power. The ability to issue 
currency and have this currency accepted has traditionally been viewed as one of the key 
practical metrics of statehood. Further, as a highly valued item, currency’s depiction of 
national symbols creates a feeling of value tied to the symbol. Currency typically will 
                                                 
950 “Fiji PM Says Flag Won’t Be Changed,” Radio New Zealand, August 18, 2016, 
https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/pacific/311240/fiji-pm-says-flag-won’t-be-changed. 
296 
 
depict the heads of state and former heads of state along with other valued symbols of the 
nation. It serves as a way for the state to say that these items are so treasured, we will 
depict them on literal treasure allowing them to become a part of it.  
The power of the state to control its currency is known as monetary sovereignty. 
It is often closely associated with ideas of national political sovereignty.951 It “refers to a 
State's undeniable power, recognised by international law, to regulate its own 
currency”.952 The state's ability to issue currency and have it accepted is, along with 
passport acceptance, forms one of the most common practical representations of 
statehood a citizen encounters. Ultimately, a state in which its citizens are unable to use 
its money is likely to become a failed state. Similarly, the replacement of a national 
central bank is often presented as naturally reducing the state’s sovereignty in an 
undesirable way.953 Further, monetary sovereignty is assumed to belong to the national-
level government, rather than any government or body below or above this level.954 
Countries can issue currency, but it is expected that other types of government entities 
will not.  
                                                 
951 Kurt Schuler, “What Use Is Monetary Sovereignty?,” in The Dollarization Debate, ed. Dominick 
Salvatore, James W. Dean, and Thomas Willett (Oxford University Press, 2003), 140–53. 
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National currencies supposedly support national pride and serve as a symbol of 
national identity.955 They are said to provide an expression of the state’s power and 
economic fortitude. Though this argument may be true for a small number of nation-
states, Schuler argues that national currency has not, in fact, been generally successful in 
improving national pride.956 He notes that, across the world, many people distrust their 
national currency, preferring instead to hold foreign currency.957 For example, 70 per cent 
of U.S. dollar banknotes (and similar numbers for other desirable currencies) are 
estimated to be held outside the U.S.958  
In recognising the suboptimal position of many national currencies, states have 
increasingly embraced a cooperative common currency (such as the euro) or completely 
adopted another country’s currency. This process of dollarisation (where a country adopts 
a foreign currency), in theory, does not eliminate a state’s monetary sovereignty. The 
state maintains the ability to reintroduce its own national currency and often has 
negotiated arrangements for additional limited control of currency issuance.959 However, 
in both of these models, and in many states with their own weaker national currency, 
states always have significant limitations on their actual ability to make use of monetary 
sovereignty, owing to external political and economic factors.960 Most limiting is that 
                                                 
955 Ibid. 
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they are unable to increase inflation strategically by printing more currency or otherwise 
control how their currency trades against others. Nevertheless, many countries share a 
currency. In addition to common currency zones such as with the euro (shared by 19 of 
the 28 member states of the European Union) and CFA franc (used by fourteen African 
countries), there are several countries that have adopted the currency of another including 
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland use of the South African rand or Panama’s and Timor-
Leste’s use of the U.S. dollar. 
Reflecting one of the common tourist questions, the Hawaii Tourism Authority 
prominently notes on its website that “Hawaii's currency is the U.S. dollar”.961 This 
should be an unnecessary statement given Hawaii’s status as a part of the United States. 
The frequency with which this misguided question occurs is a sign that an impression of 
monetary sovereignty still exists in Hawaiʻi. Though even then using the U.S. dollar, 
Hawaii briefly had its own series of banknotes during World War II.962 These notes were 
typical U.S. notes, with the word Hawaii overprinted on one side.963 They were used to 
replace U.S. currency in the islands so that, if Japanese forces were able to capture 
Hawaii, the U.S. government would be able to void all currency that had been 
                                                 
961 Hawaii Tourism Authority, “Hawaii FAQ: Frequently Asked Questions About Hawaii,” English 
(US), accessed August 21, 2015, http://www.gohawaii.com/en/statewide/travel-tips/hawaii-faqs/. 
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captured.964 Although the notes only lasted slightly past the end of World War II965, they 
provided a visible reminder that Hawaii's status was not the same as in the rest of the 
United States. Though the U.S. government responded to a credible fear, the fact that this 
solution was acceptable and still seems reasonable, even when it was not used in other at-
risk parts of the U.S., shows an acceptance of the notion of Hawaii's difference. 
Developing a separate Hawaiian currency has been proposed a number of times 
by people connected to the Hawaiian sovereignty movement. One advocate for a 
Hawaiian dollar, Laurence J. Brahm, notes that “aside from a standing army, I can think 
of only one other thing which gives a people both sovereignty and authority, … is having 
your own currency”.966 He advocates it as a local currency backed by geothermal energy, 
though the actual mechanism by which this would work is unexplained.967 
Cryptocurrencies have also been created, but have failed to gain any meaningful 
attention. Another proposal suggests reissuing the dala (the currency of the Hawaiian 
kingdom) as a local/complementary currency.968 Complementary currencies are designed 
to supplement rather than replace national currencies and are not considered legal tender, 
                                                 
964 Ibid. 
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thus avoiding many potential legal issues.969 This proposal suggests that re-establishing a 
Hawaiian currency “would stimulate curiosity and provide an opportunity to educate 
people about and win support for the Hawaiian kingdom; and it would be evidence of the 
de facto Hawaiian kingdom government effectively providing a government service to 
it’s[sic] citizens/residents, which is an important step in eventually restoring recognition 
internationally”.970 It is questionable how useful this would actually be for the cause, but 
it is likely that it would help gain attention and is thus highly compatible with the general 
strategy of the sovereignty movement. 
Niue officially uses both the New Zealand dollar and the Niue dollar. The Niue 
dollar is an interesting example of Niue exerting its sovereignty for a clear economic 
benefit. Niue mints several series of coins that feature popular characters, such as those 
from Star Wars and Disney on one side and the Queen on the other.971 Though 
technically legal tender, the coins are noncirculating and frequently made of precious 
metals.972 Except perhaps as a tourist novelty, these coins would never actually be used 
for transactions in Niue. They are minted strictly as legal tender because commemorative 
coins that are legal tender are generally valued more highly by collectors. By lending its 
sovereign right to mint coins to commercial activities, Niue is able to generate income at 
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very little cost. It also serves as a reminder of Niuean sovereignty to a set of people who 
would likely otherwise never have any interaction with or even knowledge of Niue.  
The Cook Islands uses the New Zealand dollar, along with the now-limited Cook 
Islands dollar. The Cook Islands issued its own currency starting in 1987.973 It was 
officially pegged to the New Zealand dollar with strict requirements for 100 per cent 
backing in foreign exchange reserve.974 This requirement was later reduced dramatically, 
with some denominations requiring only a 5 per cent backing.975 By the early 1990s, 
inflation and fears of a currency devaluation pushed the two major banks to no longer 
convert Cook Islands dollars to New Zealand dollars.976 Facing this crisis, the 
government passed the Currency Amendment Act of 1994–95, which declared the New 
Zealand dollar the sole monetary unit for banknotes above $3.977 The Cook Islands 
continue to circulate Cook Islands dollar coinage (including a $5 coin). Of the notes, only 
the $3 banknote remains in circulation. Cook Islands coinage features the queen on the 
obverse and traditional symbols, including local plants, Tangaroa (the sea god), and a 
vaka on the reverse. The $3 banknote, unlike the rest of the Cook Islands currency, does 
not feature the queen, but rather has a church congregation on the obverse and a series of 
traditional imagery representing the island of Aitutaki on the reverse. The now-
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discontinued $10, $20 and $50 banknotes followed this same pattern, with other islands' 
symbols on the reverse. 
 The Cook Islands' continued use of its own currency is significant as a statement 
about its nationhood. The practical reasons for a state choosing to have its own currency, 
particularly functions such as money creation, largely do not apply when it is limited to 
small denominations. The Cook Islands dollar is a reminder of the existence of a 
sovereign Cook Islands nation, rather than a practical economic policy. 
 Unique among the nations of this study, Fiji exclusively uses its own currency. 
Though it has been a republic since 1987, Queen Elizabeth II has been featured on the 
obverse of Fijian banknotes and coins until recently.978 The removal of the queen from 
Fijian currency has been very unpopular with many of Fiji's tribal chiefs (and much of the 
public), as it reflects a visible symbol of the diminishing of their power through the 
removal of the traditional governance.979 The change in Fijian currency design marks a 
significant shift in the ways national symbols are used. Rather than continuing to pair a 
foreign symbol with domestic symbols, the new bills and coins feature only symbols of 
the Fijian nation. “Important and iconic flora and fauna of Fiji has been selected to 
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replace her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II's portrait”, said Bainimarama.980 These changes 
allow Fiji to both practically express its sovereignty and further reemphasise what 
symbols are of the highest importance to the Fijian nation. 
 The Cook Islands and Niue’s use of currency can be seen as primarily symbolic 
expressions of their nation. Neither has any significant practical reason for issuing its 
own currency yet chooses to do so. Fiji, though having operational needs for it, has 
placed an unusually high amount of attention on the symbolic messages the currency 
expresses. Hawaiʻi, in contrast, has no meaningful ability to issue its own currency and 
attempts to do so have not been even slightly viable.        
6.11 Street Names 
Street names serve significant symbolic value despite being highly mundane. 
They are often an expression of everyday nationalism in a space that, while occasionally 
recognised as political, is typically unexamined and banal. These names, however, are of 
significant importance to nationalists.981 They provide a symbolically powerful way to 
construct a national identity.982 Also of particular salience is the fact that street names are 
generally administratively controlled and are thus easy for officials to change as 
desired.983 Giving streets commemorative names allows administrators to introduce an 
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authorised version of the historical identity of the area.984 They can establish who and 
what is worthy of official recognition as a symbol of the nation.  
Some governments have made renaming streets a highly visible symbolic 
representation of their regime change.985 For example, East Germany saw mass renaming 
of streets with the rise of the German Democratic Republic, as had also occurred under 
several previous governments.986 Streets named for people with Nazi connections, as well 
as those named for people who fought in the First World War, were quickly replaced by 
those of Communist significance.987 After German unification, many of these roads were 
again renamed to reflect anti-Nazi heroes and deemphasise Communist figures.988 Iraq 
and Iran have seen similar mass renamings.  
 Though street naming is occasionally a part of large-scale propaganda (or 
counter-propaganda) campaigns, commemorative naming is often the result of more 
localised, less consciously nationalistic, efforts. It has long been a favourite tool of 
politicians looking to gain easy political support at minimal cost. People selected for 
memorialisation in street names are typically well-liked, no longer controversial 
historical figures. One of the most popular for street naming in the United States is 
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Martin Luther King, Jr.989 Naming a street for him is politically well received, with 
controversy usually limited to which street to rename, rather than opposition to 
renaming.990  Similarly, naming roads for locally significant figures provides officials 
with an easy way to show the community that they understand the area and its history.  
Hawaiʻi has fully embraced the significance of commemorative naming. Roads 
have been named after Hawaiian royalty, such as Kamehameha Highway and Kapiʻolani 
Boulevard; prominent historic Hawaiʻi families like Dole and McCully; and even 
mythical figures like Lehua and ʻŌhiʻa. However, unlike many other U.S. states, there are 
very few streets named after U.S. presidents or other historically important Americans. 
The vast majority of those that appear to be named after important Americans are actually 
named for locally important people with the same name.991 Hawaiʻi is also one of a small 
number of U.S. states that does not have a road named for Martin Luther King, Jr.  
In Niue, limited new road construction and a habit of naming roads after the 
villages they connect has left Niuean politicians with few opportunities for 
commemorative naming. The most significant of these is Sir Robert Rex Wharf, named 
after the first premier of Niue. As the island’s only wharf, it is one of the most important 
pieces of infrastructure on the island.  
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 Many of Fiji’s roads have been named to commemorate important people in its 
history. For example, in Suva there is MacGregor Road (after Sir William MacGregor, 
the first chief medical and health officer); Ratu Sukuna Road (in honour of Ratu Sir Lala 
Sukuna, a Fijian chief and architect of Fijian self-governance); Queen Elizabeth Road; 
and Vishnu Deo Road (after Pandit Vishnu Deo, a powerful Indo-Fijian political leader). 
Fiji’s two most important motorways are Kings Road and Queens Road, generically 
named for the British royalty.  
 In the Cook Islands, though their nation itself is named after the British explorer 
Captain James Cook, there does not seem to be much other commemorative naming.  
Even outside of commemorative naming, street names can serve the construction 
of national identity. All four nations of this paper have, either by policy or practice, 
adopted conventions of naming streets with historically connected names. Hawaiʻi (at 
least for Honolulu) has the clearest policy in this regard. Under the Revised Ordinances 
of Honolulu 22-8.2, highways and freeways should “whenever practicable” be “named 
after Hawaiian royalty”. ROH 22-8.3 requires that street names in Honolulu “shall consist 
of Hawaiian names, words or phrases and shall be selected with a view to the 
appropriateness of the name to historic, cultural, scenic and topographical features of the 
area”. It also requires that appropriate diacritical marks be used on any new or 
replacement signage. The other counties of Hawaiʻi largely follow this policy, despite 
limited or no statutory requirements to do so.  
The road names across the Cook Islands are mostly Maori, with the notable 
exception of “Airport Road”. There does not appear to be any legislation that governs 
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how roads are named. Similarly, all roads in Niue have Niuean names, but not because of 
any statutory requirement.  
Fiji seems to have the most variety in its street names and seems to lack any 
statutory requirements related to road naming. Yet, it appears as a matter, of course, that 
new roads will receive non-English names (mostly Fijian or Hindi) or be named after 
people significant to Fiji.  
Within each of these nations, the obstinately practical choice of what a street 
should be called serves as a highly visible way to reinforce stories of a nation. The 
traditional name choice functions as a frequent reminder to everyone who uses the street 
of the connection between place and history. Though the person driving along looking at 
street signs might not consciously consider the full political and nationalistic implication 
of the street name, it is likely (and in the case of Hawaiʻi certain) that the person who 
named the street was fully immersed in its significance.  
6.12 Music 
Music typically draws strong, often subconscious, emotional responses. As such, 
it is ideal for orchestrating and manipulating nationalist sentiments.  
Hawaiʻi has been credited with many contributions to music that are remarkable 
for its size.992 Musicians from Hawaiʻi popularised the slack key guitar and the ‘ukulēlē; 
they also invented the steel guitar. Hawaiian music has been described as a “unifying 
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factor in the development of modern Pacific musics”.993 Though sharing many of its radio 
stations and music distributors with the United States, much of Hawaii’s music is distinct.  
Hawaiian music gained widespread popularity in the early twentieth century. The 
1912 Broadway show Bird of Paradise exposed Hawaiian music to many who had never 
heard it before. In the 1920s, Hawaiian music became a key part of Hawaii’s tourism 
efforts. Particularly when paired with hula, Hawaiian music, through attractions like the 
Kodak Hula Show, became a defining part of the Hawaiʻi tourist identity. Today, it 
remains a key part of how Hawaiʻi is presented to tourists. Virtually every tourist-focused 
hotel in Hawaiʻi will have nightly Hawaiian music, and many tourists describe it as an 
integral part of their Hawaiʻi vacation experience. Even for locally focused events, 
Hawaiian music plays a big role. It is a popular and non-controversial choice.  
A distinct Hawaiian identity is reinforced by the playing of Hawaiian music. Its 
uniqueness serves as a reminder that Hawaiʻi is different from the United States. More 
directly, notions of Hawaiian sovereignty and nationhood are often also presented 
through music. Much of the popular Hawaiian music contains themes of monarchy, 
nation, sovereignty and place. Music is a common way in which ideas of sovereignty are 
reinforced, even when the listener does not realise how strong a message the song sends. 
Music in Hawaii seems to be a way in which a subtle popular support for nationhood has 
developed even amongst those who would baulk at the political versions. 
As discussed previously in this chapter, “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī”, the state song and 
former national anthem of Hawaiʻi, provides a strong pro-monarchy message. Many 
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other iconic songs of Hawaiʻi are explicitly pro-sovereignty. Most notable is “Living in a 
Sovereign Land”, written by Israel Kamakawiwo'ole, the most famous Hawaiian singer 
(and one of the most famous modern Hawaiians). The song is extremely popular in 
Hawaiʻi and has been covered by many other bands. It calls for a recognition of the 
wrong that was done (“Our Children Deserve To Know; What Went Down A Hundred 
Years Ago; You Can Pay The Man, You Can Take The Land; But You Can't Take The 
Truth Away!”). It also calls upon everyone to restore the nation (“Brothers And Sisters, 
Brown, Yellow and White; Its Time To Do What You Know Is Right; Whats Been Taken 
Must Be Returned; Give Our Children What They Deserve”).  
Another very popular song by Israel Kamakawiwo`ole advocating for justice for 
the Hawaiian Nation is “E Ala E”. This song, in Hawaiian and English, calls for the 
people of Hawaiʻi to stand for justice (“Rise for justice the day has come; For all our 
people to stand as one”) and (“Defend our birthright to be free; Give our children 
liberty”). Other popular songs such as “Hawai’i ‘78” —sung by Makaha Sons of 
Ni`ihau—mourns the desecration of sacred grounds and loss of the Hawaiian nation. The 
song asks how the monarchy would feel if they were to witness the state that Hawaiʻi is 
in today (“Could you just imagine if they were around; And saw highways on their sacred 
grounds; How would they feel about this modern city life; Tears would come from each 
other's eyes … All the fighting that the king had done; To conquer all these islands now 
these condominiums”). The song has been well used by those opposing the 
overdevelopment of the islands. “I Ka La `Apopo” provides a more active call to action. 
(“Rise up Hawaiians, rise up descendants; claim your rightful things”) and mourns the 
many losses of the overthrow (“The people cry for their queen; They cry because of the 
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overthrow … The native cries for his important thing; He cries for the thing which was 
lost. He cries for the hurts of the land; the hurts of today remain”). It concludes with the 
optimistic verse that “Sovereignty will return tomorrow”. These well-known songs are 
routinely played throughout Hawaiʻi. Although other explicit pro-sovereignty nationalism 
efforts routinely fail in Hawaiʻi, music is a way in which the message has been well 
received and incorporated.  
 Music is extremely important to the Cook Islands' identity. It has been said that 
“if there is one outstanding ability which appears to be shared by all Cook Islanders it is 
music and song”.994 Music is an integral part of Cook Islands social life.995 The popular 
contemporary Cook Islands music, known as “island music”, is widely performed at 
nightclubs, bars, and community events such as weddings. It is also played as a key part 
of community fundraising.996  
Cook Islands music is largely characterised by Christian music and drumming, 
though many other contemporary styles are popular as well. Drumming is the “backbone 
of music and dance in the Cook Islands”.997 The Cook Islands style of drumming is 
widely recognised but is commonly thought to be Tahitian.998 This misattribution has 
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been described by former Cook Islands Minister of Culture Jonassen as “a blatant 
plagiarisation of cultural images and sounds too often being misappropriated by 
commercial institutions”.999 The Polynesian Cultural Center, a popular tourist attraction 
in Hawaiʻi, has been described as one of the significant sources of this confusion.1000 It 
bundles the Cook Islands drumming into the Tahitian village.1001 Though initial tour 
guide scripts in the 1970s did correctly note that the drums were not of Tahitian origin, 
this is no longer mentioned.1002 This situation has become particularly problematic 
because the Polynesian Cultural Center serves a dual role: it provides cultural education 
to tourists and also supports cultural revitalisation amongst Polynesian people.1003 Thus, 
Cook Islands style “Tahitian drumming” has been absorbed into Tahitian culture as a 
traditional practice, displacing actual traditional Tahitian drumming. 
Cook Islands songs were traditionally done as chants.1004 The Cook Islands 
Christian Church banned the ute (celebratory song) style of chant for twenty years, which 
has caused it to fall out of daily use.1005 Today this style is typically performed only as 
part of constitution celebrations or at community functions.1006 'Imene pure (church 
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songs) are among the most popular types of music in the Cook Islands. These songs are 
typical hymns performed in a harmonised manner. 'Imene tuki feature similar messages 
but are done in a traditional chant style.  
Cook Islands contemporary music is extremely popular in the Cook Islands; 
among Cook Islanders in the diaspora; and among other Polynesians.1007 Radio Cook 
Islands plays primarily this style to widespread listenership.1008 Songs are typically 
composed about life-stage events, relationships and community events.1009 Contemporary 
Western or Pacific songs are also commonly reworked to localise their lyrics.1010 With 
significant numbers in diaspora, songs often feature a theme of longing for the islands.1011 
The very popular song “Sea Breeze” describes this longing with the lyrics “Sea Breeze, 
so peaceful; Back in Aitutaki; I yearn to see you; I would love to be there this night”. 1012 
Many Cook Islanders have expressed concern that globalisation is leading to the 
absorption of their traditional music. 1013 The contemporary music has been called a 
“‘bastardisation’ of ‘traditional’ expressive forms and an indicator of ‘global’ 
corruption”.  “Local music is seen as ‘swamped’ by Western popular music”.1014 As a 
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small island nation, the Cook Islands has limited abilities to combat the spread of cultural 
absorption that is commonly paired with globalisation. Though producing a 
disproportionate amount of music for their size, the multitude of other musical options 
and growing popularity of Western popular music options limit their ability to directly 
combat globalisation.  
Music is a key part of traditional Fijian culture and modern daily life. It is rare to 
find a shop or office that does not have the radio playing in the background. Even the 
buses will typically have music playing. There is also a multitude of shops and street 
vendors selling music across Fijian cities and towns.  
While iTaukei are ethnically and geographically Melanesian, Fijian music is more 
Polynesian in character. Historically, music played a significant role in iTaukei ceremony 
and warfare. The lali drums were heavily used for communications in order to call people 
together and to announce births, deaths, call to battle and other events of significance. 
Modern iTaukei music adds the guitar, ukulele and mandolin, as well as other percussion 
instruments. Church music is among the most popular genres. A style known as “vude” 
has also emerged in Fiji to great popularity. This genre mixes traditional Fijian songs 
with modern R&B, jazz and disco. Though not well known outside of Fiji and the 
growing Fijian diaspora, it provides a uniquely Fijian style that is widely played.  
Indo-Fijian music has developed several distinct styles that have become popular 
globally. Bhajans are the most commonly exported. This style of music pairs devotional 
music with the harmonium and dholak (drums). A style of Qawaali (a type of Sufi 
devotional music) has also developed in Fiji; it uses the dholak rather than the traditional 
tabla because of a lack of trained tabla players in Fiji as a result of colonial immigration 
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patterns. Imported Indian music, particularly Bollywood soundtracks, are also extremely 
popular in Fiji.  
Music is a significant part of tourism in Fiji. Most tourist hotels have live 
musicians regularly playing Polynesian-style music. Many hotel restaurants will use the 
lali drums to announce the start of dinner. Shops selling tourist goods play this kind of 
music to set a mood of authenticity and island life. Even the airport has Fijian musicians 
playing in the arrivals area. Like most tourist-focused representations of Fiji, this music is 
almost entirely of a Polynesian style, thus ignoring the music of Indo-Fijians and other 
Fijian groups. Similarly, it will also typically be pan-Polynesian music rather than Fijian 
specific styles.  
Nevertheless, music in Fiji is an area in which Fiji’s unique identity can clearly be 
seen. Whilst Western music is undeniably popular, Fijian music has developed several 
unique styles that are becoming increasingly widespread globally. Though public music 
listening habits are influenced strongly by ethnicity, it remains very common to see 
people listening to music that is not associated with their ethnic group. iTaukei artists will 
cover Indo-Fijian songs, and vice-versa and nightclubs will play music from both groups 
within the same setlist.  
Niuean music remains a seriously understudied subject. Information on it is based 
primarily on two studies, one from 1926 and the other from 1984.1015 They suggest that 
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Niuean music existed primarily to support dance.1016 Non-traditional music appears to be 
very Samoan influenced, with some other more recent Polynesian influences. Tourist 
presentations of Niuean music seem largely indistinguishable from those of other 
Polynesian islands. Arrivals at the airport are met with government-sponsored musicians 
playing Polynesian music. Though this immediately reminds visitors and residents that 
they are entering island culture, there is little about it that would seem to be uniquely 
Niuean.  
A number of Niuean-language music albums have been produced, particularly by 
Niueans in diaspora and by church choirs. Several Niueans in New Zealand have gained 
attention performing non-traditional music there and globally, creating great pride in 
Niue. Most notable among these is Pauly Fuemana of Otara's Millionaires Club with the 
hit song “How Bizarre”. Given the limited data on Niuean music, it remains hard to fully 
assess its impact on Niuean national identity and nationalism. Based on the studies 
available and interviews I conducted, music is not having anywhere near the same 
significance as it does for other nations. This could be a result of the small population's 
lack of venue, audience and sufficient talent. What remains surprising, though, is a 
seemingly complete lack of diasporic “longing” music. With the vast majority of the 
Niuean population living in diaspora and the widely shared sentiments of connection to 
the Niuean homeland, we would expect to see some musical representation of nostalgia 
for island life. This absence suggests a need for future studies on the Niuean community 
in diaspora.  
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6.13 Sport 
 Sport has long been one of the ways in which nationalism is expressed 
symbolically. It is often an area in which nations are able to compete against one another 
in a way that reflects national conflict without the consequences of real conflict. They can 
become united around their national teams as they compete against rival nations. This 
signalling of nationhood represents one of the classic focuses of banal nationalism.  
Sport also provides a way for underrecognised nations to assert their identity 
through sports rivalry. For example, the Montreal Canadians symbolic representation of 
Francophone Quebecers and their rivalry with Anglophone teams can be seen to represent 
more general conflicts of national identity. The Spanish football team Athletic Bilbao 
exclusive selection of Basque players and its rivalry with Catalan dominated FC 
Barcelona similarly reflects the team's strong identification with Basque and Catalan 
nationalism. 
In addition to the obvious nationalistic implications of having a national team, 
sports also provide numerous opportunities for more subtle presentations of national 
symbols. National flags are typical components of sporting events, as are national 
anthems and other national songs. Even the food that is available at a game can be 
representative of the nation. The hyper-American hot dog is a regular part of American 
sports. Meat pies and lamb sausages are common at games in Australia. Roti wraps are a 
fixture of Fijian sports. These symbols, though not unique to sporting presentations, are 
so thoroughly ingrained into the events that their presence is rarely even questioned.  
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6.13.1 Olympics 
The Olympics provide one of the most obvious visible displays of nationalism. 
Nationalistic symbolism is proudly and prominently displayed throughout. States 
compete against one another for national pride, and when they win, their flag and anthem 
are highlighted. Though of course having no legal effect upon a state’s independence, the 
Olympics are an extremely emblematic expression of statehood and serve as a popular 
barometer for sovereignty. A nation’s presence or absence at the Olympics can be highly 
symbolic for nationhood and sovereignty.  
The Kingdom of Hawaiʻi had already been overthrown prior to the first modern 
Olympic games in 1896. As such, Hawaiʻi has never competed independently in the 
Olympics. Hawaii’s first Olympic athlete was Duke1017 Kahanamoku. Duke was born 
shortly before the overthrow to a prominent Hawaiian family, whose members were 
considered lower-ranking nobles. He was a five-time Olympic medallist in swimming 
and is considered responsible for re-establishing and spreading the sport of surfing across 
the world. Competing as part of the U.S. Olympic swimming team at the 1912 Summer 
Olympics in Stockholm, he won a gold medal in the 100-meter freestyle and a silver 
medal in the 4×200-meter freestyle relay. He represented the United States in four 
Olympic Games and won a total of three gold and two silver medals.1018 His 
accomplishments are widely celebrated in Hawaiʻi and across the world. His statue in 
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Waikiki is one of the most visited and iconic in Hawaiʻi. Duke represents the challenge 
that many athletes from Hawaiʻi face (along with other Native athletes in similar 
conditions). He is quite clearly Hawaiian, but as a result of political and practical 
concerns, competed under the flag of the occupying United States. Since Kahanamoku, a 
number of athletes born in Hawaiʻi have competed on behalf of the United States and 
other countries.  
Hawaiʻi does not have its own National Olympic Committee (NOC), typically a 
requirement to compete as a country in Olympics. Though American Samoa, Guam, 
Puerto Rico, and the United States Virgin Islands (all of which are administratively part 
of the U.S.) have their own NOCs, these committees predate a 1996 rule change, which 
requires international recognition of the state as independent. The International Olympic 
Committee has allowed a number of athletes to compete as “independent athletes” under 
the Olympic flag (a potentially ideological acceptable option for Hawaiian athletes). But 
this relaxing of the rule has largely been used for exceptional cases relating to recent 
major political developments, rather than a viable option for athletes unwilling to 
compete for their country of legal citizenship.  As such, until Hawaii’s sovereignty is 
internationally recognised, or the IOC changes its rules, Hawaiʻi athletes must compete 
under another country’s flag.   
Fijian athletes first competed in the 1956 Summer Olympic Games whilst still a 
colony of Great Britain. They have competed in fourteen Summer Games and three 
Winter Games in a variety of sports. At the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio, Fiji won its 
first medal, placing first in Men's Rugby Sevens. Rugby has long been one of Fiji’s 
strongest sports, but it had not been played in the Olympics since the 1924 Summer 
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Olympics. The reintroduction of the sport to the 2016 Olympics gave Fiji a chance to 
compete in its strongest sport against other nations and show the world the power of a 
small island nation. Prior to this victory, only two Fijian athletes had competed in the 
Olympics based on the standards to qualify rather than as wild cards. The two were 
Makelesi Bulikiobo, who competed in the women's 400-metre sprint at the 2008 Games 
in Beijing, and Leslie Copeland in the men's javelin event at the 2012 Games in London. 
Both placed in the middle of their events. With the reintroduction of golf to the 2016 
Games, Vijay Singh would have also qualified on merit had he not chosen to skip the 
Games owing to Zika concerns.1019  
Fiji’s sevens victory was an extremely important moment for Fijian nationalism. 
In a globally televised match, Fiji beat its former colonial overseer, Great Britain, 43-7. 
This score represents both the highest score and the largest margin of victory of any 
sevens team in a world championship game. In Fiji, the game was nearly universally 
watched, with PM Bainimarama noting that “our productivity has been nil for the last 
couple of days".1020 After the victory, he declared the following day to be a public 
holiday.  
 Niue has never sent athletes to the Olympics. Its NOC is an associate member of 
the Oceania National Olympic Committees but is not a member of the Association of 
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National Olympic Committees. Reflecting a 2012 decision by the Niue NOC to limit its 
focus, Niue can currently only participate in regional events (including commonwealth 
events) rather than the Olympics itself. As an associate member, however, it is recognised 
as meeting the fundamental requirements to qualify for full Olympic participation. Niue’s 
physical environment, however (particularly its lack of shallow navigable waters and 
limited beaches), does not allow many Olympic events favoured by small island states to 
be played there (such as volleyball or kayak events). Further, its small population, 
remoteness, the absence of specialised facilities, and lack of enough skilled 
athletes/trainers prevent competition in most sports. The sole stadium in Niue is the Niue 
High School Oval, which can accommodate 1,000 people. There are no facilities that 
would allow any other specialised events on the island. Attempts at building competitive 
mountain biking teams have been limited by the fact that the bikes are rented from a local 
car hire agency.1021 Despite these limitations, Niue has competed in a small number of 
sports at the Commonwealth Games, including the 2014 games, in which they placed 
either last or in the bottom three of each event. Niue’s strongest sports are likely netball 
(for which their national team placed twelfth of twenty-four in the 2003 World 
Championships) and Rugby Sevens (placing twenty-three of twenty-eight at the 2011–12 
IRB Sevens World Series). Though very respectable positions in these sports for a 
country of their size and limitations, the strength of other countries in the region prevents 
Olympic chances (as does the fact that netball is not currently an Olympic sport). Niue’s 
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nonparticipation in the Olympics seems most representative of their uncompetitiveness, 
rather than any sense that they could not participate. Despite this, their absence in the 
Olympics, even if their performance was abysmal, does very much work against Niue’s 
image of statehood in the world’s eye.  
The Cook Islands has competed in six Summer Olympic Games, though it has 
never competed in the Winter Games and has won no medals. The Cook Islands first 
participated in the 1988 Seoul Games and has competed in each Summer Games since. 
The Cook Islands has exclusively competed in individual sports and has never sent more 
than nine athletes. It has entered into sailing, canoeing, swimming, weightlifting and 
boxing. Qualification has been nearly exclusively through regional inclusion policies 
rather than competitive placement. Though much larger than Niue, the Cook Islands 
remains a small country with limited resources. The abundance of lagoons and beaches 
does allow athletes for some sports to train. However, the islands lack meaningful 
specialised facilities for many other sports. Although performances have been credible, 
no Cook Islands athlete has managed to move beyond the bottom places of any event. 
Participation in the Olympics does nevertheless serve a powerfully symbolic role. It 
reminds the world and the people of the Cook Islands that no matter how small they are, 
they are still able to compete as a nation on a global stage against much larger states. 
6.13.2 Multinational Competitions 
 Each nation in this study has competed in multinational competitions. These 
competitions provide a lower-key representation of the same values that form the 
Olympics. They provide a way for countries that would be uncompetitive at larger events 
an opportunity to compete as a nation.  
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The Cook Islands has competed in ten Commonwealth Games to date and has 
never won a medal. They are also a member of FIFA (International Federation of 
Association Football), though they have never made it past the first round. In netball, 
they have ranked as high as tenth, but are not currently especially competitive.  
Niue has competed four times in the Commonwealth Games without any medal 
wins. They are an associate member of the OFC (Oceania Football Confederation), but 
not FIFA, making them eligible only for regional football competition. However, they 
have not competed in football since 1983. Rugby and netball have been the only sports in 
which Niue has seriously competed.  
 Both Niue and the Cook Islands compete in the Oceania Cup (a rugby union 
competition for countries and territories from Oceania) with developmental band national 
teams (the lowest level of national rugby). In addition to Niue and the Cook Islands, 
teams competing include four independent countries (Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands, Tahiti and Vanuatu); as well as U.S. territory American Samoa and French 
special collectivity New Caledonia. Niue and the Cook Islands both do fairly well in this 
league. Niue won the 2008 FORU Oceania Cup and was the 2007 runner-up. The Cook 
Islands won in 1996, 2005 and 2013, placing second in 2002 and 2009. Though 
successful regionally with a few surprise victories against tier-one teams (such as Niue’s 
48-4 defeat of highly ranked South Africa), neither team has done especially well 
internationally. Niue is currently ranked 85th in men's World Rugby rankings, and the 
Cook Islands is ranked 45th of 102. Neither state has a national women’s team. 
 Fiji, in addition to successfully competing in the Olympics, has been fairly 
competitive in regional sporting competitions. Fiji is ranked thirty-two in Women’s 
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World Rugby rankings and tenth in Men’s. Fijian athletes have also been a member of the 
International Cricket Council since before independence and have regularly competed in 
ICC Trophy tournaments. Cricket was introduced during the colonial period by the 
British governor of Fiji. It has found a considerable local following and seen a number of 
successes and high-profile players, including eventual PM and President Ratu Kamisese 
Mara. Unlike iTaukei-dominated rugby, Fijian cricket has seen many Indo-Fijian players. 
Both sports are widely followed across Fiji, with fans of every ethnic group united in 
their support of the national team.  
 Many teams across the region are formed of Pacific Islanders in diaspora. There 
are several prominent players on the national rugby teams of New Zealand and Australia 
who are a part of these diasporas. Only three of the twelve players on Japan's men's rugby 
sevens squad are foreign born (two Fijians and a Tongan). Still, the popular impression 
among many island fans is that Japan’s recent success is because they have brought in 
Pacific Islanders. Most of the players who compete on Niue and the Cook Islands 
national teams are actually residents of New Zealand. For example, in 2014 it was highly 
significant when Niue welcomed its first Niue-resident player to its modern rugby team; 
previously, none of the players actually resided in Niue.1022  
Hawaiʻi frequently competes in several sports against other national teams. 
Though often geographically farther away than other U.S. teams, many Hawaiʻi-based 
teams will compete against national teams representing Asian and Pacific nations in 
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addition to or instead of competing against American teams. Whilst this decision is often 
made for logistical, marketing, or skill-based reasons, for the purposes of banal 
nationalism the message it sends can be quite mixed.  
Even when teams are competing along with other American teams, it is not 
uncommon for Hawaiʻi to be presented as a separate entity. This can be seen in the 
Associated Press article “Title Game Set at Series: Hawaii vs. Japan” and the New York 
Times reprinting of the article under the title “Hawaii and Japan Will Play for Little 
League Crown”.1023 The headlines suggest that the two entities competing are equivalent. 
More accurate headlines could have been “U.S.A. vs. Japan” (country vs. country); 
“Tokyo Prefecture vs. Hawaiʻi” (internal administrative unit vs. internal administrative 
unit); or the most accurate, “Waipahu vs. Tokyo” (town vs. city). Despite the headlines, 
the article does note that the Hawaiʻi fans were chanting “U.S.A.! U.S.A.!” and waving 
Hawaiʻi “flags and tea leaves for good luck”.1024 
Sports also provides an opportunity to play the state’s national anthem. In this 
regard, the trend toward playing “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī”, even though it is not typical to play 
the anthem of non-countries, is significant. This pattern can be seen clearly at the ‘Ohana 
Cup. The 2016 Ohana Cup Rugby League Festival in Hawaiʻi featured New South Wales 
Police vs. the Hawaii Chiefs; Fiji vs. Canada; and Tonga vs. Samoa. As is traditional in 
rugby, the national anthems of Fiji, Canada, Tonga and Samoa were played prior to the 
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match. To represent the Hawaii Chiefs, “Hawaiʻi Ponoʻī” was sung. For New South 
Wales Police “Advance Australia Fair” (the national anthem of Australia) was performed.  
6.14 Food 
Food is closely interwoven with "social relations, including those of power, 
inclusion and exclusion, as well as with cultural ideas about classification (including food 
and non-food, the edible and the inedible)".1025 It is inseparably tied to notions of who we 
are, both as individuals and as a nation. As Fischler argues, "Food and cuisine are a 
central component of the sense of collective belonging and the symbolic value of food is 
central to our sense of identity, at both [the] individual and group level".1026  Food 
establishes an identity. It can be used to establish who we are as individuals, but also who 
we are as a nation.1027 Though rarely formally defined as a national cuisine, a particular 
set of foodstuffs often becomes associated with a nation. The presentation and 
consumption of these dishes serve to remind residents of the nation. Food remains 
arguably the most influential representation of banal nationalism. This section highlights 
a selection of the foodstuffs that are most iconic for each of the nations. Given the 
diversity of foodstuffs available within each, it should by no means be seen as 
comprehensive.  
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6.14.1 National Cuisine 
Coconuts are used extensively in Pacific cooking and have significant symbolism 
associated with them. Coconut trees are "the universal symbol of the tropics in the 
popular imagination".1028 They are used as a symbol of a tropical island paradise, 
representing "hot weather, sea and vacation time".1029  The coconut tree is also known as 
the "tree of life" or "divine tree" in the South Pacific, owing to its use as food; building 
material (wood and leaves); material for weaving; and oil. Coconuts are of critical dietary 
importance for many islanders. 
Taro is similarly iconic. It was by far the most important and commonly eaten 
starch in pre-colonial Pacific. Its consumption has declined as other starches have gained 
in popularity. It remains a status food for many islands and is often seen as essential for 
an authentic traditional meal. Its high cost limits its consumption largely to special 
occasions and meals for tourists. 
Across the Pacific, traditional feasting is typically accompanied by music and 
dance becoming a key part of the tourist representation of the islands. Hawaiʻi calls it a 
luau; Fiji calls it a lovo1030. Both the Cook Islands and Niue have their own versions, 
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where they are known for tourists as island nights1031. The imagery and meanings of food 
are often manipulated for a variety of reasons to serve a multitude of goals. This 
manipulation is very evident in these presentations. These meals rarely include the scope 
of the island's cuisine, nor what is typically consumed. They are generally designed to 
fulfil tourists' desires for an exotic and pseudo-authentic meal. Though often 
incorporating symbolic traditional dishes and popular conceptions of what people eat in 
the islands (such as absurd amounts of pineapple), these meals are typically catered to the 
perceived desires of tourists for food that is familiar to them, but at the same time is 
suitably exotic. 
Each of the nations in this dissertation, as well as sharing these general patterns, 
also has national cuisine trends that can be seen to reflect their national identity. Hawaii’s 
popular cuisine well reflects its identity. It is distinctly Hawaiian, but fully incorporates 
the cuisines of the many cultures that form Hawaiʻi. The food that could be said to 
represent Hawaii’s national cuisine is a blend of Hawaiian, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, 
American and other culture's dishes.  
Rice is one of Hawaii's most significant foods. With Chinese immigration, rice 
quickly replaced taro as the primary starch and was consumed by nearly every ethnic 
                                                 
1031  There are traditional names for feasts with dancing and music; however, these names do not seem 
to be typically applied to tourist or casual versions rather favoring more generic names like buffet or 
borrowing the better known name of luau. 
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group in Hawaiʻi.1032 Today, it is not uncommon for people in Hawaiʻi to consume rice 
daily or multiple times a day. In preparing for natural disasters such as hurricanes, 
grocery stores will see runs on rice and Spam, similar to how stores elsewhere may have 
shortages of milk, eggs and bread. Even for those currently incarcerated, rice is 
significant. For example, a prison riot occurred in Arizona, where prisoners from Hawaiʻi 
were housed in a correctional facility. Their complaints about the type and quality of the 
rice provided were credited as the reason for the hour-and-a-half-long riot, during which 
they caused damage and injured a guard.1033 In Hawaiʻi, the general reaction to the riot, 
although disapproving, was one of understanding.  
Spam and Spam musubi are amongst the best-loved foods in Hawaiʻi, where 
consumers of Spam eat over 7 million cans a year. This meat product was introduced to 
the islands after World War II.1034 It has been jokingly called “Hawaiian steak” and is 
celebrated with a large annual street festival in Waikiki called the Spam Jam. Spam is 
eaten in a variety of ways, including fried as a breakfast food, as a sandwich, or most 
popularly, as a musubi. Musubis are a type of fusion sushi wherein meat (typically a slice 
                                                 
1032 Wanda Adams, “Reign of Rice,” The Honolulu Advertiser, January 19, 2005, 
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2005/Jan/19/il/il20ataste.html. 
1033 Due to on-island space limitations, many prisoners will be sent to mainland U.S. prisons to serve 
out their sentence. This creates frequent issues with feelings of cultural disconnect. 
 
 Charles Memminger, “A Sticky Problem for Our Inmates,” Honolulu Star-Bulletin, September 18, 
2000, http://archives.starbulletin.com/2000/09/18/features/memminger.html. 
1034 Kimberly Kohatsu, “Why Do Hawaiians Love Spam So Much?,” Huffington Post, September 24, 
2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/Menuism/why-do-hawaiians-love-spam-so-much_b_1901306.html. 
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of Spam) is pressed with rice and wrapped in nori (a type of Japanese seaweed). They are 
commonly eaten as a snack or a light meal and are sold at virtually every convenience 
store in Hawaiʻi. It is also typically seen at children’s sports games, brought by a team 
parent as a post-game snack for them. Similarly, many parents will send a musubi for a 
child's lunch on field trips. Both McDonald's and Burger King in Hawaiʻi serve Spam as 
part of their breakfast menu and have offered burgers with Spam as well.  
A number of other Hawaiian dishes remain popular and iconic. Poi is a traditional 
staple. It is a thick paste made from taro and is often served lightly fermented. Though 
highly iconic, its daily consumption varies widely. Poke is another popular traditional 
food in Hawaii and, recently, across the rest of the U.S. and Canada. In its most common 
form, it is raw fish (typically ahi tuna) and seasoned with salt, onion, shoyu and often 
limu seaweed. It can be eaten on its own or on top of rice (known as a poke bowl). Lomi-
lomi salmon is another common raw fish dish. Raw salmon is cured with salt and diced 
with tomatoes and onions. Pork was traditionally highly valued in the Pacific, and pork 
dishes remain popular today, particularly kalua pig and laulau. Kalua pig is pork slow-
roasted in an earth oven. Laulau is pork, chicken or fish wrapped in layers of taro leaves 
and cooked until soft. Chicken long rice, though not actually a traditional dish, has 
become adopted as one. It features clear mung bean noodles cooked in chicken broth with 
chunks of chicken and ginger. These dishes all remain widely consumed both as part of 
tourist presentations and by residents of Hawaiʻi.  
Plate lunch, though not a food in itself, is a quintessential Hawaiian meal. The 
representative plate lunch consists of two scoops of white rice, macaroni salad, and an 
entree. Typical entrees include chicken katsu (Japanese-style fried boneless chicken); 
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beef teriyaki (known as teri beef); Korean kalbi; char siu pork; kalua pork; hamburger 
steak; and Filipino chicken adobo. Likely derived from the Japanese bento, plate lunch is 
a popular meal. Given the quantity of food offered by a plate lunch, the price, and the 
way in which it is classically served (in a white unbranded Styrofoam container), it is 
often seen as a “working man's” meal, though it is eaten by all. In many ways, plate 
lunches are seen as symbolic of the modern nation of Hawaiʻi. They represent a distinct 
fusion of cuisines that are accessible to all.  
In addition to the foodstuffs mentioned above, there are also a number of foods 
that have become associated with Hawaiʻi that lack the same historic significance or 
actual connection. Hawaiian pizza is an excellent example of this. It is topped with ham 
or bacon and pineapple. Invented by a Greek immigrant in Chatham, Ontario, it has no 
natural connection to Hawaiʻi. Though available at most pizza places in Hawaiʻi (as is the 
case for much of the U.S.), it enjoys no greater popularity in Hawaiʻi than anywhere else. 
This trend of adding pineapple to dishes and branding them “Hawaiian” occurs frequently 
both in Hawaiʻi and elsewhere. For example, Hardees (an American fast food chain) has 
offered a “Hawaiian Chicken Sandwich”, which featured teriyaki sauce and a slice of 
grilled pineapple. Similarly, McDonald's in Waikiki (Oahu’s main tourist area) bundles 
pineapple with all of its combo meals.  
Cook Islands’ national cuisine would likely be considered traditional Polynesian. 
Though there are food options in the Cook Islands that span a wide range of cuisines 
(including continental, Indian, Chinese and Italian), they do not seem to be incorporated 
into national cuisine in the same way as in Hawaiʻi or Fiji.  
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The Cook Islands are reasonably agriculturally diverse, with a variety of tropical 
fruits and vegetables available. Seafood, including fish, clams and octopus, is also 
common. Food cooked in an umu (earth oven) is most commonly described as Cook 
Islands cuisine. However, this process is labour-intensive and does not actually represent 
a commonly consumed set of foodstuffs. Other iconic dishes include ika mata (raw fish 
with coconut milk and finely chopped vegetables marinated in citrus); curried eke 
(octopus in coconut curry); rukau (taro leaves with coconut cream); and poke (banana or 
pawpaw pudding made with coconut milk). 
Unlike in much of the Pacific, which views fruit as low-status snacks, the Cook 
Islands does not seem to have the same social stigmas for fresh fruits. This could possibly 
be seen as a sign of tourism promotion’s success in breaking the traditional stigma to 
support the paradise imagery of fruit. 
Tourism is extremely significant for the Cook Islands, and food is well 
represented in the tourism promotional materials. Various travel writers have described 
Cook Islands food in glowing terms including calling it a “food lover’s paradise” and in 
the “Top Ten List of International Food Destinations.”1035 This promotion is likely a 
significant part of the reason why conceptions of Cook Islands cuisine are so focused 
upon traditional-esque Polynesian cuisine. Cook Islands tourist focused marketing 
materials sell the islands as traditional paradises playing up the tropes of the exotic 
island. Thus, whilst many other cuisines are more widely available, and some can 
                                                 
1035 Pam Grout, “Cook Islands: A Food Lover’s Paradise,” The Daily Meal, April 16, 2013, 
http://www.thedailymeal.com/cook-islands-food-lover-s-paradise. 
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arguably be more important for daily life, there is a vested interest in maintaining 
traditional Polynesian cuisine as representative of the Cook Islands’ national cuisine. 
 Seafood is the most significant part of the Niuean cuisine. Fish, uga (coconut 
crabs), or crayfish are a key feature of most Niuean recipes. Ahi tuna, mahi-mahi, 
barracuda, and parrotfish are the most typically consumed. Uga is both highly iconic for 
Niue and widely desired but has become somewhat scarce and thus no longer eaten 
frequently. Interestingly, given the emphasis on seafood and despite a variety of edible 
seaweeds being present in Niue, they have apparently never been meaningfully 
consumed. Taro, papaya, coconut, banana, yam, cassava and breadfruit are also widely 
consumed as part of traditional style meals.  
What seems to most define Niuean cuisine is the source of the key ingredients. 
Though dishes like cream of crab soup and fish and chips are not traditional Niuean food, 
they have become a part of the national cuisine because they proudly feature Niuean 
seafood. Even restaurants like Kaiika Sushi & Gourmet Cuisine, which advertises 
“authentic Japanese cuisine”, are seen as Niuean in their focus on using premium locally 
caught fish.  
Taro, as in most of the Pacific, is seen as the highest status and most desirable 
starch. Yams and cassava, being much easier to grow, form a significant, but less desired 
portion of daily traditional style starch consumption. Papaya and bananas are very low-
status foods and are mostly consumed raw by tourists and children. However, a cooked 
papaya, coconut and taro casserole, Takihi, form what can be described as Niue’s 
national dish. As one of the few uniquely Niuean foods, Takihi is very iconic. It blends 
together several classic island flavours in a distinct way.  
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Much of Niue’s food is imported. Canned beef and frozen chicken will be 
frequently incorporated into meals of otherwise largely traditional ingredients. Most fresh 
produce is imported, though local production can inconsistently supplement demand. 
Soda, chips and other high-calorie sugary foods are extremely common and widely 
consumed, though not seen as part of the Niuean cuisine.  
Food has not played a significant role in Niue tourism promotion, with a few 
recent exceptions of food festivals. There has been a notable lack of linkages between the 
tourism and agricultural sectors.1036 In fact, many guidebooks focus more on reassuring 
visitors that they will find something they want to eat rather than emphasising the quality 
or uniqueness of Niuean cuisine. This approach is beginning to shift. KaiNiue, a food 
festival started by the premier in 2014, is an event featuring prominent New Zealand 
chefs, designed to showcase the quality of Niuean foods.1037  
Fiji has considerable diversity in food consumption. Meals will regularly 
incorporate ingredients that span a number of cultures and have non-traditional origins. 
Even traditional Fijian diets were extremely diverse. What is likely most iconic of Fijian 
cuisine is its variety and the incorporation of ingredients from across the cultures of 
modern Fiji. Food provides a point of similarity within a national narrative full of 
differences. Through foods such as rice, cassava, coconut and curry, a culinary 
                                                 
1036 Evangeline Singh, Simon Milne, and John Hull, “Linkages between Tourism and Agriculture: 
Stakeholder Perspectives and Online Marketing and Promotion on the Island of Niue in the South Pacific,” 
in Tourism in Pacific Islands: Current Issues and Future Challenges, ed. Stephen Pratt and David Harrison 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2015). 
1037 Stephanie Holmes, “Tropical Feast at Niue Food Fest,” New Zealand Herald, July 13, 2016, sec. 
Travel, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/travel/news/article.cfm?c_id=7&objectid=11672852. 
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experience is shared by all peoples of Fiji. These foods, despite their origins, are 
consumed by everyone. Food in Fiji has become an area of the national identity in which 
it is possible for all people to be represented. 
Curries are perhaps the best example of incorporation within Fijian cuisine. In 
Fiji, a curry is essentially any meat or vegetable cooked in a spiced sauce. Curries are 
seen as Indian; however, everyone in Fiji eats them. Curries will incorporate a variety of 
local ingredients, with many variations. Curries can be either vegetarian or contain a 
protein. Chicken appears to be the most common; mutton and beef (by non-Hindus) are 
also popular. The curry may also contain coconut, mango and bananas. Coconut milk is a 
common ingredient for Fijian Indians who identify themselves as South Indian, as well as 
for native Fijians. Like most other meals, curries are generally served with a starch such 
as roti, rice or cassava. 
Each of the nations has established a de facto national cuisine. They incorporate 
the values of the nation in what they emphasise, and every time they are consumed they 
strengthen the nation’s identity This occurs even if when they are consumed, the person 
is not consciously aware of the meanings behind the food. Fiji and Hawaiʻi feature 
cuisines that are distinctive to the islands but incorporate the multitude of cultures that 
form the nation. Similarly, the Cook Islands and Niue have found a way to identify food 
as theirs, despite much of it being imported.  
6.14.2 Food Branding 
Food packages are frequently “flagged” with national symbols. This can include 
direct flagging with the nation’s flag, but also other representations of the nation such as 
stylised maps of the nation and prominent symbols. They are present with somewhat 
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different goals, both in products intended for domestic consumption and in products for 
export. For products intended for domestic consumption, this flagging can be used to 
signal authenticity and connection. In products intended for export markets, the 
symbolism may be intended as part of the marketing of the exoticness or otherwise 
desirability of the source nation. Increasingly, though, the symbolism is used to connect 
the product to the “homeland” for those living in diaspora.  
Niue does not have any significant locally manufactured food products. 
Harrington's Brewery in New Zealand does, however, brew a pale ale specifically for the 
Niuean market under the brand Kalaga (shout). A locally brewed Fiafia Lager was 
previously available in Niue. Government-owned Noni Niue has also been experimenting 
with bottled water for the export market. These products do not seem to have gained any 
meaningful market penetration in Niue with imports continuing to dominate shelf space. 
Niue does export a handful of small-scale agricultural commodities, most notably, taro. 
Niuean pink taro is considered one of the highest quality taros. Though it is known in 
Samoa as taro Niue and sold in New Zealand as Niuean pink taro, it is sold without any 
particular branding or marketing that would connect it to Niue beyond its species name. 
Niue also has small-scale vanilla, honey and noni production intended for export.  These 
products have such limited market reach that they mostly function as souvenirs for 
tourists rather than being meaningful in serving the domestic market or appealing to 
Niueans in diaspora.  
 In Hawaiʻi, a large number of food products are manufactured for both the local 
and export markets. Though these products are heavily branded with symbols of Hawaiʻi, 
the flag and the outline of the islands (both common national symbols on food elsewhere) 
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are largely absent. The hibiscus (the state flower) is heavily used. For example, Kauai 
Kookie, the most prominent Hawaiʻi cookie manufacturer, uses the hibiscus as its logo 
and decorates its boxes with it. Plumerias are also used in the branding of other Hawaiʻi 
food products. Aloha Shoyu, Hawaii’s largest and most iconic seller of sauces and 
vinegars, has a ring of plumerias around the label on each bottle. Many prominent brands 
use other iconic flowers and plants to decorate their packaging. These brands include 
Hawaiian Sun (a major beverage and syrup manufacturer); Hawaiian Springs (a 
significant water bottler); Mountain Apple Brands (a local grocery store brand); and 
Hawaiian Host (the most popular chocolate-covered macadamia brand).  
 An exception to these styles is Noh Foods of Hawaii's export-focused products. 
Noh is Hawaii’s primary seasoning company. Its products such as char siu powder and 
Hawaiian Iced Tea mix are widely exported. Along with Hawaiian Host macadamia nuts, 
they probably have the best global availability of any Hawaiʻi food product. Interestingly, 
Noh uses two logo variations. On its larger packages, sold almost exclusively in Hawaiʻi, 
they use their logo without the outline of the Hawaiian Islands. The rest of their product 
line includes the logo with the island outline.  
  The Cook Islands has virtually no locally manufactured food products outside of 
the beverage sector. The Cook Islands owned Pacific Springs sells bottled water and 
carbonated soft drinks under the Vaima and Vaiora brands. Though the Vaima bottled 
water brand dominates the Cook Islands market, Vaiora soft drinks are hard to find and 
do not appear to be widely consumed.  Both products, though, are strongly branded with 
symbols of the Cook Islands. The Vaiora bottle even has the slogan “the peoples [sic] 
drink”. Low sales numbers for Vaiora soft drinks have been attributed to higher 
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production costs than Coca-Cola products, because of a long-running improper 
application of tariffs to Coca-Cola products.1038 Matutu Brewery brews Mai-branded 
lager. The packaging bears a tapa-style pattern with the tagline “proudly brewed in the 
Cook Islands”. These beverages do seem to support everyday nationalism by subtly 
reminding consumers of where they are, though they have not yet reached the level of 
production needed for their effects to be fully felt. 
The Cook Islands exports some fruits and vegetables. However, despite some 
attempts at marketing a premium frozen fruit product, nearly all of the Cook Islands 
agricultural exports are sold as commodities without any meaningful island branding. The 
situation with fish in the Cook Islands is similar. The waters of the Cook Islands are 
home to some of the world’s most significant albacore tuna populations. Despite massive 
commercial fishing operations, the tuna is almost exclusively fished by foreign operators, 
processed in American Samoa, and exported without any Cook Islands branding. Until 
recently, the Cook Islands imported NZ$500,000 of fish, even though much of it was 
caught in Cook Islands waters.1039 The Minister for Marine Resources arranged with 
Starkist, the largest processor of Cook Islands fish, to establish a brand called Golden 
Tuna, which, in addition to serving the domestic market, would also be branded with 
Cook Islands labelling to help build a premium export market.1040 The packaging for 
Golden Tuna includes the Cook Islands ring of stars and is labelled “Cook Island Golden 
                                                 
1038 Ian Wishart, “Cola-Gate,” Investigate Magazine, January 23, 2013, Feb-March 2013 edition. 
1039 Ngariki Ngatae, “‘Golden Tuna’ Latest Export Venture for Government,” The Cook Islands 
Herald, March 21, 2012, http://www.ciherald.co.ck/articles/h615g.htm. 
1040 Ibid. 
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Tuna”. It appears that the brand has never managed to gain a meaningful domestic or 
export market share.  
Fiji has fairly significant domestic production of a variety of foods. These 
products often make heavy use of their “Fijianess” to sell the product. This can be seen 
most clearly in the ways in which soda is sold in Fiji, though it is present across many 
sectors and products.    
Three main brands (Coca-Cola, Pepsi and Sprint) are available in Fiji. Sprint is 
locally owned, and all three have local bottling plants. Coca-Cola has been available in 
Fiji since 1944. In 1972, Coca-Cola Amatil began local production. Coca-Cola for 
consumption within Fiji and Tonga is manufactured on the outskirts of Suva. Coca-Cola 
is often marketed in Fiji through the use of local imagery. The current can design for 
Coke features the word “bula” (used similarly to Hawaii's “aloha”) on the side. 
Advertisements often include scenes of the beach or iconic Fijian sites. Coca-Cola also 
markets its products as natural accompaniments to Fijian foods. Many eateries are 
decorated with posters advertising Coca-Cola products paired with popular local dishes, 
such as lolo with dalo, chicken curry or chow mein. The Coca-Cola fridge is a regular site 
at Fijian shops and eateries. Pepsi is bottled in Fiji by the Tappoo group. Despite 
extensive advertising and sports sponsorship, Pepsi products are much less popular than 
Coca-Cola products and are available only in a limited number of places. By their 
numerous sports sponsorships, they are able to pitch the message that buying Pepsi is part 
of supporting the national teams and, in turn, being Fijian. The Motibhai Group 
manufactures soft drinks under the brand "Sprint". These soft drinks are significantly 
cheaper than Coca-Cola or Pepsi products and are manufactured in Fiji by an Indo-Fijian 
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owned company. As the owners of the PET bottle manufacturing plant and many retail 
stores and restaurants, the Motibhai Group maintains a very high level of vertical 
integration and trades heavily on the resulting Fijianess of this integration. Marketing 
campaigns for Sprint reflect this uniqueness. Sprint soda marketing generally emphasises 
its localness. 
Food branding in the islands does not seem to be significantly focused on 
promoting authenticity, outside of the beverage sector. Though there may be considerable 
pride in local production, locally made products are not generally seen as preferable. 
Within the diasporas, however, there seems to be an increasing market for food made in 
the home nation. Nationalism in the Pasifika diaspora, however, remains a seriously 
understudied topic.     
6.14.3 Import Limitations 
As islands, all four nations face significant limitations and challenges related to 
food supply, particularly domestic production limitations and high import needs. These 
limitations create a situation in which dependency on other states is required. Though Fiji 
and possibly Hawaiʻi could theoretically increase domestic production such that they 
become no longer dependant on imports, market forces and consumer preferences render 
it unlikely. Niue’s and the Cook Islands’ small size and agricultural limitations would 
require fairly dramatic shifts in food consumption (essentially reverting back food choice 
by several decades) in order to obtain food independence and is thus similarly unlikely to 
occur. 
 All food imported into Niue must come either via infrequent container ship or by 
twice-weekly flights from New Zealand. A container ship sails from New Zealand to 
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Niue via Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and the Cook Islands, taking about three weeks to reach 
Niue. Any fresh goods must be sent by air. Theoretically, packaged food could be sent 
from any of the countries at which the ship stops. But beyond a few speciality items from 
Fiji, New Zealand is effectively the only food source for imported goods.  
 Though the Cook Islands has more selection for food imports, minimal 
competition means limited imported food choice. Cook Islands Trading Corporation 
(CITC) largely dominates the food import market. As the operator of both of the major 
supermarkets in Rarotonga and the primary restaurant/catering supplier, they largely 
determine what food products are going to be available in the Cook Islands.  
In addition to reasonable local production, both Fiji and Hawaiʻi import 
significant amounts of food from a variety of countries. Hawaiʻi receives several hundred 
cargo ships a year and Fiji similar numbers. There is also a large amount of air cargo 
transported to the islands. Fiji has direct cargo routes from the U.S., Asia, Australia and 
New Zealand. Thus, food will be imported from a variety of countries. As is typical with 
developing countries, a significant amount of the food is imported based upon current 
market conditions and shipping schedules rather than any sort of typical logistical pattern. 
It is not uncommon to see food coming from a variety of atypical countries. During my 
previous research, I found sodas imported from Papua New Guinea, jarred fruit salad 
from Sri Lanka and ketchup from Indonesia sold alongside products imported from 
typical Fijian suppliers, Australia, India, New Zealand and the U.S.  
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The vast majority of the food in Hawaiʻi is shipped from the U.S. West Coast, 
including food originating in Asia. Restrictions under the federal Jones Act1041 prevent 
foreign cargo vessels from profitably operating service directly to Hawaiʻi from Asia.1042 
Though there is significant cargo transported between Hawaiʻi and the rest of the South 
Pacific, food cargo does not appear to form a meaningful component. South Pacific 
brands are available only in speciality shops in Hawaiʻi, and Hawaiʻi-manufactured food 
has little presence in the shops of many South Pacific islands.  
6.14.4 Health Promotion Efforts 
 Many of the world’s most obese and overweight populations are in Oceania. The 
Cook Islands and Niue currently have the second-highest mean body mass index (BMI) 
(neighbouring Nauru is slightly higher).1043 In the Cook Islands, 81 per cent of the 
population is overweight, with over half considered obese, giving it the highest obesity 
                                                 
1041 The Jones Act requires that all goods transported between U.S. ports be transported on U.S. ships. 
Thus, while a foreign ship could stop in Hawaiʻi between Asia and the U.S., it would not be allowed to take 
on any additional cargo for transport between Hawaiʻi and its next U.S. port making the stop unprofitable. 
Some interpretations of the act would forbid foreign ships from stopping in Hawaiʻi and proceeding to 
another U.S. port without an intermediary foreign stop. 
1042 “Keeping up with the Jones Act,” Hawaii Business Magazine, August 5, 2012, 
http://www.hawaiibusiness.com/keeping-up-with-the-jones-act/. 
1043 World Health Organization, “Obesity,” 2016, http://www.who.int/topics/obesity/en/. 
 
 Though BMI is in many ways a clumsy measure of health risk, particularly since it fails to account 
for the Polynesian body type, the rates in each of these nations still greatly exceed the likely imprecision in 
BMI calculation. Fiji, for example, publishes slightly higher BMI numbers to be considered obese and 
overweight than the typically used numbers. Even with this adjustment, obesity and overweight percentages 
are still extremely high.  
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rate in the world.1044 Similarly, almost three-quarters of Niue’s population is overweight, 
and over 40 per cent is obese. Fiji has a lower obesity rate of 36.4%, but 78.2% of the 
population is overweight.1045 Hawaiʻi has rather low overweight and obesity percentages 
for the U.S. (56.4 and 22.7 per cent, respectively).1046 Nevertheless, there is considerable 
variation across ethnic groups. Many groups (particularly Hawaiians and other 
Polynesians) have high overweight and obesity rates comparable to the rest of the 
Pacific.1047 The obesity rate has also climbed dramatically over the past few decades. In 
addition to the other health concerns of obesity, diabetes related to diet has been 
described as one of the top concerns for health officials in each nation.  
Many of these health problems are directly connected to globalisation and 
colonialism. Imported food has replaced many of the traditional foodstuffs with higher-
calorie, highly processed items. These foods have become socially desirable, particularly 
amongst children. Similarly, in some Pacific islands cultural values favour larger body 
types as a symbol of power and wealth; an outlook slow to change. There are also 
traditions of celebratory feasting for many life events. Desirable unhealthy foods have 
become accessible to wider populations, shifting them from occasionally consumed to 
regularly consumed. Changes in job functions have further reduced exercise that used to 
                                                 
1044 World Health Organization, “Obesity.” 
1045 Ibid. 
1046 CDC, Overweight and Obesity, 2012, 
http://origin.glb.cdc.gov/obesity/stateprograms/fundedstates/pdf/South-Carolina-State-Profile.pdf. 
1047 John A. Burns School of Medicine - Department of Native Hawaiian Health, “PILI ‘OHANA,” 
PILI ‘Ohana, accessed December 5, 2016, http://www2.jabsom.hawaii.edu/pili/about.html. 
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balance traditionally high-carbohydrate meals. These factors, along with several other 
locally specific issues, have created a significant problem for most of the region.  
Though approached as a public health problem, the solutions have significant 
implications for nationalism. A major trend favours local traditional foods in an attempt 
to combat obesity. Local food can serve as an “identity marker”.1048 Consuming it helps 
promote a sense of cultural identity and self-sufficiency, and with it build the nation. 
Although some, particularly in Hawaiʻi, have intentionally tried to shape it for 
nationalistic goals, much of it is seemingly unintentional under public health efforts. 
Niue’s Ministry of Health has been implementing a multipart strategy to target 
obesity and diabetes. This plan aims to encourage people to limit their consumption of 
imported foods and refocus on eating traditional foods. The ministry operates educational 
campaigns to promote these goals in the schools and for the general public, including a 
community cookbook of healthy Niuean recipes. Given a lack of other cookbooks, this 
could easily become the defining representation of Niuean national cuisine. There is also 
a push to encourage Niueans to eat more fruit. Though fruit is reasonably plentiful, there 
are social stigmas related to its consumption; many fruits are seen as a food of last resort. 
Eating a raw papaya would be something done only by children or with shame by the 
poor. Tourist consumption has somewhat increased its acceptability, but it still remains a 
                                                 
1048 Michael Curtis, “The Obesity Epidemic in the Pacific Islands,” Journal of Development and 
Social Transformation, 2009, 
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/moynihan/dst/curtis5.pdf?n=3228. 
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source of amusement for many that tourists find them desirable. Coconut water sees a 
similar pattern.  
The efforts by the Ministry of Health in Niue are interesting in light of the fact 
that they are primarily funded by the New Zealand government. In effect, the New 
Zealand government is paying for efforts to reduce the consumption of New Zealand 
made imported foods and also attempts to further define Niue’s identity as distinct.  
The Cook Islands Ministry of Health has for some time attempted to encourage 
healthier eating to combat obesity. However, it does not appear to have any significant 
current campaigns.  
Fiji’s Ministry of Health’s recommendations for food and health strongly promote 
eating locally and avoiding food “sold in brightly coloured packets”.1049 Fairly unique 
amongst nutrition guidelines, their guidelines also advocate growing food at home. All of 
the food shown in the guidelines are foods that are strongly identified with Fiji. This 
includes both foods that are traditionally associated with Fiji like taro and coconut, as 
well as later additions like ghee and rices. 
The guidelines for schools feature healthy meals representative of Fijian cuisine, 
such as “fish and green leaves in lolo with cassava”; “chicken curry with rice and 
cucumber”; and “chicken or egg fried rice with vegetables”.1050 Notably absent from their 
                                                 
1049 World Health Organization, Ministry of Health, and National Food and Nutrition Centre. ‘Food & 
Health Guidelines for Fiji’. Food and Agriculture Organization, March 2013. http://www.fao.org/3/a-
as883e.pdf. 
1050 National Food and Nutrition Centre, “School Canteen Guidelines Summary,” Consumer Council 
of Fiji, accessed December 5, 2016, 
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recommendations are any of the meals thought of as Western (fish and chips, sandwiches, 
etc.). Beef and pork are also absent both for health reasons and to be applicable across 
Fiji’s population.1051  
The Ministry of Health’s guidelines are clearly built with Fiji in mind, rather than 
being simply an adaptation of another nation’s or FAO/WHO recommendations. As such 
they promote foods that strengthen the Fijian identity and national cuisine in a way that 
many Pacific island states have only recently started to do.  
The Hawaiʻi governmental structure has meant a different style of approach to 
nutrition policy. The Hawaiʻi Department of Health has focused on general healthy eating 
and exercise advice through its “Healthy Hawaii Initiative”. The campaign, though 
featuring some photos that are clearly in Hawaiʻi, has virtually nothing that is Hawaiʻi 
specific. Its food suggestions show no awareness of Hawaii’s cuisine or food options and 
could be unnoticeably interchanged with any other U.S. state’s. School lunches for state-
run schools in Hawaii follow the federal U.S.DA school lunch guidelines, limiting the 
ability to adapt them to Hawaii’s foodways. Nevertheless, school lunches often do reflect 
local taste. Rice is served in some form most days. Most schools serve it daily for either 
breakfast, lunch or alternate lunch. Further, Hawaiʻi entrees such as kalua pork, chicken 
katsu, teriyaki beef, Portuguese sausage (for breakfast), and shoyu chicken/turkey are 
regularly appearing. Pineapple also appears more frequently than in non-Hawaiʻi schools. 
                                                 
http://www.consumersfiji.org/upload/Campaigns/marketing%20of%20Junk%20Food/Summary%20Cantee
n%20Guidelines.pdf. 
1051 Ibid. 
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The Hawaii Department of Education’s School Food Services Branch manages food 
services for all public schools in Hawai‘i and does all purchasing as a single entity.1052 
This model means that with demand for local food exceeding supply, despite public 
support, little food for Hawaiʻi schools is locally grown or produced.1053  
 Nongovernmental efforts to encourage Hawaiʻi-specific dietary change saw some 
highly significant early successes but have since lost much of their momentum. One of 
the most meaningful of these efforts was a study in Waianae conducted in 1991.1054 In 
this study, Hawaiians were provided with a diet of foods that were available pre-Western 
contact.1055 They were encouraged to eat as much as they wished, as the food was low in 
fat and calories.1056 Adherence to the diet was extremely high; feelings of cultural pride 
were credited with this success.1057 Across the initial three weeks, participants lost an 
average of 1.6 kg (3.5 lbs).1058 A follow-up study in 1999 found a sustained weight loss 
average of 6.8 kg (15.1 lbs).1059 Despite this success, since then most efforts have been 
smaller, targeting eating local.  
                                                 
1052 The Kohala Center, “Local Foods in Hawai‘i’s Schools,” September 2015, 
http://kohalacenter.org/docs/reports/2015_LocalFoodHawaiiSchools.pdf. 
1053 Ibid. 
1054 Curtis, “The Obesity Epidemic in the Pacific Islands.” 
1055 Ibid. 
1056 Ibid. 
1057 Ibid. 
1058 Ibid. 
1059 Ibid. 
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The message of a return to more traditional foods has become a part of the 
undercurrent of sovereignty activism and cultural revitalisation in Hawaiʻi. Food is used 
as a symbol of resistance to the occupiers and as a part of the formation of the identity of 
the sovereign nation. Food has a historical role in Hawaii as a “cultural symbol of 
alliance-building and loyalty, celebration and spiritual reverence”.1060 It is because of this 
role that food has become a tool of resistance within the Hawaiian sovereignty 
movement. Sovereignty activists have described the Hawaiian nation as a “people who 
make their livelihood from the land and the sea”.1061 A return to Hawaiian food and an 
escape from the oppression of a supermarket-oriented food distribution system have 
become key parts of the goals of rebuilding the Hawaiian nation. Direct action, however, 
has been typically treated as a low-priority item. Small-scale attempts at promoting 
traditional foodways serve as the major representation.  
6.14.5 Biodiversity 
 There have been some attempts at promoting traditional edible plants in the region 
as a way to ensure continuing biodiversity. These efforts typically focus on encouraging 
education regarding traditional practices in growing and harvesting culturally significant 
plants. The Secretariat of the Pacific Community has organised a number of these 
                                                 
1060 RaeDeen Keahiolalo-Karasuda, “A Genealogy of Punishment in Hawaiÿi: The Public Hanging of 
Chief Kamanawa II,” Hulili: Multidisciplinary Research on Well-Being 6 (2010): 147–167. 
1061 Jocelyn S. Linnekin, “Defining Tradition: Variations on the Hawaiian Identity,” American 
Ethnologist, 1983, 241–252. 
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programs for the region including their fairly successful root crops program.1062 Though 
these programs are not explicitly designed to have a nationalist message, like with 
nutrition policy, they will often serve to support nationalist causes. Within Hawaiʻi, 
working on the taro crops have become integrated within other cultural promotion efforts 
and sovereignty activism. A moral component has emerged wherein by supporting 
traditional local plants, you are supporting local cultural values and fighting the 
devaluation of local foods.1063 
6.15 Conclusions 
 Hawai‘i, as expressed through everyday nationalism, creates an unusual situation. 
Across a wide variety of areas of daily life, it is treated as distinct from the United States. 
Simultaneously, it is not operating as a sovereign nation. It is an undeniable reality that 
the U.S. continues to maintain control of the islands and the world remains largely 
content with this status despite the efforts of activists.    
 Fiji is one of a growing number of nations in which everyday nationalism is being 
intentionally shaped to promote a desired vision of the nation. The government’s efforts 
to promote a unified Fijian nation are highly significant. Interestingly, these now 
intentional efforts actually fit the way in which everyday nationalism was expressed prior 
to government's attempt reasonably well. Furthermore, their multi-part efforts to 
                                                 
1062 Nancy J. Pollock, “Diversification of Foods and Their Values:: Pacific Foodscapes,” in Tides of 
Innovation in Oceania, Value, Materiality and Place (ANU Press, 2017), 261–94, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1rfsrtb.15. 
1063 Ibid.  
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eliminate areas that are contrary to a message of unity seem to be occurring with 
moderate success.  
  Niue’s and the Cook Islands’ expressions of national identity seem to largely 
reinforce the idea that they are in fact independent nations. There is little within the 
everyday life in the islands that would indicate otherwise. Though both face struggles 
similar to that of other very small island states, they are prospering with distinct 
identities.    
 Across a number of areas of daily life, these four nations see their identities 
reproduced.  Little thought about mundane areas, such as that of customs and 
immigration, air travel, and shipping, all clearly reflect and reinforce the nation. Even the 
vague sense of foreignness and the distance travelled can strengthen this idea. The effects 
of everyday nationalism on the nation’s identity are, however, most clearly felt within 
sport, music, and food.  
 Sport provides a clear way in which nations can compete with each other where 
simply the fact that they are competing as a nation against another nation reinforces their 
identity. Though only the Cook Islands and Fiji participate in the Olympics, all four 
nations compete under their own banner as a nation regularly. They are able to repeatedly 
show who they are and what they represent.  
 Music is another area in which the nation is built, often without conscious 
thought. Music has played a big role in sharing what the nation represents. It is a fairly 
inoffensive way to express ideas that might be rejected in other settings. The casual 
acceptance and incorporation of other ethnic group’s music in Fiji or the widespreadness 
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listenership to Hawaiian protest music has done more to shape the nation's identity than 
what any nationalist could achieve through traditional approaches.      
Food is increasingly an area of nationalistic concern. Throughout the four nations, 
the efforts toward returning to a traditional diet are nutritionally sound, but largely 
unrealistic unless it can be strongly paired with nationalistic identity efforts. Traditional 
foods lack the variety to which Pacific Islanders have become accustomed. They are 
generally low fat and low sugar (though relatively salt heavy) but rely on limited flavours 
for seasoning. Many traditional foodstuffs are also fairly labour intensive to produce and 
are poorly suited to factory farming methods. Should people manage to actually return to 
a traditional diet, we would likely see massive improvements in the obesity rates. 
However, given human’s biological urges for salt, sugar and fat, it is hard to convince 
people to abandon the cheap and plentiful world of unhealthy manufactured food. By 
incorporating nationalistic messages, health promotion efforts call upon powerful forces 
of nation and belonging in an attempt to defeat the biological urges. These efforts also 
simultaneously strengthen the nation by establishing a pro-nation officially endorsed 
representation of everyday nationalism. The health promotion efforts are still, relatively 
speaking, in their infancy. We need much more time and data to determine if it is, in fact, 
possible for nationalism to be used with success in such a way as is being tried.     
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Chapter 7 
7 Conclusions 
There are a number of surprising absences within the four nations’ expressions of 
nationalism, particularly when looked at using a traditional hot nationalism model. This 
approach to nationalism would expect to see Hawaiʻi, the Cook Islands and Niue engaged 
in a fiercely contested struggle for full independence, whilst Fiji would be in the midst of 
ethnic conflict and unrest. This is not, however, the case. Further, through all four are 
small island nations in the same region, there is considerable diversity in the ways in 
which nationalism is actually expressed.  
Hawaii’s sovereignty movement, though fairly active, is surprisingly disorganised 
in tactics and desired outcomes. Few of the hallmarks of sovereignty struggles, at least as 
exists in the popular imagination, can be seen in Hawaiʻi. There is no militant wing, no 
mass protests, nor even any particularly notable icons of the struggle. The symbols of 
resistance are few and subtle. There has not been a politically viable pro-independence 
political party in decades, and the last referendum on its status was held over fifty years 
ago. Nevertheless, there is a very active movement with widespread support.      
The movement, though united on the core issue that the overthrow of the 
Kingdom of Hawaiʻi was wrong, agrees on little else. There have been several models for 
handling the wrong of the overthrow proposed, but most contradict each other. Further, 
while each group has tried a variety of methods, iconic tools of hot nationalism such as 
armed resistance and mass nationalist protests are largely absent. Armed resistance was 
last meaningfully tried in 1895 and protests whilst common, are almost never directly 
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about core nationalist topics, but rather indirect issues such as land usage or 
environmental impact.  
   The lack of a meaningful counter-sovereignty movement in Hawaiʻi is also 
significant. Given the activity level of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement, it would be 
expected that we would see meaningful opposition or, if there is not actually any 
opposition, sovereignty would be expected. 
For Niue and the Cook Islands, the minimalism of hot nationalism is remarkable. 
Though many nations like to believe that they have evolved beyond hot nationalism with 
hot nationalism being a thing that happens in other less developed nations, an actual 
absence of hot nationalism is rare. Today, neither nation has seen much that is typically 
expected in terms of nationalistic sentiment. Though both have well defined national 
identities and a widespread undeniable pride in their nation, symbols of the nation are 
typically understated.   
Fiji is surprising in the relative peacefulness its nationalist driven displays have 
had. It seems in many ways to be completely set up for serious nationalistic conflict. It 
has a large politically weak minority population who wields disproportionate economic 
dominance. Its military is fairly large for its population and has had limited oversight and 
control by civilian leadership. Though there have been four coups in the last few decades, 
no shots were fired in overthrowing the government, and the three military coups saw no 
fatalities. Even within the civilian-led coup in 2000, the coup proper saw only a handful 
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of fatalities1064. During the two 1987 coups and the 2000 coup, there was also serious, 
though brief, rioting mostly targeting Indo-Fijians and their property. Though clearly 
present, violence has been minimal, and displays of divisive hot nationalism have been 
fairly brief. When compared to other nations, Fiji’s coups have been remarkably low in 
violence. Additionally, despite the coups and discriminatory policies, there is a surprising 
lack of Indo-Fijian nationalism. 
There is also a seemingly strange pattern within several of these nations in which 
efforts to promote sovereignty and independence is being funded by the party that they 
are working against. Most directly this can be observed within the Office of Hawaiian 
Affairs. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs is a semi-autonomous state agency which has 
actively worked to promote Hawaiian sovereignty. If it were to accomplish its goals, it 
would result in the dissolution of itself and the government of which it is a part. 
Similarly, the University of Hawaiʻi typically takes a rather pro-sovereignty position 
whilst again being primarily state and federally funded. Within Niue and the Cook 
Islands, a large percentage of government funds are coming from New Zealand foreign 
aid. As a result, government efforts to strengthen their national identity and distance 
themselves from New Zealand are being funded by New Zealand.  
                                                 
1064 There is considerable disagreement about how to count the number of deaths within the 2000 
coup. During the coup, a security officer suffered a heart attack fleeing an angry crowd, and a police officer 
was shot by coup supporters. A mutiny within the military’s Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit several 
months after the coup saw four mutinying soldiers beaten to death by loyal soldiers. Beyond these, there are 
another ten fatalities that have much more distant connections to the coup that some choose to include in 
the coup’s death count.  
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7.1 Nationalism in Small States 
 Nevertheless, and despite their small size, nationalism is present in each of the 
four nations. Even in the extreme example of Niue, there still is a pride in the nation and 
a sense of comradery and nationhood that is at its core indistinguishable from larger 
nations.  
7.1.1 Effect of Small Numbers 
One of the characteristics of nationalism in small states most directly connected to 
its small size is the disproportionate effect a handful of people can have. The difference 
in many small island states between an active nationalist movement and a minimal one 
can be as small as the time availability and motivation of a couple of people. For 
example, within Niue, the fact that a newspaper exists is because of the work of one 
person. Particularly in the case of hot nationalism, we must be careful to not over 
attribute importance to its absence or presence. The appearance or absence in a small 
state could be the work of an extremely tiny number of people and cannot be said to truly 
represent the nation’s sentiments. At the same time, though, care must also be taken to 
recognise the effect a few persuasive individuals can have. In general, though, for small 
states, everyday nationalism seems to be much more representative of the nation’s 
identity.   
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7.1.2 Economic Development 
All of the nations in this dissertation are somewhere in the middle of most 
development indexes. Hawaiʻi1065 is the most developed economically in the region and 
does acceptably on most human development metrics. The Cook Islands is set to move to 
developed country status in late 2018 under the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) listing methodology. This places it with most of Western 
Europe. Though it is set to graduate, many remain very concerned because it is right on 
the edge. Niue and Fiji remain in the upper-middle-income list. Though there are some 
development challenges due to geographic factors1066,  they have reasonable average 
incomes and standards of living in much of the nation.  
                                                 
1065 Hawaiʻi is hard to classify under typical development metrics. It has the highest life expectancy in 
the US, but below average school enrollment, educational achievement and infrastructure. Hawaiʻi has a 
middle of the US median income level, but one of the highest costs of living and with it one of the lowest 
purchasing power rates in the US. As a result, when adjusted for purchasing power, Hawaiʻi is one of the 
poorest states in the US. It also has by far the highest rate of homelessness and income inequality in the US. 
Thus, whilst it is more developed than any of the other island nations in the region, it is not fully reaching 
the standards that being a part of the US would suggest. 
1066 Both the Cook Islands and Fiji have some difficulty providing services to some of the more 
sparsely populated remote islands which skews developmental metrics. There are also issues with the 
typical measures of development when applied to many Pacific island states. Many of these metrics do not 
accurately reflect the quality of life in the region, encouraging comparisons to states where conditions are 
in fact much worse for the people. Water access is a good example of this effect. In much of Oceania, 
access to improved water supplies falls short of most desired metrics. However, unlike in much of the 
world, the unimproved water supplies are often of reasonable quality. So whilst by typical development 
metrics a person in Oceania who has access to an acceptable quality unimproved water source (such as a 
clean stream) is seen as in the same situation as a person in sub-Saharan Africa whose primary water 
supply is contaminated, scarce, or requires a great distance to access.  
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It seems likely that the development levels of each nation may be having a 
moderating effect on the ways in which nationalism is expressed.  For most people living 
within these nations, despite the challenges, the status quo is working fairly well for 
them. They lack the motivation for radical change. Many past independence movements 
were largely motivated by a frustration with the administration and a belief that daily life 
could be much better as an independent state. When there is little to lose and much to 
gain, it becomes easier to back hot nationalism. In contrast, nationalists within the nations 
of this paper have much less to promise. Improvements that changing statuses can 
provide are fairly minimal and would likely cause considerable turmoil. The Cook 
Islands and Niue gain considerably from their relationship with New Zealand and would 
face a much more difficult economic situation if they were to end the free association. 
For Hawaiʻi, there is a considerable lack of popular support for meaningful changes to 
the situation. The time since the overthrow has meant significant changes to 
demographics, a near complete loss of the pre-overthrow governance infrastructure and 
the development of an economy that heavily utilises its connection to the U.S. Despite 
popular support for addressing the wrongs of the overthrow, disruptions to the status quo 
are largely unwelcome. 
7.1.3 Tourism 
The value of tourism to these small island nations provides a powerful motivator 
to maintain a specific public image of the nation. Traditional models suggest that within 
the types of tourism island nations typically see, tourists demand a nation that is suitably 
exotic, but also simultaneously familiar and unintimidating. Particularly for the “standard 
island” tourist, they want a relaxing, peaceful place with the complexities of conflicting 
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national identities hidden. They don’t want to see protests or other displays of hot 
nationalism. They view their trip as an escape from the cares of the world, not a time to 
contemplate colonial legacies. This creates a very powerful economic motivator to push 
aside any exhibitions of nationalism that do not meet these values. As a result, the 
colonial legacy issues in Fiji and the sovereignty struggle of Hawaiʻi rarely receive the 
attention of other similar concerns do in other less tourism-dependent locales.  
These fears of lost tourism income are not without merit. The coups in Fiji have 
seen direct costs in the millions from tourism declines in the immediate aftermath of each 
coup. The indirect costs are staggering with most estimates showing that Fiji has still not 
regained its tourism momentum from the losses caused by the 1987 coups.  
 The importance of tourism could, at least in part, explain the minimalism of hot 
nationalism in these nations. On a number of occasions, primarily in Fiji and Hawaiʻi, the 
government has worked to hide issues from world attention if they would be harmful to 
the tourism image.  
7.2 Academia and the Legal System in Modern 
Nationalism 
 There has been a noticeable refocusing within nationalism on the academic and 
legal spheres. Unlike in many past nationalist movements where academia was seen as 
out of touch or the enemy, they are increasingly recognising the utility of academia in 
promoting the cause.  
Several Hawaiian sovereignty activists have earned graduate degrees for with a  
dissertation that serves as a treatise on their subject of activism. Though their works are 
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primarily legal arguments, the vast majority are earning their degrees in disciplines other 
than law and often present arguments that are at best fringe interpretations of legal 
theory. Nevertheless, it has been an extremely effective strategy for gaining legitimacy 
and support for their causes. A number of them have also been able to utilise their 
degrees to gain positions within the colleges from which they can promote their pro-
sovereignty message to a receptive audience.             
In Fiji, many nationalists have used global academic discussions on indigenous 
rights and postcolonialism to justify pro-iTaukei positions. Even when inapplicable, the 
ability to connect their cause to a larger generally well-received body of scholarship has 
been very useful. Niue and the Cook Islands occasionally see similar, though often less 
well received (given the benefits of the free association), connections between local 
discussions and the larger academic focus.    
There is also growing attention on gaining formal skills and developing local academic 
materials that strengthen the culture and the nation (primarily through areas of everyday 
nationalism).      
Nationalists have increasingly been paying close attention to discussions of 
sovereignty and independence from an international law perspective. An increasingly 
common nationalist tool is to present an argument of why their nation should be 
considered a legally sovereign nation, despite practical realities. No longer content with 
vague arguments of the illegality of past conquest, nationalists today will often argue that 
their nation continues to exist today as an occupied state. Convoluted arguments 
regarding flaws in the instrument of annexation or conquest will be paired with selective 
application of international law and misunderstandings (intentional or otherwise) of legal 
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technicalities to build an argument for sovereignty. Though many of the arguments have 
some legal basis, they typically ignore all contrary facts, issues of jurisdiction, basic legal 
theory and often common sense. They are also often exceptionally self-serving in 
requiring fairly large leaps to explain why they (and usually they alone) are the rightful 
successor to the past state. Despite the deficiencies of the legal approaches, they are 
amazingly popular at gaining popular support. Within nations that feature reasonably 
functional legal systems people typically expect justice to prevail. Nationalists sell their 
approaches as clear-cut legal arguments in which they could only lose if the law is 
ignored. They conveniently neglect issues of political will, the fact that most of what they 
are asking for is either logically impossible or not a legal question, and subtleties of law 
and procedure. In this way, even in their losses, they are able to present it as an example 
of continued oppression and when they have their minor legal successes, as full 
vindication of their approach. The effect of this approach thus lies more within its ability 
to shift the popular opinion then it does the law.  
7.3 Everyday Nationalism 
The prevalence of everyday nationalism appears to be the most significant feature 
of the ways in which nationalism is expressed in these small island nations. Traditional 
hot nationalism, for a variety of nation-specific reasons, does not seem to gain much of a 
foothold in these nations. Even the expanded form of hot nationalism described in chapter 
five largely lack the intensity typically expected. In contrast, everyday nationalism seems 
to be an ever-present part of life in these four nations.  
Everyday nationalism provides a way to explain the clear presence of the nation 
and its symbols in many small nations, despite fairly minimal hot nationalist 
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presentations. Across a variety of spaces, everyday nationalism is a clear part of daily life 
in these nations. Even many banal practical decisions such as naming streets or arranging 
airports can serve to strengthen an image of the nation. Though it has traditionally been 
thought to be the result of mostly unconscious decisions, areas of everyday nationalism 
are increasingly being shaped by activists with clear nationalist agendas. Even in areas 
which are not directly being targeted by activists, there is an overall sense of the nation 
that is often intentionally shaped by activists.   
Nutrition policy provides one of the strongest examples of the increasingly 
conscious, though sometimes indirect shaping of everyday nationalism. Whilst the 
projects are typically presented as a way to address the alarmingly high obesity rates 
found across the islands, the proposed solution has been a nation affirming return to 
traditional foodways. It allows for a stronger nation through an improved sense of 
cultural identity and self-sufficiency. Despite its powerful, but subtle, effect on 
nationalism, food is often treated as a minor concern for nationalists. 
 Other areas of everyday nationalism can be clearly observed within the four 
nations. Sport and music have long been favourites for looking at everyday nationalism. 
The ways in which sporting competitions are set up, as well as how music is performed, 
can be very indicative of the popular conceptions of their nation. Similarly, there are a 
number of extremely banal areas that have powerful impacts on the identity of the nation. 
Airport layouts, customs and immigration procedures and even currency can show the 
ways in which a nation’s citizen accept their nation.  
In looking across the nations of this study, it becomes very evident that the ways 
in which nationalism are expressed have clearly changed, particularly within small more 
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developed countries. Though they have not faded away completely, traditional hot 
nationalism is becoming uncommon for these nations. As Billig notes, the fiery, in-your-
face style nationalism will turn into much subtler forms of nationalism within established 
nations. However, it's not just established nations that have seen this transition. Even 
within nations like Hawaiʻi, which have an active sovereignty movement, classic hot 
nationalism has faded away to more subtle forms. Further, as these expressions of 
nationalism disappear, and everyday nationalism comes to dominate, we see that it is no 
longer the extremists promoting a nationalist agenda, but rather a commonplace part of 
daily life.  
7.4 Factors that Affect the Type and Intensity of 
Nationalism 
 In looking at the four nations, a number of factors have emerged that can in-part 
explain the variance in nationalism seen across the four nations. Unlike hot nationalism, 
everyday nationalism does not lend itself well to measures of amounts of nationalism or 
intensity. As a tool for describing what is arguably ever present within a nation, it is 
nearly impossible to compare levels of everyday nationalism between nations. Where the 
differences seem to emerge is within the levels of visibility of it and the clarity of the 
message it promotes. Similarly, the level of awareness of it and the organised attempts to 
affect it seem to vary as well in a somewhat measurable way. Hot nationalism has been 
most noticeable in Hawaiʻi and Fiji, whilst its presence in the Cook Islands has been 
limited and is mostly historic. Beyond a minimal amount of nationalistic energy 
surrounding independence, Niue seems to have virtually no hot nationalism. Everyday 
nationalism is present and significant in all four nations. Within Hawaiʻi its role in 
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shaping and reinforcing Hawaii’s unique identity is clear, and it is often consciously 
manipulated by a variety of activists. Fiji has seen everyday nationalism become a core 
component of the government's agenda. The expressions of everyday nationalism are less 
explicit in the Cook Islands and Niue but have a noticeable effect on the nations’ identity. 
Whilst there is no clear single cause for the differences in nationalism between the 
nations, the following eight factors seem to have a meaningful effect.         
7.4.1 Population Size 
 One of the largest differences in nationalism between the four nations seems to be 
an effect of population size. The two larger nations see much greater expressions of hot 
nationalism and even more visible displays everyday nationalism, then do the two smaller 
nations. Globally, larger nations will generally be the sites of intense hot nationalism with 
examples in smaller nations much rarer.  
As previously mentioned, population size may also serve as a proxy for capacity 
to enact nationalist agendas. Small nations will often lack the resources (both economic 
and personnel) to devote too much focus to any single cause. The members of the nation 
may share a similar bond with their nation and feel as much passion as a larger nation, 
but simply be unable to recruit enough people to get their movement going.      
Whilst there is a lack of systematic research exploring the effects of nation size on 
types of nationalism, it seems, that even outside the region, small nations do not typically 
display much hot nationalism. With the exception of a handful of nations with disputed 
territory (such as Gibraltar, New Caledonia and Western Sahara), hot nationalism has 
been very rare in small nations. This may indicate a lack of capacity (hot nationalism 
requires organisation and resources that may be problematic for small nations), external 
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pressures, or a lack of public acceptance for the methods of hot nationalism. Members of 
smaller nations will generally have more bonds that extend beyond just the nation, which 
can inhibit hot nationalism. Further, the othering that often accompanies hot nationalism 
is less necessary and less possible given the small numbers and frequently the high levels 
of cultural and racial homogeneity. There is likewise a lack of anonymity in small 
nations. Unpopular radicalism is hard to sustain when the actors are known to one 
another and are subject to familiar and community pressures.  
 
  
7.4.2 Political Structure 
All four nations are essentially democracies. Whilst each has had some issues, 
they all currently have representative governments featuring inclusive free and fair 
elections and have had so for some time1067. Though there are notable exceptions, hot 
nationalism seems to be most intense either as a precursor to or during authoritarian rule. 
Whilst democratic societies are by no means immune from hot nationalism, intense hot 
nationalism does seem to be less common.        
The inclusion of nationalist parties within the governance process seems also to 
have an effect. The Cook Islands’ and Niue’s1068 ruling parties are nationalistic, allowing 
                                                 
1067 Though Fiji has not reliably respected the democratic process, its elections have been largely 
without issue and a democratic government has been maintained as the ideal with variances minimal.  
1068 Niue’s only party was dissolved in 2003, but prior to its dissolution, it was nationalistic. Though 
all officially independent, Niue’s elected officials still commonly run on values similar to that of the 
previous party.    
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the energy of nationalism to find a space within the government. In Fiji, whilst civic 
nationalism is embraced by the ruling FijiFirst party, other forms of nationalism have not 
been accepted. Hawaiʻi currently lacks any politically viable nationalistic party. It 
functions as a two-party system1069 with neither party taking much of a stance on 
nationalism. The last significant nationalist political party, the Hawaiian Independent 
Party (later renamed the Independent Home Rule Party) dissolved in 19141070. The 
intensity of hot nationalism within these four nations may be correlated with the 
opportunity for nationalists to participate in the political process. The lack of political 
inclusion for Hawaiian nationalism could be part of the reason Hawaiian nationalists have 
embraced other approaches, including the occasional expression of traditional hot 
nationalism. 
It seems that the incorporation of nationalistic political values can potentially 
allow other expressions of hot nationalism to fade. Following the argument Billig 
described as common for more developed nations, hot nationalism is merely a tool to 
deploy in the fight for the nation’s identity whilst it is being formed. Once the battle is 
over, and a government that allows nationalists to have political power is formed, they 
have no need to keep employing the intensity of hot nationalism. People often perceive 
                                                 
1069 Though both the Hawaii Republican Party and Democratic Party of Hawaii field candidates in 
most races, Republican candidates are rarely elected effectively creating a one-party system. Currently, 
only five of the 51 representatives in the Hawaii House of Representatives are Republicans. Democrats 
have dominated state government since 1962. 
1070 The Aloha ʻĀina Party was established in 2015 as a Hawaiʻi nationalist party. Though the most 
viable Hawaiʻi developed third party, it has repeatedly failed to secure the required 750 verified signatures 
to be considered an official political party in Hawai'i. 
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nationalism to be the domain of radicals but will accept it as a necessary part of the 
construction of their nation. Whilst we can clearly see that nationalism does not go away, 
the intensity does seem to fade.          
7.4.3 Civil Society 
With allotments made for their size, all four nations have fairly strong civil 
societies and reasonably free presses. There are a number of non-governmental 
organisations in each nation that work to serve the interests of the public and operate 
largely independent of the government. Whilst none of the four nations have especially 
great track records towards human rights, most citizens in these nations can expect to 
have their rights respected in daily life. Freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly 
are generally possible1071, and political participation is common. News media is closely 
interwoven into daily life and is generally respected. As such, any expressions of hot 
nationalism must be seen as a disruption to daily life.  Nevertheless, the people are free to 
express their conception of the nation with minimal governmental restriction. Nationalists 
have limited ability to justify nationalistic resistance, and similarly, the government has 
no need to use nationalism to support otherwise unpopular actions.   
                                                 
1071 Fiji in particularly has a somewhat spotty record in regards to respecting these rights. Since the 
lifting of the 2009 Public Emergency Regulations, there has been considerable improvement. The 2010 
Media Industry Development Decree still, however, remains in effect which allows for penalties for 
reporting that is against the “public interest or public order”. Though occasionally threatened, under the 
current administration, rights to political speech including criticising the government is generally respected.   
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7.4.4 Perceived Threats 
 Nationalism can often be seen quite strongly in response to a situation that is 
perceived as a threat to the nation. Nationalists will often frame issues as needing 
extreme action in order to protect the nation from threats outside the nation or from those 
who do not represent the values of the nation. To sustain or justify the extreme action, the 
rhetoric of the nation under attack must be continuously deployed. Whilst the threat is 
often overstated or occasionally completely fabricated, the threat has to seem plausible.   
 None of the nations of this dissertation has much that can be spun by nationalists 
into a significant threat to the nation. Classic nationalist targets such as immigration are 
not useful, as each of the nations has a recognised need for immigrants. Ethnic or cultural 
threats are largely unusable for the Cook Islands and Niue given the still exceptionally 
high levels of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Hawaiʻi and Fiji, at the other extreme, are 
so diverse that radical ethnic nationalism demands unrealistic goals. All four nations have 
good relations with their neighbours limiting the utility of claiming external threats. Even 
the colonial powers provided an acceptable experience rendering call-backs to 
persecution or brutality under colonialism unusable. Even for Hawaiʻi, enough time has 
passed, and demographics have shifted such that the U.S. occupation cannot be 
meaningfully used to justify extreme nationalistic action. With the lack of plausible 
threats to the nation, it is unsurprising that hot nationalism has been short-lived or non-
existent in these nations. 
 Across Europe and the Americas, many radical nationalists have used perceived 
threats from labour migrants and refugees to rally support for nationalistic policies. These 
migrants are presented as direct threats to jobs, general welfare, and lifestyle. Though the 
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actual threat is absurdly overblown by most nationalists, some component of the concern 
is clearly gaining traction within many nations. Immigration, however, presents little 
threat to the nations of this dissertation. All four nations have low unemployment and a 
serious need for more workers. Further, the migration patterns to these islands have had 
only minimal numbers of people coming from unfamiliar states around which radical 
nationalists could create fear.  
7.4.5 Lack of Anti-Nationalist or Counter-Sovereignty Movements 
There are only very minimal anti-nationalist or counter-sovereignty movements in 
the four nations. This could explain why hot nationalism has been so minimal and 
everyday nationalism so visible. Typically, hot nationalist movements will have some 
group that they oppose, allowing an us-vs-them battle that can sustain the movement. It is 
hard to establish or maintain the energy required for hot nationalism when there is no one 
meaningfully objecting to your message. Whilst it is impossible to say if the lack of 
counter-movements is a result of a lack sustained of hot nationalism or the cause of it, its 
absence seems significant.     
7.4.6 Kinship Models 
 South Pacific culture places a high value on family ties. Kinship models are often 
extremely inclusive and would include a number of people as fictive kin greatly beyond 
most Western models. It is possible that this expanded model of kinship can take on some 
of the role the imagined community takes. Within Anderson’s conception of the imagined 
community, its members are tied together by little more than a sense of commonality in 
being a part of a nation. In many nations of the South Pacific, small populations and 
expansive family ties mean that the members of the nation will have more than just the 
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bonds of the nation to connect them.  This reduced need for national bonds could be a 
part of the reduced presence of hot nationalism in the region.  
7.4.7 Ethnic Homogeneity 
 The Cook Islands and Niue have exceptionally high levels of racial and ethnic 
homogeneity. Hawaiʻi, in contrast, has one of the most ethnically diverse population in 
the world. Fiji similarly has unusually high diversity for a small island nation. Given the 
classic conception of the nation being formed on the basis of a shared cultural and ethnic 
experience, Niue and the Cook Islands are able to establish political legitimacy for their 
nation on this basis. In contrast, ethnic nationalist claims, though employed, are 
fundamentally unworkable in Hawaiʻi and Fiji.  
     The nations in this dissertation represent both extremes of ethnic diversity. 
Niue and the Cook Islands have such limited ethnic diversity that a focus on it by 
nationalists would be pointless, as shared cultural values can be assumed without a 
connection to the nation. A politician or activist trying to make promoting a Niuean or 
Cook Islander ethnic identity a serious part of their campaign would likely get a poor 
response because this identity can already be assumed.  Fiji and Hawaiʻi are at the other 
end of the spectrum with very high levels of ethnic diversity. Ethnonationalist initiatives 
are naturally poorly received, given the limited audience that can be included. Even the 
few attempts at ethno-nationalistic campaigns typically are forced to obfuscate 
themselves by framing it as a non-ethnic issue and appealing to other principles, such as 
native rights and (often misleading) notions of inclusiveness.  
 There does not seem to be a specific ratio of ethnic homogeneity at either end of 
the spectrum that triggers these effects. Ethnically homogeneous countries can still see 
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ethnonationalism emerge, particularly if there is a perceived threat in shifting 
demographics. Likewise, ethnically diverse countries can still turn to exclusionary 
ethnonationalism, even if that ethnic group is a minority. Nevertheless, as in these four 
nations, civic nationalism does seem to be the most viable nationalistic expression in the 
long-term and ethnonationalism hard to maintain.  
7.4.8 Communications Infrastructure 
 Anderson argues that the modern nation emerges through a common language and 
discourse made possible through the printing press and print capitalism. It provides a 
mechanism for establishing commonality and sharing the ideas that form the nation’s 
identity. The internet has largely replaced this function in most nations including those of 
this dissertation. Fiji and Hawaiʻi have reasonable-quality affordable high-speed internet 
across most of the islands. Niue has nationwide free wifi, and the Cook Islands has 4G 
and DSL widely available. The internet in each nation is heavily used for news and 
political debate. Interestingly, newspapers maintain higher readership in these nations 
than they do in much of the rest of the world. A healthy communications infrastructure 
does not seem to favour any particular type of nationalism with both hot and everyday 
nationalism possibly strengthened by it. It does however potentially explain the 
seemingly slow historic rise in nationalism across some of the more remote islands.  
 Communications infrastructure does not emerge as a major factor anymore in 
cross-nation comparisons. Even the poorest or most remote of nations will now have 
reasonable cell phone and radio access. Areas without television are likewise fairly 
uncommon today. Nationalistic movements are able to quickly spread in a way that 
would have previously been inaccessible. It creates an extremely low barrier to entry and 
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the possibility of very large audiences. Nationalist movements in Fiji and Hawaiʻi have 
made heavy use of the internet and are generally extremely media savvy. Whilst not all 
nationalists groups globally have utilised their full range of communication options, even 
radical nationalistic organisations are increasingly seeing their battles for acceptance 
fought on social media. 
7.4.9 Colonial Past 
 One of the most noticeable ways in which Fiji, the Cook Islands, and Niue differ 
from many other small post-colonial states is the way in which nationalists view their 
colonial experience. Though colonialism is not loved anywhere, many people in these 
three states (and some of the others in the region) have adopted a nostalgic fondness for 
the colonial period. There even exists a popular narrative within Fiji, that it only became 
a British colony because the Fijian people wanted it to become one and the British were 
too impressed or afraid of the Fijian warriors to try to take the islands without consent. 
For Niue and the Cook Islands, becoming a colony is often seen as a rational choice to 
protect the nation. 
 All three nations were ceded more-or-less voluntarily, and the colonial experience 
was comparatively positive. Great Britain and New Zealand interfered minimally with 
existing governance structures and typically avoided exploiting native labour or 
resources. The most common complaint of the colonial era is that of neglect and 
indifference from the colonial power. The colonial period is locally often presented 
neither positively nor negatively, but merely as part of the formation of the nation. 
 Independence also came differently for these three nations than is typically seen. 
Much of Fiji was reluctant to advocate for independence and many Native Fijians were 
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actually opposed to the idea. Niue and the Cook Islands obtained independence more 
because New Zealand did not want to have colonies than as a result of their own wishes. 
The transition for the three states was fairly seamless without the struggle that is often 
expected to accompany a path to independence.   
 Nationalists in other nations have frequently made the struggle for independence a 
core part of their national symbols. Independence days are celebrated as victories over 
their former colonial oppressors with national anthems that describe the struggle. For 
example, the Algerian national anthem has a verse that states “We are soldiers in revolt 
for truth / And we have fought for our independence. / When we spoke, nobody listened 
to us, / So we have taken the noise of gunpowder as our rhythm / And the sound of 
machine guns as our melody.” and the Argentine national anthem celebrates its 
independence with “Hear, mortals, the sacred cry: "Freedom! Freedom! Freedom!"/ Hear 
the sound of broken chains/ See noble equality enthroned”. Many nationalists will use the 
struggles of independence to unite or lend legitimacy to their movements.  
 Fiji, in contrast, had a changeover ceremony when they received independence 
that was designed intentionally with a positive stance towards Great Britain. Niue and the 
Cook Islands similarly had fairly muted celebrations with a focus on the future of the new 
nation rather than victory over a colonial power. Without an energising story of struggle, 
it is much harder for nationalists to create an identity around a shared sense of victory or 
sacrifice for the nation.  
7.4.10 Dependency on Other Nations 
 In some nations, the level of dependency has become a crucial part of their 
nationalist efforts. For many Latin American nationalist movements, the need for the 
372 
 
nation to free itself from its colonial legacy of dependency and oppression were familiar 
rallying cries for nationalists. Nationalism served to galvanise anti-colonial struggles 
where it would be hard to otherwise unite people against the economic interests of post-
colonial dependency. It provides a justification for actions that may not otherwise gain 
support.  
 Within the context of everyday nationalism, reducing dependency on imported 
goods can also strengthen the nation. Seeing goods made within the nation, particularly 
when clearly branded as such, reminds people every time they see it that they are a part of 
that nation. When store shelves are filled with imported products and services are 
provided by foreign firms, it becomes hard to gain a sense of nationhood in daily life.  
 Many of the nations of Oceania remain highly dependent for goods, services and 
general logistics on other larger states. This dependency exceeds that of most other 
regions. Indeed, several island nations of Oceania are so highly dependent on larger 
nations that they would be nearly unable to function without them. Fiji and Hawaiʻi, with 
significant decreases in the standard of living, could conceivably become completely self-
sustaining. For both, however, it would require significant efforts to refocus industry and 
would still require noticeable sacrifice. Niue and the Cook Islands, in contrast, lack the 
resources to meaningfully maintain modern living standards without assistance from 
other states. Further, the lack of any adversarial relationship with the former colonial 
powers on which they are dependent greatly limits the popular appeal of any message 
calling for self-sufficiency.   
 For larger nations, reducing dependency is a viable goal that nationalism could 
enable. However for many small island states, particularly those in Oceania, there are 
373 
 
clear limits to these efforts. Foreign aid and imported goods are so necessary for many of 
the islands and the caveats that accompany these so insignificant that nationalists in the 
region have made minimal direct mention of reducing dependency. Where we have seen 
some efforts towards reducing dependency, is indirectly through nutrition and energy 
policy.   
7.4.11 Global Political Power 
 As nations express themselves on a global stage, their legitimacy and sense of 
nationhood are strengthened. The perceived threat of other states not taking them 
seriously or otherwise losing its global political power is often presented by nationalists 
as a serious danger to the nation. 
 There are clear differences amongst the four nations in their political power. 
Hawaiʻi commands a reasonable amount of attention on the world stage. Fiji similarly 
can get attention as the common spokesperson for the region, though their voice is still 
limited. Niue and the Cook Islands receive almost no attention globally.  
 Though useful, Hawaii’s power is, however, very much a double-edged sword. 
Whilst their position as a US state automatically affords them global attention, it also 
prevents discussions of recognising sovereignty from occurring. Further, from an 
everyday nationalism perspective, it shares the muddled position many expressions of 
Hawaiian nationhood share in the hybrid role of the State of Hawaii.  
Niue and the Cook Islands lack any meaningful global political power. Lacking 
any strategic geographic importance, usable natural resources (except tuna for the Cook 
Islands), or even a UN seat, they provide little reason for larger states to give them any 
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attention. This lack of global political power seems very much to fuel those who express 
doubt over the islands' sovereignty and nationhood.     
7.4.12 Logistics 
 In looking at other successful sovereignty movements, one of the factors 
in their success seems to be logistical. Movements that have clear pathways towards 
operating as a sovereign state seem to be the most likely actually to obtain sovereignty. 
Nationalists can be very persuasive in building a justification for sovereignty. However, 
people are much more wary of supporting specific action rather than general principles 
when there is no clear vision of what the future will look like.  
 For Hawaii, there is a lack of any sort of viable government (or plan for 
one) that supporters of sovereignty can back. There is no de facto government or 
government in exile that other nations could recognise. Unlike other efforts in places like 
Palestine or Abkhazia that have de facto governments or Tibet with a government in exile 
that could gain global recognition, Hawaii’s path to sovereignty would require 
establishing an entirely new government. Hawaiian nationalists to-date have not been 
able to agree upon any shared vision of what a sovereign Hawaiʻi should look like. 
Furthermore, none of the groups active today could possibly serve as or even provide a 
meaningful framework for a successor government. This lack of a viable pathway has 
further limited the ways in which recognition of Hawaiian nation can occur and with it 
the acceptance of Hawaiian nationalism  
 Though Fiji had some reluctance with respect to  independence, they were 
able to follow a model that had been applied a number of times within the decolonisation 
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movement. Niue and the Cook Islands had a slower path to sovereignty largely due to the 
need to establish an effectively new style of government1072.  
7.4.13 Challenges Shared with Other Small States 
 Small states across the world often encounter similar problems within their 
nationalist efforts. Their relationship with larger states frequently fluctuates between 
apathy and being bullied, with foreign pressures often moderating their nationalistic 
desires. As nations express their identity, larger states may completely ignore it, or if it 
does not fit their interests, they may directly interfere. The small states, however, remain 
forced to continue to participate in arenas that are dominated by larger states, as 
withdrawing would often be disproportionately devastating. 
 Small nations will generally be economically or logistically dependent on 
neighbouring larger nations who will typically wish to quell any potential instability 
causing nationalistic energy. Whilst the larger nations may have few concerns about the 
issues composing the nationalistic values, a desire to ensure continued market access and 
to prevent refugee or humanitarian needs is common. Though these concerns are typical 
across most nations, small nations will generally have limited ability to ignore the 
pressures of the larger nation. 
                                                 
1072  Whilst true free association had not existed previously, there were a handful of other 
states that had theoretically similar relationships. These states, however, existed primarily as 
transition stages as they worked towards full independence or puppet states of the larger state. 
The Cook Islands was the first state to both have it be considered a permanent status and have 
full independence.   
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 The apathy of larger states can, however, be quite useful to smaller states. 
Their lack of geopolitical power can make them appealing for friendship agreements 
between states and allow them to serve as testbeds for new initiatives. They are not seen 
as a threat to anyone, so there is little harm in trying out new arrangements with them 
(such as free association).    
7.4.14 Islands 
One of the most significant advantages nationalist in small island nations have is 
the physical boundedness of the islands. There is a clear and discreet border that is 
difficult to ignore. Whilst land-locked nations can and often do have borders that are 
clearly arbitrary, islands have no ambiguity. Further, this clear border, especially when 
there is some geographic distance, allows for arguments of difference from other peoples 
to be easily supported. Whilst it is not a guaranteed winning argument (islands such as 
Hispaniola and Ireland are still split), it does seem to be persuasive.  
7.5 Areas of Future Study 
This dissertation aimed to provide a broad overview of nationalism in four small 
island nations. There are a number of trends I observed that had to be reserved for future 
research. Most interesting amongst these are the effects of diaspora from these four 
nations upon the expressions of everyday nationalism. Diaspora can create an extremely 
powerful longing for the nation that was left behind. Within the geographic bounds of the 
nation, everyday nationalism is typically an ignored force that occurs seemingly 
naturally. For those in diaspora, though, there is more of a need to consciously reproduce 
the nation. Elements of material culture have to be specially imported, and cultural 
celebrations require coordination. Despite the extra effort required many of the 
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communities in diaspora will actually devote more energy towards strengthening the 
effects of everyday nationalism than will those still living within the nation’s borders. 
There are even hot nationalist movements emerging within the diasporic communities, 
sometimes for safety reasons (for those in exile, where the home state would be unsafe 
for the movement), but also increasingly because they feel a stronger connection to that 
nation than the one within which they reside.     
 All four nations have extremely large populations in diaspora. The diasporic 
population of Cook Islanders and Niueans abroad is several times that of those living in 
the islands. A third of Indo-Fijians live outside of Fiji, as do large numbers of other 
Fijians. Hawaiʻi similarly has large numbers living outside its borders1073.    
 Though we are starting to see numerous effects of the diaspora on nationalism 
with food and music being amongst the most noticeable, there has to-date been little 
academic work within the diasporic communities of these four nations. Music (and for 
Fiji, film as well) is increasingly being marketed to the large and in many cases more 
affluent, communities in diaspora. Similarly, food provides a very visible way in which 
communities in diaspora can strengthen their identity. It is no longer just restaurateurs 
opening restaurants which serve an adapted menu targeted towards the people of their 
new country. Increasingly, the target customer is those wanting a taste of home. Across 
the United States, there has been a recent trend of new Hawaiian restaurants serving 
                                                 
1073 Because of the lack of border crossing and fuzziness on who should be included, it is hard to 
determine how many people from Hawaiʻi are living outside of Hawaiʻi. Nearly half of Native Hawaiians 
live outside of the islands, as do large numbers of people born in Hawaiʻi who belong to other ethnic 
groups 
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people from Hawaiʻi which typifies this. Though Hawaiian restaurants have been a part 
of the mainland US landscape since the 1930s, namely as tiki bars, most had a menu that 
would be barely recognisable to someone from Hawaiʻi and was developed by people 
from outside Hawaiʻi to sell a romanticised version of the islands. In contrast, many of 
the recently opened restaurants are opened by people from Hawaiʻi, have menus that are 
indistinguishable from those in the islands and lack any of the inauthentic tiki decorations 
that have long marked Hawaiian restaurants outside of Hawaiʻi. These diasporic 
communities, though briefly explored throughout this dissertation, represent a meaningful 
area in the ever-changing ways in which small island nationalism can be expressed.  
7.6 Impact 
 In looking at these four nations, it is clear that nationalism is still present. 
Though they are small states with unusual statuses, existing theories of nationalism 
remain applicable. Further, whilst the small size and strong kinship ties would suggest 
that there is less of a need for the bonds of the nation, the comradery and feeling of 
connectedness described by the “imagined community” are as present within these small 
nations as anywhere else. Despite the applicability of these theories, there are 
nevertheless a number of differences in how these small nations express their nationhood. 
Hot nationalism is significantly more muted than would be otherwise be expected, but 
everyday nationalism is as everpresent as it is in larger nations. Similarly, the effects of 
other nations on the ability of small nations to express their nationhood is greatly 
magnified. By exploring nationalism far outside the areas it is typically tested, we can 
expand our knowledge of nationalism in general, as we are able to probe the universality 
of these concepts.   
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